I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal. I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability... To: ianatransition@icann.org Hi, Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain one of its attributes. Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility. Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up. A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function. There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem. Just a thought. avri On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote: I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-) I would say it is _possible_. The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have. Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered. --MM -----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that: ... b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do Jordan - Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible? -----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me: If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that: a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a workable settlement for names e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a transition. I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear direction to try and rule out any institutional changes. I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure. Wonder how others feel about this. cheers Jordan _______________________________________________ ianatransition mailing list ianatransition@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ianatransition
There is a lot of sense in here. Its very close to what I personally feel that IANA at this stage should not evolve into a separate entity without a good deal of working that is not achievable in an open community process by September 2015 however if a clause for separability was developed and kept in the proposal and then later and somehow a consensus process or approach was to approve such, it can be considered. Lets strip it out of ICANN isn't workable and I would not support it. The proposal should show a way forward for the longterm and that should include a mechanism (however hard it may be). One fact remains, ICANN is a non-profit under US law. Putting IANA completely under it is again prone to law affects on ICANN and vice versa. That discussion has somehow disappeared to the ATRT process. For the IANA function transition in an open and inclusive manner, it does have to move out of under ICANN's complete remit, but how, remains the big question. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal.
I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability... To: ianatransition@icann.org
Hi,
Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain one of its attributes.
Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility.
Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.
A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function.
There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem.
Just a thought.
avri
On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote:
I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)
I would say it is _possible_.
The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have. Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered.
--MM
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the
numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
... b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do
Jordan -
Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a workable settlement for names e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a transition.
I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.
I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.
Wonder how others feel about this.
cheers Jordan
_______________________________________________ ianatransition mailing list ianatransition@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ianatransition
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Please keep in mind that ccTLDs are direct consumers of IANA services. Not all ccTLDs participate in the ccNSO, so we would probably look to regional cc organizations and other mechanisms, along with the ccNSO, to populate a User Council J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz On 10/23/14, 11:25 AM, "Fouad Bajwa" <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> wrote:
<html> There is a lot of sense in here.
Its very close to what I personally feel that IANA at this stage should not evolve into a separate entity without a good deal of working that is not achievable in an open community process by September 2015 however if a clause for separability was developed and kept in the proposal and then later and somehow a consensus process or approach was to approve such, it can be considered.
Lets strip it out of ICANN isn't workable and I would not support it. The proposal should show a way forward for the longterm and that should include a mechanism (however hard it may be). One fact remains, ICANN is a non-profit under US law. Putting IANA completely under it is again prone to law affects on ICANN and vice versa. That discussion has somehow disappeared to the ATRT process.
For the IANA function transition in an open and inclusive manner, it does have to move out of under ICANN's complete remit, but how, remains the big question.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal.
I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here:
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docu ment_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing& d=AAICAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WD DkMr4k&m=mAM3fpCe8ntqOvhhLrNVhfECnWeKnvVY0waB0wsWNBM&s=gryS0O3RHxT2DFBtbF 3pj6kqXcgOMPGZI3YHiIZONQM&e=
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability... To: ianatransition@icann.org
Hi,
Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain one of its attributes.
Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility.
Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.
A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function.
There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem.
Just a thought.
avri
On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote:
I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)
I would say it is _possible_.
The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have. Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered.
--MM
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the
numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
... b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do
Jordan -
Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a workable settlement for names e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a transition.
I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.
I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.
Wonder how others feel about this.
cheers Jordan
_______________________________________________ ianatransition mailing list ianatransition@icann.org
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_ianatransition&d=AAICAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X _GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=mAM3fpCe8ntqOvhhLrNVhfECnWeKnvVY0waB0ws WNBM&s=-ge3EpigdzQz2oyM0oCQRck1D0kWadDR66UQiGsLMZ8&e=
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.bl ogspot.com_&d=AAICAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDm rxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=mAM3fpCe8ntqOvhhLrNVhfECnWeKnvVY0waB0wsWNBM&s=COUB1Cw3 2UBGt1M1fKyEFHvNpYfxl2YIfS1VPPaoeo4&e= Follow my Tweets: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa &d=AAICAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WD DkMr4k&m=mAM3fpCe8ntqOvhhLrNVhfECnWeKnvVY0waB0wsWNBM&s=KxdplrL3PyD20Y0K-is 7ywdUkgumbvdLll0WSmxGn_Y&e= _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_ listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAICAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6 X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=mAM3fpCe8ntqOvhhLrNVhfECnWeKnvVY0waB0ws WNBM&s=hCJS8R-BnYCY-3kP5ja_wUmQRYEOgQ2FiEhP2WUeKdY&e=
Hi, I think, formation of ICG, independent of ICANN with its present modus operand enough and a good model, for transfering from NTIA. But, if that's to be adopted, should there bylaw? Regards On Oct 23, 2014 4:26 PM, "Fouad Bajwa" <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> wrote:
There is a lot of sense in here.
Its very close to what I personally feel that IANA at this stage should not evolve into a separate entity without a good deal of working that is not achievable in an open community process by September 2015 however if a clause for separability was developed and kept in the proposal and then later and somehow a consensus process or approach was to approve such, it can be considered.
Lets strip it out of ICANN isn't workable and I would not support it. The proposal should show a way forward for the longterm and that should include a mechanism (however hard it may be). One fact remains, ICANN is a non-profit under US law. Putting IANA completely under it is again prone to law affects on ICANN and vice versa. That discussion has somehow disappeared to the ATRT process.
For the IANA function transition in an open and inclusive manner, it does have to move out of under ICANN's complete remit, but how, remains the big question.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal.
I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability... To: ianatransition@icann.org
Hi,
Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave
if
necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain one of its attributes.
Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility.
Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up.
A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function.
There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem.
Just a thought.
avri
On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote:
I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-)
I would say it is _possible_.
The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have. Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered.
--MM
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the
numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
... b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do
Jordan -
Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible?
-----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me:
If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that:
a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a workable settlement for names e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a transition.
I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear direction to try and rule out any institutional changes.
I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure.
Wonder how others feel about this.
cheers Jordan
_______________________________________________ ianatransition mailing list ianatransition@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ianatransition
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
participants (4)
-
Burr, Becky -
Fouad Bajwa -
Guru Acharya -
Olawale Bakare