Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Chuck, I can't answer on behalf of Olivier, but will on my own behalf. WGs explicitly do not limit participation (and the equivalent of voting - that is, being an equal player in reaching consensus). Deliberations of the GNSO do NOT have that. I fully understand that the GNSO is not the GNSO Council, just as At-Large is not the ALAC, but in both cases, it is the GNSO Council and the ALAC that makes statements and recommendations on behalf of the larger body. In answer to a question you posed to Elise - "Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries?", I will note that perhaps the Registries will always have the same concerns as others. Even if that were the case, as an open transparent organization, we should not presume that there will ALWAYS be full synergy between registries and the rest of the community. The optics of it are all wrong. I instead ask the opposite question. If you believe that there is a large degree of synergy between registries and the rest of the community, why NOT allow us to all participate. What are we protecting against here? Alan At 05/06/2015 10:49 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Olivier,
I want to respond to just the following paragraph of your message:
" As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it."
In my opinion you are doing what many often do and that is equating the GNSO to the GNSO Council. In fact you even mention the Council. It is critical to recognize the following about the GNSO and the GNSO Council: 1. The majority of what goes on in the GNSO does not happen on the Council. 2. The Council is simply the management body of the GNSO; it is not where the work happens. 3. The work of the GNSO happens in working groups that are completely open to everyone and are not governed by the rules that determine the makeup of the Council. 4. In the end of a process, the Council's role is simply to confirm that WG guidelines were followed including that best efforts were made to involve all impacted parties and that everyone was given the opportunity to participate.
To claim that " the GNSO is highly imbalanced " is essentially to say that the design of WGs is imbalanced. If you believe that, I ask you to explain to me how that is the case so it can be corrected.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:59 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Hello all,
I was unfortunately unable to attend the last CWG call due to commitments at EuroDIG but have reviewed the transcript of the call and have a question regarding the escalation. As Alan voiced it clearly on the call, the ALAC has concerns about the multistakeholder component of the escalation, has doubts that the GNSO and ccNSO are balanced multistakeholder groups - and has concerns that with the IANA Function's main goals being to operate a stable Internet, the very Advisory Group that is concerned with Stability of the Domain Name System is not explicitly included in the escalation process.
In order to clear any misunderstanding and in order to avoid us all driving in the wrong direction and potentially committing a faux-pas that could cast doubt over the multistakeholder element of the escalation process, could someone please clearly summarise the escalation, from the point a problem takes place, through its escalation from the CSC all the way to when it reaches the SCWG, and please identify the make-up of each of the groups along the way? In order to evaluate the multistakeholder element, we need to look at the overall picture, not each of the small groups or committees in isolation.
As far as the GNSO engaging in more than policy work, we may have stumbled on an anomaly. Agreed, the GNSO has and indeed should comment on matters that affect it directly, such as the Budget. That said reading Article X of the ICANN Bylaws, it is very clear indeed that the GNSO is a policy-development body. Its voting thresholds are quite carefully fleshed out and all relate to a PDP except in the creationg of an Issues Report. It is therefore clear that if the GNSO was to assume a responsibility in the IANA escalation process, this would require Bylaw Changes.
As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it.
I also do not agree with the notion that a multistakeholder consultation (an open public comment period), but the critical path on the escalation not including a full multistakeholder Committee, is actually a multistakeholder process. This is akin to saying the ITU - which makes all its decisions in a multilateral fashion, is multistakeholder because it includes an open comment period where stakeholders other than Governments are allowed to speak. Whenever a complete stakeholder category can be completely ignored at will by other stakeholders, this is not a multistakeholder model. Balance means having the right to vote, not just comment.
I look forward to your responses.
Kindest regards,
Olivier _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Alan, It's very simple: practicality, functionality and efficiency. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:29 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Chuck, I can't answer on behalf of Olivier, but will on my own behalf. WGs explicitly do not limit participation (and the equivalent of voting - that is, being an equal player in reaching consensus). Deliberations of the GNSO do NOT have that. I fully understand that the GNSO is not the GNSO Council, just as At-Large is not the ALAC, but in both cases, it is the GNSO Council and the ALAC that makes statements and recommendations on behalf of the larger body. In answer to a question you posed to Elise - "Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries?", I will note that perhaps the Registries will always have the same concerns as others. Even if that were the case, as an open transparent organization, we should not presume that there will ALWAYS be full synergy between registries and the rest of the community. The optics of it are all wrong. I instead ask the opposite question. If you believe that there is a large degree of synergy between registries and the rest of the community, why NOT allow us to all participate. What are we protecting against here? Alan At 05/06/2015 10:49 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Olivier,
I want to respond to just the following paragraph of your message:
" As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it."
In my opinion you are doing what many often do and that is equating the GNSO to the GNSO Council. In fact you even mention the Council. It is critical to recognize the following about the GNSO and the GNSO Council: 1. The majority of what goes on in the GNSO does not happen on the Council. 2. The Council is simply the management body of the GNSO; it is not where the work happens. 3. The work of the GNSO happens in working groups that are completely open to everyone and are not governed by the rules that determine the makeup of the Council. 4. In the end of a process, the Council's role is simply to confirm that WG guidelines were followed including that best efforts were made to involve all impacted parties and that everyone was given the opportunity to participate.
To claim that " the GNSO is highly imbalanced " is essentially to say that the design of WGs is imbalanced. If you believe that, I ask you to explain to me how that is the case so it can be corrected.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:59 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Hello all,
I was unfortunately unable to attend the last CWG call due to commitments at EuroDIG but have reviewed the transcript of the call and have a question regarding the escalation. As Alan voiced it clearly on the call, the ALAC has concerns about the multistakeholder component of the escalation, has doubts that the GNSO and ccNSO are balanced multistakeholder groups - and has concerns that with the IANA Function's main goals being to operate a stable Internet, the very Advisory Group that is concerned with Stability of the Domain Name System is not explicitly included in the escalation process.
In order to clear any misunderstanding and in order to avoid us all driving in the wrong direction and potentially committing a faux-pas that could cast doubt over the multistakeholder element of the escalation process, could someone please clearly summarise the escalation, from the point a problem takes place, through its escalation from the CSC all the way to when it reaches the SCWG, and please identify the make-up of each of the groups along the way? In order to evaluate the multistakeholder element, we need to look at the overall picture, not each of the small groups or committees in isolation.
As far as the GNSO engaging in more than policy work, we may have stumbled on an anomaly. Agreed, the GNSO has and indeed should comment on matters that affect it directly, such as the Budget. That said reading Article X of the ICANN Bylaws, it is very clear indeed that the GNSO is a policy-development body. Its voting thresholds are quite carefully fleshed out and all relate to a PDP except in the creationg of an Issues Report. It is therefore clear that if the GNSO was to assume a responsibility in the IANA escalation process, this would require Bylaw Changes.
As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it.
I also do not agree with the notion that a multistakeholder consultation (an open public comment period), but the critical path on the escalation not including a full multistakeholder Committee, is actually a multistakeholder process. This is akin to saying the ITU - which makes all its decisions in a multilateral fashion, is multistakeholder because it includes an open comment period where stakeholders other than Governments are allowed to speak. Whenever a complete stakeholder category can be completely ignored at will by other stakeholders, this is not a multistakeholder model. Balance means having the right to vote, not just comment.
I look forward to your responses.
Kindest regards,
Olivier _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Let's not forget, this is just a check on the CSC initiating a SIFR. The SIFR itself brings in other stakeholders outside of the GNSO and ccNSO (as well it should). Do we really need to convene a SIFR-type panel to decide to convene a SIFR panel? Viewed another way, if the CSC, the GNSO and the ccNSO all believe a SIFR needs to be convened, should ALAC and the GAC be able to stop it? Convening a Working Group in all of its glory to determine whether the CSC got it right would be overkill. I do agree with Chuck that one of the expedited processes recommended by the P&IWG could fit this purpose. (Notably, these processes are designed to involve and devolve matters to the community and to avoid fact-finding and decisional exercises solely within the Council.) I think we are making way too much of this "sanity check" on the CSC. On another note, I'd be happy to critique the GNSO and the GNSO Council, but I disagree with some of what's been said so far. First, treating the Registries, Registrars, BC, IPC and ISPCP as some sort of "private sector" monolith really makes no sense in the context of the GNSO or the GNSO Council. The perspectives of these groups are fundamentally different from each other. There may be some congruence between the "contracted parties" and some between the constituencies of the CSG (or any given two of them), but it's reductive nose-counting to count all these groups as part of a common node. Second, I would disagree with the characterization that the "GNSO Council ... makes statements and recommendations on behalf of" the GNSO. The GNSO Council does not typically originate statements and recommendations from within the Council, since it is primarily a process-management and ratification body. The GNSO Council rarely makes statements as such, and in my view it generally should not, unless it is a consensus view of the entire GNSO community. The individual SGs and Constituencies tend to be the voices making statements, filing public comments and such. As for recommendations, the GNSO Council only makes very narrow types of recommendations -- policy recommendations to the Board to adopt policies developed through a PDP Working Group. This is of course part of its core mandate, but I wouldn't say these are done "on behalf of the community" in the sense that the GNSO Council has some sort of broad and flexible mandate to act as it sees fit on behalf of the community. That is not to say I support the current configuration of the GNSO Council, but if the entire GNSO were to act using that same configuration, I doubt the result would be any different. Greg On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Alan,
It's very simple: practicality, functionality and efficiency.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:29 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Chuck, I can't answer on behalf of Olivier, but will on my own behalf.
WGs explicitly do not limit participation (and the equivalent of voting - that is, being an equal player in reaching consensus). Deliberations of the GNSO do NOT have that.
I fully understand that the GNSO is not the GNSO Council, just as At-Large is not the ALAC, but in both cases, it is the GNSO Council and the ALAC that makes statements and recommendations on behalf of the larger body.
In answer to a question you posed to Elise - "Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries?", I will note that perhaps the Registries will always have the same concerns as others. Even if that were the case, as an open transparent organization, we should not presume that there will ALWAYS be full synergy between registries and the rest of the community. The optics of it are all wrong. I instead ask the opposite question. If you believe that there is a large degree of synergy between registries and the rest of the community, why NOT allow us to all participate. What are we protecting against here?
Alan
At 05/06/2015 10:49 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Olivier,
I want to respond to just the following paragraph of your message:
" As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it."
In my opinion you are doing what many often do and that is equating the GNSO to the GNSO Council. In fact you even mention the Council. It is critical to recognize the following about the GNSO and the GNSO Council: 1. The majority of what goes on in the GNSO does not happen on the Council. 2. The Council is simply the management body of the GNSO; it is not where the work happens. 3. The work of the GNSO happens in working groups that are completely open to everyone and are not governed by the rules that determine the makeup of the Council. 4. In the end of a process, the Council's role is simply to confirm that WG guidelines were followed including that best efforts were made to involve all impacted parties and that everyone was given the opportunity to participate.
To claim that " the GNSO is highly imbalanced " is essentially to say that the design of WGs is imbalanced. If you believe that, I ask you to explain to me how that is the case so it can be corrected.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:59 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Hello all,
I was unfortunately unable to attend the last CWG call due to commitments at EuroDIG but have reviewed the transcript of the call and have a question regarding the escalation. As Alan voiced it clearly on the call, the ALAC has concerns about the multistakeholder component of the escalation, has doubts that the GNSO and ccNSO are balanced multistakeholder groups - and has concerns that with the IANA Function's main goals being to operate a stable Internet, the very Advisory Group that is concerned with Stability of the Domain Name System is not explicitly included in the escalation process.
In order to clear any misunderstanding and in order to avoid us all driving in the wrong direction and potentially committing a faux-pas that could cast doubt over the multistakeholder element of the escalation process, could someone please clearly summarise the escalation, from the point a problem takes place, through its escalation from the CSC all the way to when it reaches the SCWG, and please identify the make-up of each of the groups along the way? In order to evaluate the multistakeholder element, we need to look at the overall picture, not each of the small groups or committees in isolation.
As far as the GNSO engaging in more than policy work, we may have stumbled on an anomaly. Agreed, the GNSO has and indeed should comment on matters that affect it directly, such as the Budget. That said reading Article X of the ICANN Bylaws, it is very clear indeed that the GNSO is a policy-development body. Its voting thresholds are quite carefully fleshed out and all relate to a PDP except in the creationg of an Issues Report. It is therefore clear that if the GNSO was to assume a responsibility in the IANA escalation process, this would require Bylaw Changes.
As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it.
I also do not agree with the notion that a multistakeholder consultation (an open public comment period), but the critical path on the escalation not including a full multistakeholder Committee, is actually a multistakeholder process. This is akin to saying the ITU - which makes all its decisions in a multilateral fashion, is multistakeholder because it includes an open comment period where stakeholders other than Governments are allowed to speak. Whenever a complete stakeholder category can be completely ignored at will by other stakeholders, this is not a multistakeholder model. Balance means having the right to vote, not just comment.
I look forward to your responses.
Kindest regards,
Olivier _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Chuck, Allan - thanks for your comments :) Chuck, to your questions: 1. You say:" timely and proper PTI implementation of the practical outcome of policy set by ICANN community is of high interest and importance to many others that the ccTLDs and gTLD's." Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries? As stated, -this might be theoretical, and I will guess that in most scenarios registries and the rest of the community would agree on what needs to be escalated, but Allan's comment is to the point. In the big picture the whole community have a high interest in the PTI daily deliverables, and perspective and priorities might be different in different communities and also between registries. Some might say that this diversity should be reflected also in the ability to escalate to a special IFR, after all - different perspective and roles in the Multistakeholder community is the reason for broad community representation in the periodic IFR. 2. As proposed now the CSC can escalate performance problems to the ccNSO & GNSO. Are you thinking that there should be some other way to escalate problems to the ccNSO and GNSO besides through the CSC? No - I wasn't indicating or thinking of any other escalation process between CSC and ccNSO and GNSO. My comment was about other communities maybe questioning that there is no other way to request a special IFR other than through ccNSO/ GNSO process. -----Opprinnelig melding----- Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Gomes, Chuck Sendt: 5. juni 2015 20:38 Til: Alan Greenberg; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Alan, It's very simple: practicality, functionality and efficiency. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:29 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Chuck, I can't answer on behalf of Olivier, but will on my own behalf. WGs explicitly do not limit participation (and the equivalent of voting - that is, being an equal player in reaching consensus). Deliberations of the GNSO do NOT have that. I fully understand that the GNSO is not the GNSO Council, just as At-Large is not the ALAC, but in both cases, it is the GNSO Council and the ALAC that makes statements and recommendations on behalf of the larger body. In answer to a question you posed to Elise - "Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries?", I will note that perhaps the Registries will always have the same concerns as others. Even if that were the case, as an open transparent organization, we should not presume that there will ALWAYS be full synergy between registries and the rest of the community. The optics of it are all wrong. I instead ask the opposite question. If you believe that there is a large degree of synergy between registries and the rest of the community, why NOT allow us to all participate. What are we protecting against here? Alan At 05/06/2015 10:49 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Olivier,
I want to respond to just the following paragraph of your message:
" As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it."
In my opinion you are doing what many often do and that is equating the GNSO to the GNSO Council. In fact you even mention the Council. It is critical to recognize the following about the GNSO and the GNSO Council: 1. The majority of what goes on in the GNSO does not happen on the Council. 2. The Council is simply the management body of the GNSO; it is not where the work happens. 3. The work of the GNSO happens in working groups that are completely open to everyone and are not governed by the rules that determine the makeup of the Council. 4. In the end of a process, the Council's role is simply to confirm that WG guidelines were followed including that best efforts were made to involve all impacted parties and that everyone was given the opportunity to participate.
To claim that " the GNSO is highly imbalanced " is essentially to say that the design of WGs is imbalanced. If you believe that, I ask you to explain to me how that is the case so it can be corrected.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:59 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Hello all,
I was unfortunately unable to attend the last CWG call due to commitments at EuroDIG but have reviewed the transcript of the call and have a question regarding the escalation. As Alan voiced it clearly on the call, the ALAC has concerns about the multistakeholder component of the escalation, has doubts that the GNSO and ccNSO are balanced multistakeholder groups - and has concerns that with the IANA Function's main goals being to operate a stable Internet, the very Advisory Group that is concerned with Stability of the Domain Name System is not explicitly included in the escalation process.
In order to clear any misunderstanding and in order to avoid us all driving in the wrong direction and potentially committing a faux-pas that could cast doubt over the multistakeholder element of the escalation process, could someone please clearly summarise the escalation, from the point a problem takes place, through its escalation from the CSC all the way to when it reaches the SCWG, and please identify the make-up of each of the groups along the way? In order to evaluate the multistakeholder element, we need to look at the overall picture, not each of the small groups or committees in isolation.
As far as the GNSO engaging in more than policy work, we may have stumbled on an anomaly. Agreed, the GNSO has and indeed should comment on matters that affect it directly, such as the Budget. That said reading Article X of the ICANN Bylaws, it is very clear indeed that the GNSO is a policy-development body. Its voting thresholds are quite carefully fleshed out and all relate to a PDP except in the creationg of an Issues Report. It is therefore clear that if the GNSO was to assume a responsibility in the IANA escalation process, this would require Bylaw Changes.
As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it.
I also do not agree with the notion that a multistakeholder consultation (an open public comment period), but the critical path on the escalation not including a full multistakeholder Committee, is actually a multistakeholder process. This is akin to saying the ITU - which makes all its decisions in a multilateral fashion, is multistakeholder because it includes an open comment period where stakeholders other than Governments are allowed to speak. Whenever a complete stakeholder category can be completely ignored at will by other stakeholders, this is not a multistakeholder model. Balance means having the right to vote, not just comment.
I look forward to your responses.
Kindest regards,
Olivier _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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Thanks Elise. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Lindeberg, Elise [mailto:elise.lindeberg@nkom.no] Sent: Sunday, June 07, 2015 5:35 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Alan Greenberg; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: SV: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Chuck, Allan - thanks for your comments :) Chuck, to your questions: 1. You say:" timely and proper PTI implementation of the practical outcome of policy set by ICANN community is of high interest and importance to many others that the ccTLDs and gTLD's." Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries? As stated, -this might be theoretical, and I will guess that in most scenarios registries and the rest of the community would agree on what needs to be escalated, but Allan's comment is to the point. In the big picture the whole community have a high interest in the PTI daily deliverables, and perspective and priorities might be different in different communities and also between registries. Some might say that this diversity should be reflected also in the ability to escalate to a special IFR, after all - different perspective and roles in the Multistakeholder community is the reason for broad community representation in the periodic IFR. 2. As proposed now the CSC can escalate performance problems to the ccNSO & GNSO. Are you thinking that there should be some other way to escalate problems to the ccNSO and GNSO besides through the CSC? No - I wasn't indicating or thinking of any other escalation process between CSC and ccNSO and GNSO. My comment was about other communities maybe questioning that there is no other way to request a special IFR other than through ccNSO/ GNSO process. -----Opprinnelig melding----- Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Gomes, Chuck Sendt: 5. juni 2015 20:38 Til: Alan Greenberg; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Alan, It's very simple: practicality, functionality and efficiency. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:29 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process Chuck, I can't answer on behalf of Olivier, but will on my own behalf. WGs explicitly do not limit participation (and the equivalent of voting - that is, being an equal player in reaching consensus). Deliberations of the GNSO do NOT have that. I fully understand that the GNSO is not the GNSO Council, just as At-Large is not the ALAC, but in both cases, it is the GNSO Council and the ALAC that makes statements and recommendations on behalf of the larger body. In answer to a question you posed to Elise - "Can you give an example of what kind of policy related to IANA services that would be of high interest to other community members and not also ccTLD and gTLD registries?", I will note that perhaps the Registries will always have the same concerns as others. Even if that were the case, as an open transparent organization, we should not presume that there will ALWAYS be full synergy between registries and the rest of the community. The optics of it are all wrong. I instead ask the opposite question. If you believe that there is a large degree of synergy between registries and the rest of the community, why NOT allow us to all participate. What are we protecting against here? Alan At 05/06/2015 10:49 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Olivier,
I want to respond to just the following paragraph of your message:
" As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it."
In my opinion you are doing what many often do and that is equating the GNSO to the GNSO Council. In fact you even mention the Council. It is critical to recognize the following about the GNSO and the GNSO Council: 1. The majority of what goes on in the GNSO does not happen on the Council. 2. The Council is simply the management body of the GNSO; it is not where the work happens. 3. The work of the GNSO happens in working groups that are completely open to everyone and are not governed by the rules that determine the makeup of the Council. 4. In the end of a process, the Council's role is simply to confirm that WG guidelines were followed including that best efforts were made to involve all impacted parties and that everyone was given the opportunity to participate.
To claim that " the GNSO is highly imbalanced " is essentially to say that the design of WGs is imbalanced. If you believe that, I ask you to explain to me how that is the case so it can be corrected.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Friday, June 05, 2015 1:59 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Escalation Process
Hello all,
I was unfortunately unable to attend the last CWG call due to commitments at EuroDIG but have reviewed the transcript of the call and have a question regarding the escalation. As Alan voiced it clearly on the call, the ALAC has concerns about the multistakeholder component of the escalation, has doubts that the GNSO and ccNSO are balanced multistakeholder groups - and has concerns that with the IANA Function's main goals being to operate a stable Internet, the very Advisory Group that is concerned with Stability of the Domain Name System is not explicitly included in the escalation process.
In order to clear any misunderstanding and in order to avoid us all driving in the wrong direction and potentially committing a faux-pas that could cast doubt over the multistakeholder element of the escalation process, could someone please clearly summarise the escalation, from the point a problem takes place, through its escalation from the CSC all the way to when it reaches the SCWG, and please identify the make-up of each of the groups along the way? In order to evaluate the multistakeholder element, we need to look at the overall picture, not each of the small groups or committees in isolation.
As far as the GNSO engaging in more than policy work, we may have stumbled on an anomaly. Agreed, the GNSO has and indeed should comment on matters that affect it directly, such as the Budget. That said reading Article X of the ICANN Bylaws, it is very clear indeed that the GNSO is a policy-development body. Its voting thresholds are quite carefully fleshed out and all relate to a PDP except in the creationg of an Issues Report. It is therefore clear that if the GNSO was to assume a responsibility in the IANA escalation process, this would require Bylaw Changes.
As far as the GNSO being multistakeholder, it needs to be recognised that the multistakeholder aspect of the GNSO is highly imbalanced, with two thirds of its Council being composed of Private Sector and with no specific Technical Community nor Governments being represented. Furthermore, there are absolutely no checks and balances for Geographical balance and the GNSO Council is therefore highly biased in its composition towards North America and Western Europe. So if we need a multistakeholder committee in the critical path of the escalation, this is not it.
I also do not agree with the notion that a multistakeholder consultation (an open public comment period), but the critical path on the escalation not including a full multistakeholder Committee, is actually a multistakeholder process. This is akin to saying the ITU - which makes all its decisions in a multilateral fashion, is multistakeholder because it includes an open comment period where stakeholders other than Governments are allowed to speak. Whenever a complete stakeholder category can be completely ignored at will by other stakeholders, this is not a multistakeholder model. Balance means having the right to vote, not just comment.
I look forward to your responses.
Kindest regards,
Olivier _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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participants (4)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
Lindeberg, Elise