GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that "we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator." I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c's and g's. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
Hi Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591 (…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community. (…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.” gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected. In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process. Yours, Erick pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ).
El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> escribió:
Martin,
I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s.
Chuck
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Jonathan,
In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further.
However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA.
I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources.
However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.
But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.)
The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point.
That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly.
I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.)
Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise.
I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel.
Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship>
Erick, I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about. If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD. What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing. Chuck From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Hi Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591 (…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community. (…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.” gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected. In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process. Yours, Erick pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ). El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió: Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
As a person who once worked in ccTLD while now in gTLD, I think what Erick and Martin were trying to argue is that the CWG has significantly neglected individual cc registry's comments. As they have described correctly, cc registries not only disagree with gs, but also disagree with each other. So they couldn't act collectively like the g registries have done (mostly via RySG). In practice, I guess not every single cc registry's comments were taken, some will complain they haven't been in engagement EQUALLY as the g registries. Erick and Mrtin, please correct me if my understanding is wrong. Jian From: Gomes, Chuck Date: 2015-06-02 05:06 To: Erick Iriarte CC: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Erick, I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about. If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD. What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing. Chuck From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Hi Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591 (…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community. (…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.” gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected. In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process. Yours, Erick pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ). El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> escribió: Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Jian, I wish I could say that I understand better but I cannot. The reality of a consensus process for g’s and c’s and everyone else is that there will be times when participants disagree with one another and cannot reach full consensus. In those cases it is impossible to give everyone exactly what they want so efforts are made to develop a compromise that most everyone can support. If one entity doesn’t get what they wanted, it doesn’t mean that they were not treated equally. In fact, I am not sure what treated equally means. Everyone should be given the same opportunity to participate in consensus building efforts as much is practically feasible but that does not mean that everyone can get everything they want. It may be true that c’s disagree with one another more than g’s; I don’t know whether that is true or not but even if it is, what do you suggest as the solution to that? That is the key question in my opinion. It seems to me that there may be too much focus on voting rights and not enough focus on working together to develop positions that most if not all can support. An effective consensus building approach emphasizes the latter and avoids the former as much as possible. I suggest we spend our time trying to find ways to bridge our differences. Chuck From: jczhang@knet.cn [mailto:jczhang@knet.cn] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 3:41 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; Erick Iriarte Cc: cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info Subject: Re: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model As a person who once worked in ccTLD while now in gTLD, I think what Erick and Martin were trying to argue is that the CWG has significantly neglected individual cc registry's comments. As they have described correctly, cc registries not only disagree with gs, but also disagree with each other. So they couldn't act collectively like the g registries have done (mostly via RySG). In practice, I guess not every single cc registry's comments were taken, some will complain they haven't been in engagement EQUALLY as the g registries. Erick and Mrtin, please correct me if my understanding is wrong. Jian ________________________________ From: Gomes, Chuck<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com> Date: 2015-06-02 05:06 To: Erick Iriarte<mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com> CC: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Erick, I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about. If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD. What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing. Chuck From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Hi Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591 (…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community. (…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.” gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected. In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process. Yours, Erick pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ). El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió: Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi Jian / Chuck Consensus based in the silence is not a consensus. Is clear that a technical problem (operation IANA) not only keep in the “technical side”, for a lot of ccTLDs (please review comments almost LACTLD) is more a political / legal / geopolitical problem. And Jian is correct, for gTLDs is more easy finally all are based in a specific contract in their relation with ICANN/IANA, the ccTLDs don’t are so lucky? to have that clear legal relation, and what means in their local relation with civil society, government, private sector, academy, technical community. We must be clear that will not be a unique solution, we must negotiate the solution to try to make the best option possible for all. But was a clear mistake put gTLDs and ccTLDs in the same box, both are TLD, but now (at this moment and not in technical field) are completely different problematics in special in relation with IANA. For ccTLDs delegation/redelegation issue is clear a “red line”, for gTLDs not. For ccTLDs the relation with their governments are importante and relevant in all the process, for gTLDs that relation is not priority because have a contract with specific jurisdiction to solve problems. For ccTLDs the relation with IANA is based in RFC 1591 in a historic relation, for gTLDs are based in contracts. And finally, one of the topics behind Internet Governance discussions are related with ITU 102 and the relation between governments and ccTLDs. Please, a solution that helps gTLDs (because are more domain names, have clear contracts, and another points) are important and relevant, but if that solution will be affect ccTLDs that are less, small, from countries around the world, will be affected the majority of population around the world in relation with their local communities. I respect all the point of view, but me must separate gTLDs from ccTLDs now, or we will affect all the system. Erick
El 3/6/2015, a las 7:44, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> escribió:
Jian,
I wish I could say that I understand better but I cannot. The reality of a consensus process for g’s and c’s and everyone else is that there will be times when participants disagree with one another and cannot reach full consensus. In those cases it is impossible to give everyone exactly what they want so efforts are made to develop a compromise that most everyone can support. If one entity doesn’t get what they wanted, it doesn’t mean that they were not treated equally. In fact, I am not sure what treated equally means. Everyone should be given the same opportunity to participate in consensus building efforts as much is practically feasible but that does not mean that everyone can get everything they want.
It may be true that c’s disagree with one another more than g’s; I don’t know whether that is true or not but even if it is, what do you suggest as the solution to that? That is the key question in my opinion. It seems to me that there may be too much focus on voting rights and not enough focus on working together to develop positions that most if not all can support. An effective consensus building approach emphasizes the latter and avoids the former as much as possible.
I suggest we spend our time trying to find ways to bridge our differences.
Chuck
From: jczhang@knet.cn <mailto:jczhang@knet.cn> [mailto:jczhang@knet.cn <mailto:jczhang@knet.cn>] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 3:41 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; Erick Iriarte Cc: cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
As a person who once worked in ccTLD while now in gTLD, I think what Erick and Martin were trying to argue is that the CWG has significantly neglected individual cc registry's comments. As they have described correctly, cc registries not only disagree with gs, but also disagree with each other. So they couldn't act collectively like the g registries have done (mostly via RySG). In practice, I guess not every single cc registry's comments were taken, some will complain they haven't been in engagement EQUALLY as the g registries.
Erick and Mrtin, please correct me if my understanding is wrong.
Jian
From: Gomes, Chuck <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com> Date: 2015-06-02 05:06 To: Erick Iriarte <mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com> CC: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Erick,
I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about.
If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD.
What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing.
Chuck
From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com <mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com>] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Hi
Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591
(…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community.
(…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.”
gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected.
In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.
Yours,
Erick
pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ).
El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió:
Martin,
I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s.
Chuck
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Jonathan,
In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further.
However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA.
I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources.
However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.
But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.)
The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point.
That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly.
I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.)
Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise.
I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel.
Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship>
Erick, What do you mean when you suggest separating ccTLDs and gTLDs? BTW – I don’t think you have any idea what an advantage it is not to have a contract with ICANN. Chuck From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 12:32 PM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: jczhang@knet.cn; cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Hi Jian / Chuck Consensus based in the silence is not a consensus. Is clear that a technical problem (operation IANA) not only keep in the “technical side”, for a lot of ccTLDs (please review comments almost LACTLD) is more a political / legal / geopolitical problem. And Jian is correct, for gTLDs is more easy finally all are based in a specific contract in their relation with ICANN/IANA, the ccTLDs don’t are so lucky? to have that clear legal relation, and what means in their local relation with civil society, government, private sector, academy, technical community. We must be clear that will not be a unique solution, we must negotiate the solution to try to make the best option possible for all. But was a clear mistake put gTLDs and ccTLDs in the same box, both are TLD, but now (at this moment and not in technical field) are completely different problematics in special in relation with IANA. For ccTLDs delegation/redelegation issue is clear a “red line”, for gTLDs not. For ccTLDs the relation with their governments are importante and relevant in all the process, for gTLDs that relation is not priority because have a contract with specific jurisdiction to solve problems. For ccTLDs the relation with IANA is based in RFC 1591 in a historic relation, for gTLDs are based in contracts. And finally, one of the topics behind Internet Governance discussions are related with ITU 102 and the relation between governments and ccTLDs. Please, a solution that helps gTLDs (because are more domain names, have clear contracts, and another points) are important and relevant, but if that solution will be affect ccTLDs that are less, small, from countries around the world, will be affected the majority of population around the world in relation with their local communities. I respect all the point of view, but me must separate gTLDs from ccTLDs now, or we will affect all the system. Erick El 3/6/2015, a las 7:44, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió: Jian, I wish I could say that I understand better but I cannot. The reality of a consensus process for g’s and c’s and everyone else is that there will be times when participants disagree with one another and cannot reach full consensus. In those cases it is impossible to give everyone exactly what they want so efforts are made to develop a compromise that most everyone can support. If one entity doesn’t get what they wanted, it doesn’t mean that they were not treated equally. In fact, I am not sure what treated equally means. Everyone should be given the same opportunity to participate in consensus building efforts as much is practically feasible but that does not mean that everyone can get everything they want. It may be true that c’s disagree with one another more than g’s; I don’t know whether that is true or not but even if it is, what do you suggest as the solution to that? That is the key question in my opinion. It seems to me that there may be too much focus on voting rights and not enough focus on working together to develop positions that most if not all can support. An effective consensus building approach emphasizes the latter and avoids the former as much as possible. I suggest we spend our time trying to find ways to bridge our differences. Chuck From: jczhang@knet.cn<mailto:jczhang@knet.cn> [mailto:jczhang@knet.cn] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 3:41 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; Erick Iriarte Cc: cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model As a person who once worked in ccTLD while now in gTLD, I think what Erick and Martin were trying to argue is that the CWG has significantly neglected individual cc registry's comments. As they have described correctly, cc registries not only disagree with gs, but also disagree with each other. So they couldn't act collectively like the g registries have done (mostly via RySG). In practice, I guess not every single cc registry's comments were taken, some will complain they haven't been in engagement EQUALLY as the g registries. Erick and Mrtin, please correct me if my understanding is wrong. Jian ________________________________ From: Gomes, Chuck<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com> Date: 2015-06-02 05:06 To: Erick Iriarte<mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com> CC: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Erick, I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about. If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD. What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing. Chuck From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Hi Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591 (…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community. (…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.” gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected. In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process. Yours, Erick pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ). El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió: Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Dear Chuck i have a clear idea why don’t have a contract with ICANN is a advantage :) Please don’t confuse i don’t want to be in your shoes for that. But is clear that TLDs situation is not the same for gTLDs and for ccTLDs, and maybe a solution is a separate the communities and have 2 bodies to each “kind of clients”. I know that you will say (or somebody) will be more bureaucracy, and more problematic, but put together is not a solution, the levels of relations are different. All the gTLDs are “inside icann structure” (GNSO), not all the ccTLDs are inside ICANN structure (ccNSO). I really think at the beginning of this process we can find a solution for all TLDs, at this point (and repeat based in the comments in special LACTLD comments), could be not possible a “unique solution for all”. Erick
El 3/6/2015, a las 11:50, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> escribió:
Erick,
What do you mean when you suggest separating ccTLDs and gTLDs?
BTW – I don’t think you have any idea what an advantage it is not to have a contract with ICANN.
Chuck
From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com <mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com>] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 12:32 PM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: jczhang@knet.cn <mailto:jczhang@knet.cn>; cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Hi Jian / Chuck
Consensus based in the silence is not a consensus. Is clear that a technical problem (operation IANA) not only keep in the “technical side”, for a lot of ccTLDs (please review comments almost LACTLD) is more a political / legal / geopolitical problem.
And Jian is correct, for gTLDs is more easy finally all are based in a specific contract in their relation with ICANN/IANA, the ccTLDs don’t are so lucky? to have that clear legal relation, and what means in their local relation with civil society, government, private sector, academy, technical community.
We must be clear that will not be a unique solution, we must negotiate the solution to try to make the best option possible for all. But was a clear mistake put gTLDs and ccTLDs in the same box, both are TLD, but now (at this moment and not in technical field) are completely different problematics in special in relation with IANA.
For ccTLDs delegation/redelegation issue is clear a “red line”, for gTLDs not. For ccTLDs the relation with their governments are importante and relevant in all the process, for gTLDs that relation is not priority because have a contract with specific jurisdiction to solve problems. For ccTLDs the relation with IANA is based in RFC 1591 in a historic relation, for gTLDs are based in contracts.
And finally, one of the topics behind Internet Governance discussions are related with ITU 102 and the relation between governments and ccTLDs.
Please, a solution that helps gTLDs (because are more domain names, have clear contracts, and another points) are important and relevant, but if that solution will be affect ccTLDs that are less, small, from countries around the world, will be affected the majority of population around the world in relation with their local communities.
I respect all the point of view, but me must separate gTLDs from ccTLDs now, or we will affect all the system.
Erick
El 3/6/2015, a las 7:44, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió:
Jian,
I wish I could say that I understand better but I cannot. The reality of a consensus process for g’s and c’s and everyone else is that there will be times when participants disagree with one another and cannot reach full consensus. In those cases it is impossible to give everyone exactly what they want so efforts are made to develop a compromise that most everyone can support. If one entity doesn’t get what they wanted, it doesn’t mean that they were not treated equally. In fact, I am not sure what treated equally means. Everyone should be given the same opportunity to participate in consensus building efforts as much is practically feasible but that does not mean that everyone can get everything they want.
It may be true that c’s disagree with one another more than g’s; I don’t know whether that is true or not but even if it is, what do you suggest as the solution to that? That is the key question in my opinion. It seems to me that there may be too much focus on voting rights and not enough focus on working together to develop positions that most if not all can support. An effective consensus building approach emphasizes the latter and avoids the former as much as possible.
I suggest we spend our time trying to find ways to bridge our differences.
Chuck
From: jczhang@knet.cn <mailto:jczhang@knet.cn> [mailto:jczhang@knet.cn <mailto:jczhang@knet.cn>] Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 3:41 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; Erick Iriarte Cc: cwg-stewardship; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
As a person who once worked in ccTLD while now in gTLD, I think what Erick and Martin were trying to argue is that the CWG has significantly neglected individual cc registry's comments. As they have described correctly, cc registries not only disagree with gs, but also disagree with each other. So they couldn't act collectively like the g registries have done (mostly via RySG). In practice, I guess not every single cc registry's comments were taken, some will complain they haven't been in engagement EQUALLY as the g registries.
Erick and Mrtin, please correct me if my understanding is wrong.
Jian
From: Gomes, Chuck <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com> Date: 2015-06-02 05:06 To: Erick Iriarte <mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com> CC: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Erick,
I am pretty sure I understand everything you said except for your last paragraph: “In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.” The first sentence is fine. The second sentence I am less clear about.
If all you are saying is that the difference of contractual relationship vs. no contractual relationship needs to be a priority, I agree. Throughout the CWG process, I have been under the impression that that difference has been emphasized over and over again and everyone seems to support that. I think we all also understand the differences related to the involvement of governments for ccTLDs and that that varies by ccTLD.
What I don’t understand is where you think you and I are disagreeing.
Chuck
From: Erick Iriarte [mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com <mailto:eiriarte@iriartelaw.com>] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 9:36 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Hi
Balance is one of the words, the other is diversity, and with diversity i mean what exactly means for each ccTLD (with their local realities around the world) the relation with IANA now, and will be affected with a change in special in relation with their local community. (Remenber RC 1591
(…) “2) These designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community. The designated manager is the trustee of the top-level domain for both the nation, in the case of a country code, and the global Internet community.
(…) 6) For any transfer of the designated manager trusteeship from one organization to another, the higher-level domain manager (the IANA in the case of top-level domains) must receive communications from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA that the transfer in mutually agreed, and that the new organization understands its responsibilities.”
gTLDs and ccTLDs are not only different, ccTLDs are different between each, and that means the “solution for IANA transition” need to recognized that difference and how will be affected.
In the case of gTLDs finally is based in a contract with ICANN, and IANA is a function. For the majority of ccTLDs the relation is with IANA (the old IANA), and with ICANN as “housing” of IANA. That difference need to be a priority in all the process.
Yours,
Erick
pd. I’am agree with Martin (this time :) ).
El 1/6/2015, a las 8:15, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> escribió:
Martin,
I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s.
Chuck
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info <mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Jonathan,
In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further.
However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA.
I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources.
However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.
But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.)
The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point.
That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly.
I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.)
Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise.
I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel.
Martin _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship>
Chuck, Jonathan & I had a discussion this morning about the implications of my e-mail. In essence my concerns focus on two clear issues: 1. GNSO-appointed members intervening on issues relevant to ccTLDs or ccTLD-appointed members intervening on gTLD issues. (This is clear out of line with the principles and criteria document - annex C of the 2nd draft proposal - in particular under 7.ii, 8.ii and 8.iii.) 2. Policy issues becoming criteria in any of the review processes other than a failure of the IANA functions operator abiding by agreed policy. (This is covered in the principles and criteria document under 5.iii, independence of policy from IANA and 7.) In the first case, a large GNSO-nominated membership of the review team would outnumber those who know about the issues affecting ccTLDs: I am concerned that this could lead to reviews being based on performance against gTLD processes, ignoring or misinterpreting ccTLD issues. The second is more subjective. Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy In our discussion Jonathan & I wondered whether we could include clear statements in the terms of reference for the IFR on these points. Hope this helps identify a practical way forward. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 14:15 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that "we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator." I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c's and g's. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
Martin, I'll speak as one of those GNSO non-registry types (I'm in the Intellectual Property Constituency, one of the constituencies of the Commercial Stakeholder Group). If I were to be on the review team (or CSC), I would see my job as determining whether PTI was doing the job required of it in the contract and SLAs, and whether it was meeting the needs of all customers/users (not just gTLD customers/users). Frankly, anything else would be a perversion of the process. I have zero interest in trying to sneak policy issues or debates into an operational review process. I really don't see any reason why "heavy [which I would debate as a characterization] GNSO membership will lead to to re-running policy issues. I think it is a bit narrow to view the stakeholder groups within the GNSO as essentially policy-development bodies, just because the GNSO's main purpose is policy development. This is an entirely understandable view, but it's not correct. It might make sense if there were "non-policy" stakeholder groups mirroring the GNSO stakeholder groups, but there aren't. As a result, the stakeholder groups in the GNSO deal with all manner of DNS-related issues, not merely policy development, and have done so all along. Furthermore, while each SG or C may represent the perspective of its stakeholders, the SG/Cs (and in particular, the actual individuals who are participating in the CWG and other ICANN matters) are not working solely (or even primarily) out of parochial self-interest. We realize we are involved in a bigger enterprise and that if we are given a hand on the ship's wheel, we cannot merely try to steer the ship toward our own port. Granted, there are some participants who see everything through the perspective of their group's policy desires, and whose every move is intended to advance only those desires. However, those who act singlemindedly and selfishly tend to get marginalized (and in the end, get less done in the long run for their stakeholders as well as for the greater good). Furthermore, those participants tend to gravitate toward those work areas most directly related to their stakeholders' interests, and tend to have little or no interest in other affairs at ICANN. The corollary of this is that those participants who gravitate toward work areas less related to their direct interests tend to be the participants who tend to see the bigger picture, who want to work toward broader goals, and who share the long-term common vision of a highly functional ICANN and DNS. In sum, I think your fears are unfounded. That said, clear terms of reference are an excellent idea and should be part of the review team's foundational documents (charter, etc.). I don't think that's a controversial idea (nor a new one). And I don't think there will be any problem with GNSO non-registry stakeholders (or for that matter, non-GNSO non-registry stakeholders) failing to understand or trying to subvert those terms of reference. Greg On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 11:43 AM, Martin Boyle <Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk> wrote:
Chuck,
Jonathan & I had a discussion this morning about the implications of my e-mail. In essence my concerns focus on two clear issues:
1. GNSO-appointed members intervening on issues relevant to ccTLDs or ccTLD-appointed members intervening on gTLD issues. (This is clear out of line with the principles and criteria document – annex C of the 2nd draft proposal – in particular under 7.ii, 8.ii and 8.iii.)
2. Policy issues becoming criteria in any of the review processes other than a failure of the IANA functions operator abiding by agreed policy. (This is covered in the principles and criteria document under 5.iii, independence of policy from IANA and 7.)
In the first case, a large GNSO-nominated membership of the review team would outnumber those who know about the issues affecting ccTLDs: I am concerned that this could lead to reviews being based on performance against gTLD processes, ignoring or misinterpreting ccTLD issues.
The second is more subjective. Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy
In our discussion Jonathan & I wondered whether we could include clear statements in the terms of reference for the IFR on these points.
Hope this helps identify a practical way forward.
Martin
*From:* Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] *Sent:* 01 June 2015 14:15 *To:* Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Martin,
I have no argument at all with your conclusion that “we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.” I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c’s and g’s.
Chuck
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Martin Boyle *Sent:* Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM *To:* jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model
Jonathan,
In one of Friday’s calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further.
However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA.
I’m sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN’s costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN’s resources.
However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I’d say we – gs and cs – have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator.
But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I’d say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.)
The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I’m not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point.
That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly.
I’m not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.)
Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise.
I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel.
Martin
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hmmm. I really agree with what Martin said here:
Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy
I think it is a bit narrow to view the stakeholder groups within the GNSO as essentially policy-development bodies, just because the GNSO's main purpose is policy development. This is an entirely understandable view, but it's not correct. MM: The GNSO is indeed a “essentially policy development bodies.” Don’t take my word for it, read ICANN’s bylaws (Article X): “There shall be a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains.” MM: It is reassuring and nice for Greg to talk about responsibility and the bigger picture, and in his case, he has some credibility. But not everyone does. Aside from its basic purpose and organization as established in the bylaws, someone like me with a lot of experience of GNSO could never agree that its constituencies and stakeholder groups do not act primarily in their own self-interest. We see, for example, a concerted effort to connect the creation of the .sucks domain to the IANA transition going on now in Washington. 3 years ago during the renewal of the IANA contract, we saw a concerted effort by certain stakeholder groups – caught up in the controversies over new TLDs - to require IANA to determine whether new TLDs “had consensus” and were “in the public interest.” Basic institutional design would caution us that there will be continuing pressure to link IANA issues to policy disputes. Our mechanisms must guard against this. That said, clear terms of reference are an excellent idea and should be part of the review team's foundational documents (charter, etc.). I don't think that's a controversial idea (nor a new one). And I don't think there will be any problem with GNSO non-registry stakeholders (or for that matter, non-GNSO non-registry stakeholders) failing to understand or trying to subvert those terms of reference. MM: It’s probably not controversial but the question for us is one of enforcing those terms if a review group goes astray. How do we do that?
Martin, I don't see anything in your concerns that I disagree with so if there are places where we tighten up the language, I hope you will provide suggestions for clearer language. Chuck From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 11:44 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Chuck, Jonathan & I had a discussion this morning about the implications of my e-mail. In essence my concerns focus on two clear issues: 1. GNSO-appointed members intervening on issues relevant to ccTLDs or ccTLD-appointed members intervening on gTLD issues. (This is clear out of line with the principles and criteria document - annex C of the 2nd draft proposal - in particular under 7.ii, 8.ii and 8.iii.) 2. Policy issues becoming criteria in any of the review processes other than a failure of the IANA functions operator abiding by agreed policy. (This is covered in the principles and criteria document under 5.iii, independence of policy from IANA and 7.) In the first case, a large GNSO-nominated membership of the review team would outnumber those who know about the issues affecting ccTLDs: I am concerned that this could lead to reviews being based on performance against gTLD processes, ignoring or misinterpreting ccTLD issues. The second is more subjective. Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy In our discussion Jonathan & I wondered whether we could include clear statements in the terms of reference for the IFR on these points. Hope this helps identify a practical way forward. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 14:15 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that "we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator." I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c's and g's. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
Thanks Chuck, that's helpful in that it does provide a way of addressing my concerns. As a starter for 10 (and based on the document Grace sent out last night), I would suggest the following: Paragraph 106, add to the end: "However, the review mandate is strictly limited to evaluation against the SOW and does not include any policy or contracting issues that are not part of the IANA functions operation contract. In particular it does not include issues related to policy development and adoption processes, or evaluation or contract enforcement measures between contracted TLDs and ICANN." Paragraph 111, add to end: "As for the periodic review, the special IANA Functions Review is limited to the operation of the IANA functions operation and does not include policy development and adoption process or the relationship between ICANN and its contracted TLDs." Paragraph 226 (Annex F), second bullet, add to end: "Note, this does not include any review of policy developed or adopted through agreed processes or on ICANN's relationship with contracted TLDs." Paragraph 226, final bullet, between "improvements" and "suggested by" insert: "(where relevant to the mandate of the IFR)" Paragraph 233 table: I thought that at the last call we agreed to there being two ccNSO and three RySG-appointed members. Paragraph 233bis (new paragraph under the table): In any case where a recommendation focuses on a service specific to gTLDs or to ccTLDs, or where the processes are different between the two, the final recommendation should not be decided in the face of opposition from that community's members. Solely gTLD issues must not be decided in opposition to GNSO members and solely ccTLD issues (or issues which are handled differently for ccTLDs) must not be decided in opposition to ccTLD members of the IFRT." I hope this helps and would welcome thoughts. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 21:50 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I don't see anything in your concerns that I disagree with so if there are places where we tighten up the language, I hope you will provide suggestions for clearer language. Chuck From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 11:44 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Chuck, Jonathan & I had a discussion this morning about the implications of my e-mail. In essence my concerns focus on two clear issues: 1. GNSO-appointed members intervening on issues relevant to ccTLDs or ccTLD-appointed members intervening on gTLD issues. (This is clear out of line with the principles and criteria document - annex C of the 2nd draft proposal - in particular under 7.ii, 8.ii and 8.iii.) 2. Policy issues becoming criteria in any of the review processes other than a failure of the IANA functions operator abiding by agreed policy. (This is covered in the principles and criteria document under 5.iii, independence of policy from IANA and 7.) In the first case, a large GNSO-nominated membership of the review team would outnumber those who know about the issues affecting ccTLDs: I am concerned that this could lead to reviews being based on performance against gTLD processes, ignoring or misinterpreting ccTLD issues. The second is more subjective. Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy In our discussion Jonathan & I wondered whether we could include clear statements in the terms of reference for the IFR on these points. Hope this helps identify a practical way forward. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 14:15 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that "we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator." I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c's and g's. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
Thanks Martin. Your proposed edits look very good and helpful to me. Regarding the table in paragraph 233, I will let others respond to what was agreed to but I personally do not have any problem with what you understood. Chuck From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk] Sent: Tuesday, June 02, 2015 5:44 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Thanks Chuck, that's helpful in that it does provide a way of addressing my concerns. As a starter for 10 (and based on the document Grace sent out last night), I would suggest the following: Paragraph 106, add to the end: "However, the review mandate is strictly limited to evaluation against the SOW and does not include any policy or contracting issues that are not part of the IANA functions operation contract. In particular it does not include issues related to policy development and adoption processes, or evaluation or contract enforcement measures between contracted TLDs and ICANN." Paragraph 111, add to end: "As for the periodic review, the special IANA Functions Review is limited to the operation of the IANA functions operation and does not include policy development and adoption process or the relationship between ICANN and its contracted TLDs." Paragraph 226 (Annex F), second bullet, add to end: "Note, this does not include any review of policy developed or adopted through agreed processes or on ICANN's relationship with contracted TLDs." Paragraph 226, final bullet, between "improvements" and "suggested by" insert: "(where relevant to the mandate of the IFR)" Paragraph 233 table: I thought that at the last call we agreed to there being two ccNSO and three RySG-appointed members. Paragraph 233bis (new paragraph under the table): In any case where a recommendation focuses on a service specific to gTLDs or to ccTLDs, or where the processes are different between the two, the final recommendation should not be decided in the face of opposition from that community's members. Solely gTLD issues must not be decided in opposition to GNSO members and solely ccTLD issues (or issues which are handled differently for ccTLDs) must not be decided in opposition to ccTLD members of the IFRT." I hope this helps and would welcome thoughts. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 21:50 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I don't see anything in your concerns that I disagree with so if there are places where we tighten up the language, I hope you will provide suggestions for clearer language. Chuck From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk] Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 11:44 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Chuck, Jonathan & I had a discussion this morning about the implications of my e-mail. In essence my concerns focus on two clear issues: 1. GNSO-appointed members intervening on issues relevant to ccTLDs or ccTLD-appointed members intervening on gTLD issues. (This is clear out of line with the principles and criteria document - annex C of the 2nd draft proposal - in particular under 7.ii, 8.ii and 8.iii.) 2. Policy issues becoming criteria in any of the review processes other than a failure of the IANA functions operator abiding by agreed policy. (This is covered in the principles and criteria document under 5.iii, independence of policy from IANA and 7.) In the first case, a large GNSO-nominated membership of the review team would outnumber those who know about the issues affecting ccTLDs: I am concerned that this could lead to reviews being based on performance against gTLD processes, ignoring or misinterpreting ccTLD issues. The second is more subjective. Given that the GNSO is essentially a policy-development organisation, I am concerned that heavy GNSO membership will lead to re-running issues that should be dealt with at the ICANN level. I would not want to see the PTI (or a successor organisation) being judged on issues where it does not have a role and cannot (or should not) have an influence. Independence of policy from IANA also means that the assessment of the performance of the IANA functions operator also needs to be independent of policy In our discussion Jonathan & I wondered whether we could include clear statements in the terms of reference for the IFR on these points. Hope this helps identify a practical way forward. Martin From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com] Sent: 01 June 2015 14:15 To: Martin Boyle; jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Martin, I have no argument at all with your conclusion that "we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator." I think one cause of any imbalances that may be perceived has to do with the fact that gTLD registries are just a subset of the GNSO while the ccNSO only involves ccTLD registries, albeit not all of them. That said, I personally support efforts to achieve as much balance as possible between c's and g's. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Martin Boyle Sent: Monday, June 01, 2015 3:58 AM To: jonathan.robinson@afilias.info<mailto:jonathan.robinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] GNSO-ccNSO engagement in the Multi-stakeholder model Jonathan, In one of Friday's calls I noted the imbalance between GNSO and ccNSO (and wider ccTLD) engagement in the various entities the model is putting in place. You responded that the GNSO is not an homogenous organisation. I let the discussion drop, not because I was happy with the response, but because I was getting no traction in the discussion and did not want to delay it any further. However, I would like to at least put on the record why I think the current imbalance is wrong and gives too much say to a GNSO-skewed view of the IANA. I'm sure that the traditional balance in favour of the gTLD-centric view of the universe works fine in an ICANN setting, given that most of this is about policy-making and relatively little of this implicates ccTLDs. This is the main reason for the disproportionate funding of ICANN's costs between the GNSO and ccNSO: simply put, ccTLDs use considerably less of ICANN's resources. However, for the IANA, without exact figures to hand, I would expect the balance in use between ccTLDs and gTLDs of the IANA services to be much more equal and most ccTLDs recognise the need for fair funding of the IANA functions operation. Certainly I'd say we - gs and cs - have at least equal interest in the provision of a well-run IANA functions operator. But a serious alarm went up for me a few weeks ago when I had an extended exchange on list with Chuck and Milton about ICANN instructions to IANA. (For many of you, this must have seemed like an esoteric discussion. I'd say it was symptomatic of a fundamental issue that we are failing to address.) The gTLD view of life (in this case) was all about ICANN giving instructions to the IANA functions operator. That is certainly not the case for ccTLDs, but I got a lot of abuse for pointing this out. It only was resolved when the ICANN (ccNSO-focussed) secretariat was asked to clarify. In a post transition world, I'm not sure how easy it we will be able to draw on this experience and knowledge to back up a point. That is my fundamental concern about the imbalance between the ccNSO and GNSO. Especially a concern as the constituent parts of the GNSO are heavily policy focussed. It will be so easy for the GNSO representatives in various discussions to focus on gTLD issues (ignoring that ccTLD delegations and redelegations are actually usually well outside an ICANNic framework) and misshape the discussion accordingly. I'm not sure that the current proposed imbalance will be sustainable in the long term unless it is very clear that different needs are respected. (In the same way, in the ccTLD world, we need to be very cautious about not applying inappropriate blanket rules.) Simply ignoring the significant number of ccTLD comments about the imbalance might be an easy solution, but it is not a good compromise. I hope that this helps colleagues understand my very real concerns about our direction of travel. Martin
participants (6)
-
Erick Iriarte -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
jczhang＠knet.cn -
Martin Boyle -
Milton L Mueller