The thing with private data is that it is amazing what you can
legitimately and illegitimately do with it. You can correlate,
investigate, use, abuse it in any shape or form, but at the end of
the day, the question should be: Do you have a legally enforceable
right to access that data and do with it whatever you please. Many
jurisdictions have decided that the protection of the individual
weighs heavier than any potentially beneficial uses.
And if you have a right to access the data, you will still be able to do so.
Best,
Volker
Hi Allison,
Would you be able to carry out your investigations normally if access to WHOIS thick were restricted only by the need to enter an email?
With regards to privacy by design, instead of pushing for the implementation of this concept inside the realm of WHOIS where it is foreign, since it is an engineering concept, why not advocate for its implementation at the design level of the Internet, where it belongs?
Nathalie
On Tuesday, February 14, 2017 12:38 AM, allison nixon <elsakoo@gmail.com> wrote:
This car metaphor isn't complete without also stating that some car owners purchase them for the sole purpose of running over people!
Some car owners purchase fleets of cars to run over as many people as possible. Even though they re-use their name on every single vehicle registration, the subpeona takes so long that the city can no longer automatically block the cars as they enter, and need to wait for them to run over a few people before they can do anything about it.
This metaphor has obviously been tortured past the point of absurdity, I'll leave it alone now.
I've mostly been lurking for the whole duration of this group, and please forgive me if I'm missing something massive here, but I get the impression that most people here don't spend a lot of time doing investigations. But this is my life. If I needed a subpeona for every single historical lookup, pivot, and reverse search, I would get zero done due to a lack of legal authority. Many if not most of the people doing the heavy lifting in anti-cybercrime efforts are private citizens with no government issued authority. It seems that the general expectation here is that limiting access to people with badges is OK, but I'm telling you there is a severe lack of those skillsets and it will be years before we see widespread technical literacy among the police. Whatever system results, private citizens need a path for unrestricted and automated access. And if we want to talk protecting privacy, I think criminally motivated violations of privacy are far more likely to affect everyone's day to day life right now, and automated WHOIS lookups are used heavily especially in anti-phishing and anti-spam operations.
With the status quo, I can go on fishing expeditions through the WHOIS data and turn up hundreds of domains used for the same type of malicious activity, and predict with a high accuracy which domains will be malicious before they are used for anything. It sometimes turns up domains owned by innocent people, and I doubt privacy minded people would like that, but the reality is I rarely ever encounter WHOIS data that is convincing PII. It's almost all fake. And if it's not fake, it's a company's public contact info, or it's a foolish person who turned down WHOIS privacy protection, and will change their WHOIS as soon as the spam starts flowing.
Have there been any studies on what percentage of WHOIS data is real and correct? Can we ever expect to have meaningful data when registrars are allowed to take Bitcoins over Tor as payment? At what point does "privacy" become an empty argument when some of these Internet hosting/registrar companies clearly profit from facilitating abuse, and network defenders block entire TLDs due to the saturation of abuse?
From my vantage point, I see great benefit from seeing patterns in the fake data submitted by fraudsters, and I see few harms from the privacy side of things, because people seem to generally realize that "123 fake st" is a perfectly acceptable WHOIS entry.
I also recognize this situation is completely absurd. Every aspect of this is surely an abuse of the original system. But it seems like building a pyramid from the top down, restricting access to supposed "PII" that is unlikely to contain PII, to the detriment of legitimate efforts that also seek to enhance privacy by preventing criminal theft of private data like bank account numbers.
On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 9:14 PM, Sam Lanfranco <sam@lanfranco.net> wrote:
I have to strongly agree with Alex that whatever the criteria are for thin data, they cannot include that thin data "is transitive" in some sort of bread crumb trail manner.
Everything is potentially transitive in that sense. I observe a vehicle but all I get is make, model and license plate, and in most jurisdictions that is all I get. It is the vehicle owner's "thin data". Of course I can hang around, see that the car has a baby seat, witness a woman or man putting a child in the car, assume that she/he has legitimate access to the car, follow the car and assemble more personal information (lives at; works at; shops at; visits;) The license plate didn't facilitate that crumb train discovery, but no license plate would hamper legitimate seeking of information about who owns the car (issuing a parking ticket, LEA investigation, etc.) . License plate is part of thin data with no gated access. Of course, this will change in the era of the digital vehicle. Depending on security, and authorization, one will be able to just ask the car, and ask about a lot of things...like whose cell phone was in the passenger's seat last night, when I was supposed to be alone )-:
There needs to be a similar balance (license plate but no owner's name unless wanted, like Sam's Curry Pizza Barn logo, phone number and website URL painted on the side).
More Important, have we made progress (convergence) on the working principles that should be brought to bear in building a thin data set. A lot of time has been spent looking at good case and bad case scenarios. What operational principles have been distilled from all these examples? What is the balance between thin data inclusion and exclusion, and design and technical solutions that can be used to prevent (for example) robotic harvesting? There is another frontier here, and that is what governments will do to restrain or enable certain uses of thin data? While ICANN needs to be aware of what is going on there, that part is beyond ICANN's remit, but those policies will help shape some of the context within which ICANN deals with the thin data task.
Sam L--
On 2017-02-14 1:23 AM, Deacon, Alex wrote:
All,
So it seems the debate has progressed from “thin data” to “thick data” (i.e. data that includes email). I know we are all super excited to talk about “thick data” but I don’t think we are there yet (are we? Hopefully I didn’t miss the party…)
Focusing on thin data for the moment I struggle to understand how it is personal data. I do not believe it is. As for the odd logic proposed by some that the property of privacy is transitive (i.e. Because “thin data” can be used to link/point/discover other data then “thin data” equals “personal data”) I just don’t buy it.
I don’t disagree with much of what was expressed in this thread, however we must keep in mind that balance and proportionality are important concepts in many (all?) data privacy laws. Any arguments that imply that no such balance exists (or should exist) is obstructive IMO.
Alex
On 2/13/17, 5:42 AM, <gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann .org on behalf of michele@blacknight.com> wrote:
I agree and I know from how I’ve used various email addresses that they are actively being harvested and spammed.
Also it’s one of the biggest sources of complaints we get from our clients (registrants)
It’s definitely not an “edge case”.
Regards
Michele
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