Action item - gap assessment
I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances. I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different. Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its. Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this. Greg On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com> wrote:
Dear all,
To address the following action item:
*Action item*: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them
Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw
[image: Emacs!]
In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...> Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case.
As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention.
Best regards, Lisa
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
Did you mean 16? It seems so. With great respect Greg, I think you are turning this case on its head. Yes, WHOIS has been and likely will continue to be a useful source of info for identifying perpetrators of abuse. We don't need a separate case for each type of abuse (child porn, selling counterfeit goods, post intimate relationship hassment, etc etc). This use case identified the risk that abusers will get the data they need to abuse from the WHOIS. Lets be clear, investigators of abuse can go to the registrar. It is not as if this data suddenly becomes unavailable if it is not publicly displayed. It is just not available so readily. And that, as Martha might say, is a good thing. Stephanie Perrin On 2016-08-16 19:31, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances.
I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different.
Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its.
Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this.
Greg
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com <mailto:lisa@corecom.com>> wrote:
Dear all,
To address the following action item:
*/Action item/*: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them
Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw <https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw>
Emacs!
In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...> Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case.
As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw <https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw>), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention.
Best regards, Lisa
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg>
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
Yes, I did mean16, not 19. I guess that was a result of turning the case on its head.... I think that this shows both sides of the case, rather than turning it on its head: that the victims in this case may well need access to WHOIS data, irrespective of where the data used against them came from. As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf? I don't know who Martha is, but with great respect, I disagree with her. Greg On Tuesday, August 16, 2016, Stephanie Perrin < stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca> wrote:
Did you mean 16? It seems so. With great respect Greg, I think you are turning this case on its head. Yes, WHOIS has been and likely will continue to be a useful source of info for identifying perpetrators of abuse. We don't need a separate case for each type of abuse (child porn, selling counterfeit goods, post intimate relationship hassment, etc etc). This use case identified the risk that abusers will get the data they need to abuse from the WHOIS. Lets be clear, investigators of abuse can go to the registrar. It is not as if this data suddenly becomes unavailable if it is not publicly displayed. It is just not available so readily. And that, as Martha might say, is a good thing.
Stephanie Perrin
On 2016-08-16 19:31, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances.
I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different.
Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its.
Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this.
Greg
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lisa@corecom.com');>> wrote:
Dear all,
To address the following action item:
*Action item*: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them
Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw
[image: Emacs!]
In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...> Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case.
As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention.
Best regards, Lisa
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing listgnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org');>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf? Do you really think that is appropriate? If I was to receive harassing telephone calls, I would not expect to be able to call a telecommunications company “24/7” and to be immediately provided with their customer’s records. I would expect access to their database to be heavily restricted. It is not difficult to imagine the trouble that would result from free, unrestricted, anonymous public access to a database of telephone number account holders. Sure, a few crimes might be solved, but a thousand times more would be instigated by identify thieves, spammers, and stalkers. The same concerns apply here to WHOIS or whatever form the RDS may take. - Ayden -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Action item - gap assessment Local Time: August 17, 2016 5:59 AM UTC Time: August 17, 2016 4:59 AM From: gregshatanipc@gmail.com To: stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org Yes, I did mean16, not 19. I guess that was a result of turning the case on its head.... I think that this shows both sides of the case, rather than turning it on its head: that the victims in this case may well need access to WHOIS data, irrespective of where the data used against them came from. As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf? I don't know who Martha is, but with great respect, I disagree with her. Greg On Tuesday, August 16, 2016, Stephanie Perrin <stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca> wrote: Did you mean 16? It seems so. With great respect Greg, I think you are turning this case on its head. Yes, WHOIS has been and likely will continue to be a useful source of info for identifying perpetrators of abuse. We don't need a separate case for each type of abuse (child porn, selling counterfeit goods, post intimate relationship hassment, etc etc). This use case identified the risk that abusers will get the data they need to abuse from the WHOIS. Lets be clear, investigators of abuse can go to the registrar. It is not as if this data suddenly becomes unavailable if it is not publicly displayed. It is just not available so readily. And that, as Martha might say, is a good thing. Stephanie Perrin On 2016-08-16 19:31, Greg Shatan wrote: I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances. I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different. Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its. Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this. Greg On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com> wrote: Dear all, To address the following action item: Action item: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: [ https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw](https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw) Emacs! In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: [ EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc](https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...) Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case. As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention. Best regards, Lisa _______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg _______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
What evidence do you have to support that claim? Sent from my iPad On Aug 17, 2016, at 6:42 AM, Ayden Férdeline <icann@ferdeline.com<mailto:icann@ferdeline.com>> wrote: As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf? Do you really think that is appropriate? If I was to receive harassing telephone calls, I would not expect to be able to call a telecommunications company “24/7” and to be immediately provided with their customer’s records. I would expect access to their database to be heavily restricted. It is not difficult to imagine the trouble that would result from free, unrestricted, anonymous public access to a database of telephone number account holders. Sure, a few crimes might be solved, but a thousand times more would be instigated by identify thieves, spammers, and stalkers. The same concerns apply here to WHOIS or whatever form the RDS may take. - Ayden -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Action item - gap assessment Local Time: August 17, 2016 5:59 AM UTC Time: August 17, 2016 4:59 AM From: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> To: stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca<mailto:stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca> gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org> Yes, I did mean16, not 19. I guess that was a result of turning the case on its head.... I think that this shows both sides of the case, rather than turning it on its head: that the victims in this case may well need access to WHOIS data, irrespective of where the data used against them came from. As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf? I don't know who Martha is, but with great respect, I disagree with her. Greg On Tuesday, August 16, 2016, Stephanie Perrin <stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca<mailto:stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca>> wrote: Did you mean 16? It seems so. With great respect Greg, I think you are turning this case on its head. Yes, WHOIS has been and likely will continue to be a useful source of info for identifying perpetrators of abuse. We don't need a separate case for each type of abuse (child porn, selling counterfeit goods, post intimate relationship hassment, etc etc). This use case identified the risk that abusers will get the data they need to abuse from the WHOIS. Lets be clear, investigators of abuse can go to the registrar. It is not as if this data suddenly becomes unavailable if it is not publicly displayed. It is just not available so readily. And that, as Martha might say, is a good thing. Stephanie Perrin On 2016-08-16 19:31, Greg Shatan wrote: I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances. I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different. Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its. Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this. Greg On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com> wrote: Dear all, To address the following action item: Action item: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw <part3.CCB4B344.F63B1712@mail.utoronto.ca<mailto:part3.CCB4B344.F63B1712@mail.utoronto.ca>> In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...> Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case. As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention. Best regards, Lisa _______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg _______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg _______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
Setting aside the numbers claimed, the potential for abuse should be concern enough. ...but we seem to be tracking ahead of the group again... Best, Volker Am 17.08.2016 um 13:25 schrieb Victoria Sheckler:
What evidence do you have to support that claim?
Sent from my iPad
On Aug 17, 2016, at 6:42 AM, Ayden Férdeline <icann@ferdeline.com <mailto:icann@ferdeline.com>> wrote:
As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf?
Do you really think that is appropriate? If I was to receive harassing telephone calls, I would not expect to be able to call a telecommunications company “24/7” and to be immediately provided with their customer’s records. I would expect access to their database to be heavily restricted. It is not difficult to imagine the trouble that would result from free, unrestricted, anonymous public access to a database of telephone number account holders. Sure, a few crimes might be solved, but a thousand times more would be instigated by identify thieves, spammers, and stalkers. The same concerns apply here to WHOIS or whatever form the RDS may take.
- Ayden
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Action item - gap assessment Local Time: August 17, 2016 5:59 AM UTC Time: August 17, 2016 4:59 AM From: gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> To: stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca <mailto:stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca> gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org>
Yes, I did mean16, not 19. I guess that was a result of turning the case on its head....
I think that this shows both sides of the case, rather than turning it on its head: that the victims in this case may well need access to WHOIS data, irrespective of where the data used against them came from.
As to how readily data would be available from registrars, that may or may not be true (and issues of burdensomeness come into play as well). Will every registrar have a 24/7 contact available to give out information in real time to victims of abuse and infringement and those working on their behalf?
I don't know who Martha is, but with great respect, I disagree with her.
Greg
On Tuesday, August 16, 2016, Stephanie Perrin <stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca <mailto:stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca>> wrote:
Did you mean 16? It seems so. With great respect Greg, I think you are turning this case on its head. Yes, WHOIS has been and likely will continue to be a useful source of info for identifying perpetrators of abuse. We don't need a separate case for each type of abuse (child porn, selling counterfeit goods, post intimate relationship hassment, etc etc). This use case identified the risk that abusers will get the data they need to abuse from the WHOIS. Lets be clear, investigators of abuse can go to the registrar. It is not as if this data suddenly becomes unavailable if it is not publicly displayed. It is just not available so readily. And that, as Martha might say, is a good thing.
Stephanie Perrin
On 2016-08-16 19:31, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think that Case 19 ("WHOIS misused to shame, anger or scare a registrant") suggests a potential gap or at least a counter-case ("WHOIS used to find those posting personally identifiable information to shame, anger or scare a registrant"'). As Case 19 posits, this involves posting information on the Internet. In many cases, the information is posted on websites using domains registered for such purpose, or sent using email addresses using domains registered for that purpose. WHOIS data is an important and much-used tool in determining the identity of those disseminating the PII under those circumstances.
I have personal experience with this. When my client was the victim of a doxing attack (and this involved publishing confidential documents, not merely publicly available contact information), WHOIS data was critical in tracking down the identity of the individuals responsible. There was much more to it, but the WHOIS data was the first lead in the chain. Without that data, the results may have been quite different.
Rather than drafting a whole new use case, I think that this use case is similar enough to existing use cases 06, 09, 21 and 22 to point to those cases for more detail. I would point in particular to use case 21's statement that "telltales may be found in resources used to register the domain" which in turn lead to other information necessary to move forward. "Telltales" may also be found in information that is not completely accurate. This point should not be lost -- WHOIS records can reveal telltales and "breadcrumbs" even when the information is not a bald-faced registration in the name of the "miscreant" (as use case 22) put its.
Of course, if it's deemed necessary, I can create a separate use case for this.
Greg
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Lisa Phifer <lisa@corecom.com> wrote:
Dear all,
To address the following action item:
*/Action item/*: WG members to review example use cases and identify any gaps that should be filled - preferably volunteering to draft and present them
Example use cases identified by this WG to date are listed below and can be found here: https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw <https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw>
<part3.CCB4B344.F63B1712@mail.utoronto.ca <mailto:part3.CCB4B344.F63B1712@mail.utoronto.ca>>
In addition, cases originally drafted by the EWG are listed here: EWG Report - Example Use Case and Related Data Annexes.doc <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/60490860/EWG%20Report%20-%2...> Contact staff if you would like to a copy of any EWG draft use case.
As we are trying to examine a representative but not exhaustive set of examples prior to deliberation (see https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw <https://community.icann.org/x/JA6bAw>), if you believe that a different and important example is missing from the above table, please raise that gap to the WG's attention.
Best regards, Lisa
_______________________________________________ gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg>
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On Aug 17, 2016, at 6:42 AM, Ayden Férdeline wrote:
Sure, a few crimes might be solved, but a thousand times more would be instigated by identify thieves, spammers, and stalkers. The same concerns apply here to WHOIS or whatever form the RDS may take.
On 2016-08-17 12:25, Victoria Sheckler wrote:
What evidence do you have to support that claim?
Anecdotal mathematics will be able to make that justification ... So whilst the number "1000" is purely a guess, the concept that it would be "more" is sound ... If you start with the simple assumption that a LawEnforcementAgent has a primary task of stopping a Criminal (which ignores the multitude of other roles, tasks, responsibilties and so-on that modern "policing" actually covers) : * there are more people in jail than there are police - therefore there are more crime-committers than crime-stoppers * criminals to crimes is a 1-to-many relationship - there is no magic fairy counting the number of crimes and somehow stopping a criminal at one Ergo, if you introduce something which is equally able to be used to find a criminal and commit a crime, the crime number will always be higher by that reasoning. Whether something should be allowed/restricted/controlled/banned/not-even-made because of either of those 2 "extremes" is the question. I like to think that the %age of people criminals and the %age of people who are lawenforcement is an infinitisimally small number in comparison to the massive amount of people who are neither - thus it is the impact/effect on them (positively or negatively) that matters. Rob
participants (7)
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Ayden Férdeline -
Greg Shatan -
Lisa Phifer -
Rob Golding -
Stephanie Perrin -
Victoria Sheckler -
Volker Greimann