George, Paul,When analyzing the number of Sunrise registrations in the last round, how do you suggest factoring-in to the analysis the number of DPML/other blocking mechanisms, that function as defensive, non-resolving registrations across hundreds of new gTLDs?Once a trademark is 'blocked' through one of these additional marketplace RPMs (for several thousand dollars per mark) - currently offered on a voluntary basis as an alternative to Sunrise, to reduce social costs imposed by the new gTLD program, that mark is defensively 'registered' across hundreds of new gTLDs (at the same time, any of these DPML 'domains' can be overridden by a non-trademarked registrant upon request to the registry operator).On a related point, we have numbers on the number of domains blocked through these services?Thanks!Best,ClaudioOn Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 7:11 AM George Kirikos <icann@leap.com> wrote:Hi folks,
On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 11:47 AM, Beckham, Brian <brian.beckham@wipo.int> wrote:
> Finally, the suggestion that Sunrises may not be meeting their intended
> purpose due to low uptake statistically-speaking (also as to documented
> abuses) seems to widely miss the mark. As J Scott and others pointed out on
> the call, the intended purpose is to provide an opportunity to get ahead of
> infringing registrations. Whether that opportunity is taken up by a brand
> owner is an altogether separate question.
This analysis is deeply flawed. It attempts to justify the continued
existence of the sunrise by measuring "theoretical benefits", despite
the low uptake rate, as opposed to "actual realized benefits" (as
measured by the actual low update, data that is actually observable),
when comparing against the costs of the sunrise period (to competing
good faith registrants, etc.).
For example, consider a public library branch that is in a large
neighbourhood of 100,000 people, but is only used by 100 people per
year. Using Brian's flawed analysis, the branch should be kept open,
because "theoretically", 100,000 people have the opportunity to use it
(even though 99,900 don't actually use it). Instead, it should be
closed because only 100 people actually use it. The actual benefits
(the usage by a mere 100 users) are what matter, when compared against
the costs.
I agree with the analysis of Paul Keating in this thread, who properly
weighed the actual benefits (low), vs the costs, and came out in
favour of elimination of the sunrise period.
As I discussed in a previous thread on this topic, sunrise demand
would shift to the landrush period when the sunrise period is
eliminated. Appropriate safeguards could be instituted to reduce
cybersquatting in that landrush (e.g. loser pays UDRP costs for
landrush registrations, thereby raising the bar for those
registrations, compared to general availability, or other mechanisms
suggested). See the (long) thread in April 2017, starting with:
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-rpm-wg/2017-April/001509.html
and with other replies at:
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-rpm-wg/2017-April/date.html#1509
ICANN's history is riddled with examples of bad policy suggestions
that had theoretical benefits, and whose introduction was based on
speculative demand that never was realized. It's time to assess those
policies properly and honestly, and admit that they were failures. The
sunrise period for new gTLDs is a prime example. By Brian's analysis,
it can **never** be eliminated, even if just 1 user actually used it,
because its "theoretical" benefits can **always** be said to be high.
The purpose of this PDP is to do a proper and intellectually honest
review, which means looking at the actual benefits. To do otherwise is
to say that the outcome of this PDP is rigged and predetermined, and
it doesn't matter what the actual data (as measured by actual usage),
actual experience and actual statistical evidence, tells us.
Sincerely,
George Kirikos
416-588-0269
http://www.leap.com/
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