Pardon my ignorance, but would such a roll at transfer not require the collaboration of the losing Registry? el On 2023-10-20 05:51, Viktor Dukhovni via gtld-tech wrote:
On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 08:40:12PM -0700, Wes Hardaker via gtld-tech wrote: [...] Indeed, a potential outage during a botched rollover needs to be one of the transition plan considerations.
But I think there's a case for at least seriously considering, and at the appropriate opportunity, at least once, practicing, a more graceful transition in the case of a TLD, some of whose delegated zones could alternatively be unwitting casualties of DNSSEC being turned off (they may have operational dependencies on DNSSEC being available).
The question at hand is whether this was a plausible opportunity. Perhaps not this time, but ideally before an emergency operator change is required for a more critical TLD???
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