On 10/10/2014 2:05 AM, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
On 10 okt 2014, at 04:19, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:


Assuming that a rollover uses the Double-KSK method described previously, is there an intention to test systems for the new SEP key before removing the old one? That is, if A is the current KSK and IANA adds B, after the 30-day hold-down time, either key could be used to sign zones in the root.

No, both keys needs to sign the ZSK that signs the DS records in the root zone. And that invalidates the rest of your (otherwise interesting) proposal. Sorry :-/

Not exactly.  By convention we split ZSK and KSK duties, but that's not actually enforced by the resolver.


So   
  1. A and B sign (A B Z)
  2. Z signs most of the zone.
  3. B signs the DS record for the test zone.

Should work.  But that doesn't prove anything about B's "trust anchor"ness because the chain can go A -> (A B Z) -> B(DS) rather than B -> (A B Z) -> B(DS).

If I'd been smarter, I would have provided a convention to query a caching validating resolver for its trust anchors.  

Mike



	jakob

_______________________________________________
ksk-rollover mailing list
ksk-rollover@icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ksk-rollover