I wanted to make sure you were all aware of several notices issued which
came just before and after the root key change over for DNS. Bad actors
with access to the older private key root (if compromised) may have
been motivated to strike before the key change over.
The timing of this change over taking place roughly 2+ weeks after the
U.S. Government Shutdown is a little unfortunate, since the switch over
date may have encouraged attacks before the old key was revoked. I do
think the re-key is a good idea, and agree with Tony Finch on the
concept of
"[I favour annual rollovers, with keys generated and promulgated out
of band a few years in advance, and at most two KSKs in the root zone at
any time.]"
I welcome any comments.
Lee Neubecker, CISSP
President & CEO
GreatLakesForensics.com