David,
I agree with your comment about the limitations of using metaphors.
Economic activity in the DNS is quite diverse. A metaphor that might be suitable for describing one aspect of the DNS may be ill-suited for a different form of economic activity under the DNS.
We may each be focussed on a particular aspect of economic activity in the DNS, but our perspective and conclusions from a limited subset may not be applicable across the full scope of activity. "The moral of the parable is that humans have a tendency to claim absolute truth based on their limited, subjective experience as they ignore other people's limited, subjective experiences which may be equally true."
I acknowledge my own limitation here, as I am focussed on one aspect of the aftermarket: transactions involving non-distinctive domain names that were first registered many years ago. This may be similar to physical real estate transactions.
Others appear to be focussed on those who register otherwise unregistered domain names directly from the registry and who then resell them at far higher prices. Some, incorrectly in my view, have suggested that ticket scalping may be the appropriate metaphor for this practice.
Another distinction that is often blurred and that muddles the policy discussions is that the role of the registries in the legacy extensions, such as .com, .net and .org is entirely different from the role of the registries of the new gTLD extensions.
The ultimate owners of the legacy extensions of .com, .net and .org are the public, first through the U.S. government and then through ICANN, which was charged with operating them for the public benefit. Verisign and ISOC/PIR were engaged as contractors to perform the administrative and technical functions of distributing the domain names and maintaining the zone files. The presumptive renewal provisions, while anti-competitive, do not change the nature of the legacy registries as hired service providers - not owners.
In contrast, with the new gTLD program, ICANN assigned ownership of entire name spaces to the registries, at times through an application process alone, and at other times through a competitive bidding process. The new gTLD registries own their name spaces in a manner that the legacy registries, as merely registry service providers, do not.
Significant policy considerations depend on these distinctions.
- As David correctly stated earlier - "the pool of human relevant domain names is smaller than infinite. The value of a domain name is connected to the relevancy it has to humans (aka Brand Marketing)."
In the .com name space, the pool of available human relevant domain names were for all practical purposes registered 20+ years ago. If there was a way to value the current .com name space (excluding any value associated with TM usage so that only the inherent human relevant value is considered), one would find that the domain names representing 99% of that value were first registered many years ago.
Effective policy should take into account that the vast majority of Aftermarket economic activity in the .com name space involves domain names that were first registered decades ago.
Concerns about speculators registering available domain names and holding them for resale at far higher prices may have been relevant when the legacy registries were first launched in the 1980s. Different approaches could have been taken then rather than a first-come, first-served, flat rate pricing (or initial free registration) using a land rush model. But second-guessing this approach decades later serves little purpose. Even some who have expressed concerns about this approach acknowledge that the "ship has sailed" long ago on this topic. While some may focus on those who register freely registered domain names for resale in 2021, this represents an inconsequentially small segment of the aftermarket. Drawing broad conclusions for the entire aftermarket from those who still in the present day register unregistered domain names would be akin to proposing urban land use policies with the aim of trying to thwart people from buying up unclaimed land in the Sahara Desert.
- If premium pricing unregistered domain names is a problem, then what is the new gTLD program other than institutionalizing this across hundreds of new name spaces for the financial benefit of ICANN? ICANN has made hundreds of millions of dollars by auctioning of fresh name spaces with the specific intention of permitting new gTLD registries to charge higher prices for the more "human relevant" domains within their name spaces.
- the new gTLD program shifted domain speculation from the aftermarket and from folks like me dealing in individual domain names, to the registries speculating in entire name spaces. If ICANN believes that the free market should not determine the value of domain names, then why did ICANN put new gTLD name spaces out for bid and enable new gTLD registries to charge prices for domain registrations as high as the market would bear?
- Is it wise policy to treat legacy registries the same as new registries and to adopt the same agreements for both? How does it serve the public good to award a sole-source service contract to one company, and then to allow that company to charge whatever fee it chooses to perform the service it is contracted to provide?
- In other aspects of economic life, such as with utility providers, when there is one company with a sole-source contract to be the exclusive provider of services, that utility is heavily regulated and any price increase is closely scrutinized and must be justified. What is the justification for Verisign's recently announced increase of its fees for providing .com registry services - when its profit margins are already an extreme outlier since milking the .com contract has made it one of the most highly profitable companies in the world?
- Is there effective competition for .com? How come .com registrations have increased by more than the total of all new gTLDs combined? Verisign's latest Domain Industry Brief (https://www.verisign.com/en_US/domain-names/dnib/index.xhtml?section=executive-summary) reports that .com/.net registration increased by 6.3 million from Q2 2020 to Q3 2020, while total new gTLD registrations actually fell by 1.4 million registrations. Doesn't effective competition lead to lower fees? How is Verisign able to keep increasing its fees if it faces effective competition? Are other TLD extensions effective substitutes for .com? Not according to the aftermarket, where .com domain names sell for over 10x as much, in general, as the identical SLD in any other TLD. This strongly suggests that none of the other TLDs are effective substitutes for, or effective competition to, .com. Similarly, if one company has a monopoly on producing and selling cars, it would not diminish that company's monopoly power to set up hundreds of motorcycle companies as competitors.
Regards,
Nat