Hi Glenn, and thanks for this.
I agree with you about the lack of clarity. The slide deck is very informative, but it seems to ignore what are now the most effective ways that the general public now confronts DNS abuse. They seem to be off the radar of the entire ICANN community because they've evolved as workarounds that do not wait for committees or government agencies or working groups to act, indeed they bypass ICANN completely:
- Abuse-limiting DNS servers: Anyone can override the DNS server provided by their ISP in their phone, PC or home router if they wish. Setting this manually enables anyone to send their DNS queries to a server that maintains lists of abusing DNS domains and refuses to feed them to you. There are many examples, the best of which (IMO) is the Swiss nonprofit Quad9. Setting your DNS server to 9.9.9.9 sends queries through this well-trusted site which is free to use and does not require setting up an account. They maintain a database of millions of malicious domains which is updated in real-time. It's easy to use, and an immediate step that protects the privacy of DNS lookups while blocking bad domains. (Quad9 provides setup guides for PCs, phones and routers; here is a video that compares it to alternatives.)
- Spam is correctly noted in the slide deck as being an enabler of DNS abuse rather than the abuse itself. However the slide deck makes no mention of the massive amounts of volunteer time that go into creating Remote Blackhole Lists (RBLs) that maintain not only domains but also IP addresses of sources of unwanted and unsolicited email. The best known of these is Spamhaus but there are a few of them. They sometimes suffer from false positives, but there is a well-documented process for legitimate bulk-email senders to get removed from the lists. Many mail systems implement some kind of such blocking; anyone who looks at the spam folder of their Gmail will see this in action.
Spam is specifically also the subject of legislation in both Canada (CASL) and the US (CAN-SPAM).
As the component of the ICANN that is closest to the end-user, if we in NARALO are interested in the actual practice of helping the public mitigate DNS abuse -- something that can be done by anyone, TODAY -- we can (and should) do much more than just point to internal ICANN process churn and pray that the contracted parties do the right thing. The solutions I have listed above unabashedly bypass the ICANN-registry-registrar chain in their pursuit of practical abuse mitigation. ICANN's work is trying to stop abuse at the source with limited success despite decades of work. Well-meaning people joined NARALO chiefly to address abuse (old-timers here will remember Marc, Garth and Beau) but left out of frustration. Abuse-minded DNS servers and RBLs perform the task at the receiving end and appear to be more successful in the actual problem solving; it's much easier to ignore a bad domain than to take it down but the end-user effect is the same. The slide deck makes mention of PDNS but it's never elaborated.
I ask everyone here: what action is both easier and more likely to help you and your family reduce exposure to DNS abuse, right here right now?
- Explaining ICANN processes and hoping it will all work out?
- Monitoring Netbeacon and pressuring registries and/or ICANN to act on its information?
- Setting your devices' DNS to 9.9.9.9?
Education about Abuse-resistant DNS servers and DIY abuse mitigation should be part of ICANN's (and especially At-Large's) public mandate. That these solutions did not come from within ICANN (and indeed ignore it completely) does not negate their intense potential for public benefit in this realm. NIH thinking must be resisted.
- Evan