Re: [NA-Discuss] On the cost of application, and Joint Application Support related
This is confusing. This discussion on the SSR-RT is supposed to happen on the technical issues list, not the NA one.
On list_A, someone is arguing that the ALAC position on issue_A should be that applicants with less than a million {euros or dollars} is play money are a nuisance or threaten to cause the failure of the Internet or some other amazing effect of having less than a million {euros or dollars} to play ICANN roulette. On list_B, others are arguing that the ALAC position on issue_B should be that all applicants have to attempt to acquire the same scarce resources en mass, simultaneously, as if that policy has no cost consequences to applicants forced to acquire those same scarce resources, which happens to be held in surplus by legacy operators. Now, without attempting to argue the merits of issue_B on list_A, or the merits of issue_A on list_B, I have pointed out that a consistent position on cost to applicants is unlikely if the conclusions of list_A and list_B are contradictory. We could have ALAC recommends inflicting wicked high and purposeless costs on all applicants through a comment on the SSR-RT issues. We could have ALAC recommends avoiding inflicting wicked high and purposeless costs on all applicants through a comment on the SSR-RT issues. We could have NARALO recommends jacking up the prices on all scarce goods and services through mass synchronous demand. We could have NARALO recommends not jacking up the prices on all scarce goods and services and avoiding mass synchronous demand. Eric
On 4 April 2011 16:09, Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>wrote:
We could have ALAC recommends inflicting wicked high and purposeless costs on all applicants through a comment on the SSR-RT issues.
We could have ALAC recommends avoiding inflicting wicked high and purposeless costs on all applicants through a comment on the SSR-RT issues.
Of the two choices my preference is for the latter.
We could have NARALO recommends jacking up the prices on all scarce goods and services through mass synchronous demand.
We could have NARALO recommends not jacking up the prices on all scarce goods and services and avoiding mass synchronous demand.
High school economics teaches that demand rises as prices drop, assuming a certain amount of elasticity in demand. If this is applicable here, shouldn't it follow that minimizing prices might *increase* mass synchronous demand (as opposed to the result of artificial price inflation)? If not, why? If so, what is our suggestion of a throttling mechanism to deal with the increase in demand? - Evan
On 4/4/11 4:20 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:
High school economics teaches that demand rises as prices drop, assuming a certain amount of elasticity in demand.
If this is applicable here, shouldn't it follow that minimizing prices might *increase* mass synchronous demand (as opposed to the result of artificial price inflation)? If not, why? If so, what is our suggestion of a throttling mechanism to deal with the increase in demand?
High school math manages to reach the mid-17th century. Some developments in economic theory occurred after that date. All that is required for "this" to be applicable here is the wave of a magic wand and in the blink of an eye the cost and complexity of the aggregate of some very aggravating and vexing requirements in the DAG, and ICANN Legal and Compliance Staffs, and some of the laws of motion will vanish or cease to apply. However, if the DAG, ICANN Legal and Compliance Staffs, and one or more of the laws of motion are magic wand resistant, then "this" may not be the best model available. A "throttling mechanism" may be useful when the queue of applications for which a public interest exists have been served, and "price setting" in a market for which no public interest exists is a tool to determine demand. Eric
participants (2)
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Eric Brunner-Williams -
Evan Leibovitch