Thanks everyone. I read over the transcript. Some small things:
- I also have no further comments on the charter, it's ok with me.
- I also support Suzanne's suggestion of how to introduce the document and problems of laying out where things started.
As a substantive question, something that comes up in incident response circles is what the effect of DNS encryption will be for incident forensics for enterprises. Rod mentioned use cases, but is that use case on the table as a view to analyze the impact? Passive DNS is generally useful during IR. IIRC Bro can automagically label endpoints of flows with observed passive DNS resolutions on the network. Enterprises with a central web proxy, etc., can analyze encrypted web traffic that way. Will we end up seeing something similar for DoH in enterprises, or is it too thoroughly designed to avoid enterprise visibility?
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best,
Jono
From my mobile, please excuse brevity