ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Welcome to the SSAC Evolution of the Resolution Work Party on April 6, 2023. Russ, over to you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So the first thing I'd like to talk about is schedule. I think we have been making steady progress and that we will continue to do so. But I was hoping that we could have a document over to SSAC to review in the fall. Does anyone think that is unrealistic?

GEOFF HUSTON: So you mean in about six months' time, is that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. All right. I just wanted to kind of confirm that we're all at the pace we're going, which is not breakneck. But if we're

continuing to work at this pace, that we'll have something about then, I think. So before the break for the ICANN76 and IETF 116, we had a guest speaker that told us about how botnets are not actually using blockchains, even though you would think the immutable property was something they would like. And so we had asked Andrew to put some text into the document in Section 4 about that. And so I thought that would probably be the best place to start. Although I guess you made a bunch of changes to Section 4 anyway, right?

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Yeah, so there's older changes to Section 4.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, then maybe we should just do Section 4 from the top.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Section 4 from the top it is.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Just since you have green text all over the place.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So, Section 4 comes after Section 2, actually, because there was agreement on the last call to delete Section 3, but because I told people to reduce text in Section 4, I didn't renumber it. So, just be aware there's no longer a Section 3, and this will eventually become Section 3. So, this text comes from, I guess goes back to February 16th.

And I think Section 4 was originally written by me either late January or early February, and we had one review of it on the call, and then I captured a bunch of feedback, and then I added some more content. So that's what you're seeing with the green text now on the screen. This is the additional content that added on February 16th. So, I'm not saying you can't review the black text, but I think it's best if we just stick with the review in the green text. So any comments on this green paragraph here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. Names to the left of the dot. Is there a better way of saying that?

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Is it a current dot beneath the...

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, you could actually say this by going differently by indicating different name servers for a label in a domain. In other words, domains have labels, and labels are indeed -- it's a bit weird, but I'm thinking you could actually delegate a or b inside a zone, but even so, what I'm trying to say is by indicating different name servers for a label in a domain, the zone administrator is also delegating the authority to govern that or govern those subzones, because it's the names and all names underneath.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Sure. How do you like that sentence now?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I wonder if you turned it around and say, talk about delegating different labels. In other words, the tail of it, just swap the ends of the sentence.

GEOFF HUSTON: Either works for me. It's just to the left of a dot and talking about names when you're actually talking about entire zone hierarchies. And so the second part of that sentence govern those names. It's actually governed that. What do you call the subtree? Is it the subtree? Because it is the entire subtree over to you.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I think this is what Russ had in mind. There is names.

RUSS HOUSLEY: For a label within the domain. For a label or a subtree within the domain, either one.

GEOFF HUSTON: An entire subtree.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Absolutely. That works.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I predict you delegate the authority to govern names.

GEOFF HUSTON: No, an entire subtree. To govern an entire subtree by Indicating different name servers for a label within a domain.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I'm with you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Because you're talking about DNS records against the label and by in effect, you're handing the entire tree over.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: All right. Moving on to the next bit of green text. These two paragraphs here, they're green.

GEOFF HUSTON: I can live with that.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Okay. I think this was your suggestion to talk about.

GEOFF HUSTON: That's probably why I can live with this.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Anyone else? Maybe I accepted that a bit too fast, but anyone have any comments on these paragraphs?

MERIKE KAEO: Looks good to me.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Cool. All right. Let's try this green text.

SUZANNE WOOLF: I like misparsing the first part of the sentence there that it's about everyone's own stability rather than the global DNS stability. Everyone using the internet [CROSSTALK].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Everyone depends on a stable global DNS.

SUZANNE WOOLF: Mentally, it was exactly right. Yes, thank you.

MERIKE KAEO: I'd like the mentally.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So everyone on the internet depends on the global DNS to remain stable. Is that it?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Everyone on the internet depends on a stable global DNS.

MERIKE KAEO: Yes, that's better.

SUZANNE WOOLF: Thank you.

MERIKE KAEO: Much better.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Or just the we on the call depend on it for mental stability, but most people don't.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The second sentence was about the people who depend on it for mental stability. The ICANN multi stakeholders.

GEOFF HUSTON: Does governance accrete or does governance develop or evolve.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Accrete is pretty negative, but I guess it was how I was feeling at the time. I think it just gets bigger.

SUZANNE WOOLF: I like evolve. I don't use a dictionary either.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Oh, I like accrete, it's a big black hole.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right, but I think the sense of what you're trying to say is actually an evolution, you're trying to say that the governance and the technology are now fused together. And when you alter the technology, you have a real issue with governance. When you talk back to or ever refer to an existing conversation in another working group about CDNS and CDNSKEY and the whole registry registrar governance structure and it's kind of those two things are incompatible with each other. And it's kind of, how do they get resolve? And it is really the registry, registrar mechanism needs to change to accommodate what's being used in the DNS, not the opposite. So I think this sentence is actually correct in the

way it states it now, and it's not really an accretion, it is an evolution.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Perfect. We'll stick with evolved. And I've just learned that Warren is an apology for today's call.

GEOFF HUSTON: Hopefully you made it back and all that. He was doing the COVID dance last week.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Oh, that's right. Should I accept this paragraph?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I wonder just if it would be better to say the DNS, and it's really the global DNS. The governance structures are, because it's not the DNS protocol, but it is related to the DNS protocol when used with the IANA route. Am I right or am I looking for trouble? I mean, earlier we spent all the time trying to be clear about what the protocol being used with alternate routes meant and what the -- Also separating the idea that the IANA route and the protocol were fused together. But here, that's what you're trying to say,

not only is those two fused together, but the governance structures.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think it's a good point.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I had the word 'global' here. I did not have it here or here. So I've just added it to there. I don't know if we need it here, and I don't think we need it here, but we do have it here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Anyway, I think I'm happier with it.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I added it in two places. I mean I think that comment is mostly about this sentence.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, it was. I mean, that's where I tripped over.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Not hearing anyone complain, I will move on. I left a bit of a prompt for the work party here. If the SSAC wanted to say something kind of strong.

GEOFF HUSTON: I'm not sure what there is to say. When you're not the dominant incumbent, you can tolerate much more innovative pressure because there are a few folk invested in the status quo. Once you are the dominant incumbent, we tend to relabel innovation as fragmentation and tend to resist it simply because there's this massive inertial cost imposed on any aspect of change. And we're trying to sort of summarize this and say, well, further innovation is a problem. And it's not necessarily bad. It's just the system is now so invested in the status quo that innovation represents a call to reinvest. That's heavily resisted by incumbents. That's classic economic theory from millennia. I don't think there's anything to say that we believe about it.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Do you think the paragraph properly captures all those thoughts already?

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, it's kind of true. The only thing you can say is that these kinds of tensions are inevitable and not readily reconciled because they're not. Or the other way of saying it is these kinds of tensions are inevitable and this causes innovation to be phrased as small evolutionary steps that maintain backward compatibility. The only way you can change the DNS these days is not to disrupt incumbency. And that limits your innovation. Doesn't mean everything is lost. And there are entire working groups trying to salvage something out of this mess. But it does mean you have to innovate very gently around the edge with small steps. You can't just go, let's change X.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I like the way you're talking about small evolution, but I would say while maintaining backward compatibility.

GEOFF HUSTON: Oh, absolutely.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: It's backwards compatibility, not backward compatibility, I think.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think you can drop the S.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Okay.

GEOFF HUSTON: And I think you change innovation to successful innovation. You can innovate any way you want, but if you want folk to adopt it, by being successful.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think results, then maybe the wrong word, but causes.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yes, causes successful innovation.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Well, it causes a lot of failed innovation, too.

GEOFF HUSTON: But the ones that succeed.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: These tensions are inevitable. And I think we just say and successful innovation.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That works better.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Requires small evolutionary steps that maintain backward compatibility. That looks better.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Maybe a comma after inevitable because we're really fusing two related thoughts. Whatever. I think that gets us to a place we...

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: We're wrapping through section four. So now we're down to the blockchain bit. I admit to not really knowing enough about blockchains to really write about them, as was kind of revealed when I said this and Barry was like that, but that's not true, Andrew. It's not true for all blockchains. And so I have an action item to just really kind of do some research and figure out what I can say about immutability in general about the blockchain,

because I don't really understand that. So let's ignore that for now. But I think starting here.

And then going down to here is what we should be reviewing. And this is based on Audrey's presentation that we had at the last meeting. The green text is. And Russ already identified that there needs to be probably another paragraph about proxies and how easy they are to block, because I don't really go into that in this paragraph. So that's kind of already an action item for me.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You may remember that Audrey talked about to make these blockchains accessible, proxies are put in front of them to give them a web interface, and so if you want to block the use of the blockchain, you just block those websites. So I'm not hearing anybody speak up. Is that because you're still reading or because you agree?

GEOFF HUSTON: Oh, I agree. I was trying to sort of phrase this differently. The property of a blockchain is, of course, to some extent, you automate the ledger and you make changes extremely high resistance and it requires permission from the old person or the

old thing to change to another thing. That's just the way the blockchain works. Your observation is that it's easy to block. The related observation is the folk who play need to positively want to play. It's not going to happen by default.

The blockchain folk can't impose themselves on the DNS without the folk playing, having a positive change to their resolution. It's not COVID. Having a positive change to the resolution environment that actually folds in the blockchain and that issue and that deliberate sort of choice point, you're right, makes it easy to block, but also makes large scale acceptance a real challenge.

MERIKE KAEO: I'm a little bit, I think I need a little bit of clarification when I'm looking at the sentence one status on the blockchain. It exists there forever. It is immutable. I mean, the hash that's created from a data. I mean it provides proof that the data was not modified. And so what is actually immutable?

RUSS HOUSLEY: You also can't change that record in the blockchain, the hash, because then the hash tree collapses.

MERIKE KAEO: And it won't verify because it's not a shot at a certain time.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think that's the point we're talking about here.

MERIKE KAEO: So the blockchain itself, right, is immutable. But where I'm having a little bit difficult, I think it needs to be changed is once a hash maybe is on the blockchain and exists there forever, it's immutable because the hash is actually the hash of the data. So having the data in there is confusing to me, the term data.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It depends on the blockchain, because the certificate transparency logs, they actually thread the certificate into it. Because the certificate -- I mean, you can literally harvest certificates from the blockchain.

MERIKE KAEO: Can we say something like once the data that is part of the blockchain is on the blockchain, but that's a little odd.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I need to work on that sentence. And Barry also pointed out to me that there are blockchains out there which allow you to kind of backtrack and mutate previous blocks. So I think both of these sentences are actually just, they're not true in every case. And so that's what I don't really understand.

MERIKE KAEO: That's news to me. I would like to have more info about where you can actually modify a blockchain. Because to me that goes against the principles of what the blockchain actually is.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: That's what I thought. I thought it is immutable was kind of the whole point, but that's not what Barry said on our last call. And I really just don't know enough to know more about that.

ROD RASMUSSEN: I'm sort of auto forking thing. I mean the math is the math.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The tree depends on…

MERIKE KAEO: There's a dependency on the previous blockchain. So that doesn't make any sense to me whatsoever.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think we need to ask Barry to explain that. What he's talking about.

GEOFF HUSTON: I remember an Ethereum presentation in an ICANN meeting some years back that said the Lords of Ethereum could all meet together and effectively alter a record under their own authority without the explicit clearance of the owner or controller of the resource. But I think the math is the math. And what it was able to do was to actually create a new transaction that act like, if you will, a canceller of a previous transaction.

But you're right. I don't think anyone can erase data in the blockchain because the math doesn't work. So I think this sentence, once it's there, it's there forever, is true. The real statement about immutability is an interesting one. Is the current description immutable?

Well, some make a feature that the current situation can be changed by, if you will, non-permissionary parties. Because other blockchains are, you said it, only you can alter it because you're key. But I think we're straying from the point of the paragraph once we get there. And this sentence, once it's there, it's there forever, it's immutable. I thought was a sentence about the maths of blockchains.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Well, the next sentence makes it about scaling. Because the only way you can change stuff is to add. There's no way to properly delete something. You can only add.

GEOFF HUSTON: Exactly.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Some blockchains have a semantic that says, this node is replacing the previous one of some identifier. And that's how the trading ones, like they're going on in the SAP working group work, I believe.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: How do we, or how do I learn more about blockchains without having to dig through tons of cruft? My issue with trying to figure out stuff about blockchains is that a lot of the stuff written about them is just kind of garbage.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I found this survey article that was published by IEEE that I found helpful because it talked about there's three basic kinds and walk through them that kind of stuff.

SUZANNE WOOLF: I put a thing in the chat that may or may not be useful. It's not going to give you the high level on blockchain, but if you want to read a little bit of a high level about the mutable versus the immutable, you might, and it's a fairly high level and points to some papers and tries not to go down too many rabbit holes, but you might give it a try just to talk about this mutable/immutable issue.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I need good reading on blockchains. Thank you. So moving on from this paragraph, because it's clear that we need to do some

work here in this section. How do people feel about this full green paragraph beneath it?

RUSS HOUSLEY: There's something wrong about more legitimate uses there are for blockchains. Something's wrong, I don't know what. I got lost.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think the point you're trying to make is immutable names might be easy in blockchain, but they're also easy to block. And for malware, you want both ease of permanence and impossibility to block. And that's why the fit is poor. But it's only about that. It actually doesn't talk and shouldn't talk about other forms of evolution around blockchains. If this is a paragraph about malware, and you might expect that in malware, immutable names might be considered a major asset because in theory, disrupting control is a case of disrupting a name. But the issue is, while it might not be possible to disrupt the name in the blockchain, the way blockchains are implemented, they're easy to block completely. In other words, you take out the entire chain, not just the name and success.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Because there are no legitimate uses at this time. There's no cost for operators.

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, that's right. Most folks feel that by blocking it, you're losing nothing. It's like the old arguments we had about blocking the.cn domain name because only spam came from .cn. It's kind of the same attitude, but true.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: And then that will hopefully lead into this new paragraph I'm going to write, which is, well, it's easy to block them because it's all just global DNS under the hood. And you can't get to them unless you use proxies that have domain names and normal IP addresses. So you can block them in the traditional way that you block anything on the Internet.

GEOFF HUSTON: And for the moment, because the DNS itself, the global DNS has not integrated that approach in, it's just easy to block all the proxies for a blockchain thing. And you're done. You're not losing anything.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Because there aren't that many proxies.

GEOFF HUSTON: Exactly. The final sentence is kind of curious, one conclusion. And I don't know, I think you're leaping across tall buildings at that point.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Well, we can just drop this sentence because Russ had an issue with it as well. I am I am reading into the future with that sentence, so it's probably better to just delete it.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think your previous sentence said it said almost the same thing, but left it more up in the air and that's easier.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: The situation may change.

GEOFF HUSTON: Why do you need the other the second paragraph, Andrew, when you've already said it for the time being..... Haven't you said it?

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Which one?

GEOFF HUSTON: For the time being, current general purpose blockchain systems are not attractive to malware authors because of their high cost, while naming specific blockchains are easy for defenders to block because their centralized infrastructure is innumerable and unchanging. Done.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Well, Russ wanted. Russ, you can speak to this, but you wanted another paragraph specifically about the proxies they use, because what that sentence doesn't say is that it's all global DNS under the hood.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That the blockchain becomes available at all because you could you've got a URL to go fetch it.

GEOFF HUSTON: So what you're saying is that the Blockchains -- well, that's not quite true, but you're saying, in effect, to be widely accepted, the blockchains need a hook in the global DNS to do that first leap.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You needs to be some way to fetch it, to fetch the Merkle tree. I mean, the math all depends on that. So you've got to be able to fetch the Merkle tree. And so how does that work today? It's by using the DNS.

GEOFF HUSTON: By using a domain name.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. So I suppose you could use an IP address, but we all know what would be fragile with that. Renumbering and the blockchain goes away.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I think it's even more than that, because you fetch it, but then you have to get updates and you have to receive.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Exactly.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: You have to talk to a proxy with an IPv4 address, probably, and these are all well-known IPv4 addresses that probably just have A records.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I just think something about that. blockchains are cool because they're immutable. But wait, you can't get them without the DNS. Needs to reset. And that's really not my point. It was Jack's point in Cancun. Thanks for the credit, but let's give credit where it belongs.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I give credit to Jack further down. You can share credit. But did that answer your question, Geoff? Is it why we want this second paragraph? I don't think it's going to be a long paragraph.

GEOFF HUSTON: That does answer my question. It is a data point that, if you will, solidifies the previous assertion.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, exactly. And it also, by the way, provides the proxy point for people who do law enforcement stuff if they ever need to take down a blockchain.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So, that's done with section four. We learned a little bit in the Cancun meeting. There was this comment from Peter on this section where we're confusing two different kinds of context, a search engine-type context and a DNSRR-type of context. I think he's really talking about starting here and then going all the way down to here.

MERIKE KAEO: What are we actually trying to say here? Are we trying to say that DNS in itself is too complicated to really understand what it's supposed to do for the general user?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think we're trying to say that some context comes from the type of RR that you're using. Because the whole first paragraph is about context in a URL kind of a notion. QR codes and all that stuff. And so I think the point is that resource record type gives you some context, A records, AAA records, MX records, so on. At least that's what I thought we were trying to do.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I mean, if you query for an MX record, you, you can assume that you're getting the address of a mail server. And I guess Peter's point is that's fundamentally different than the kind of context we're talking about in the paragraph before.

MERIKE KAEO: That's why I was a little bit confused.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So we need a better transition is what I'm hearing. That the context that you think from the top paragraph determines which resource record you care about in the DNS.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So when I look at that...

GEOFF HUSTON: I think maybe the issue was actually about the motivation for resolution. If you just give me an internet name, then without a service the gut reaction is, well, I'll get an IP address. It's the URL mode. MX says my motivation in resolving this name is to send you a piece of electronic mail. I actually don't care about that name as a host. I care about that name as a service point as in the mail domain.

And part of this issue of ambiguity is differing purposes and reasons why clients in the most general sense want to resolve a name. And the DNS is quite happily said, I'm elastic. It's just another resource record type. If you have a different motivation, let's add a new RR type and off we go. And in some ways, it's ambiguous because if I query all the RR types, I might get a whole bunch of different endpoints.

But the issue is you don't query all the RR types. You're querying for either a service or if you don't know what you're doing, an A and a quad A and that's it. I think it's the same kind of issue as that third paragraph. There is no context. But the issue comes because we wanted to use this identifier system for a variety of purposes. Service points as distinct from endpoints, et cetera.

Then we placed all of that semantic burden into the DNS through the RR type.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I admit to having a hard time understanding this.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think I put a comment in that I had a hard time understanding right at the start of this. I'm trying to salvage a bit out of it in my head to say, well, what makes sense of this? What context is this useful?

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So it kind of goes back to Merike's question. What do we want to say here about context? As you say, Geoff, do we want to talk about the motivation for resolution? Or do we want to talk about what the system provides, maybe an MX record to denote some kind of limited context or the formatting of an E.164 telephone number. Is it the context that comes with the formatting and what's embedded in the system? Or is it something we just kind of impose on it like as a belief when we are motivated to query for something specific?

MERIKE KAEO: And when I look at the title, we're looking -- I mean, this is supposed to be perspectives on ambiguous internet name resolution. Where does the ambiguity come in?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Maybe we're chasing a red herring and we should stop talking about RR records at all.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: That makes sense to me, Russ. I think I agree with that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I don't know where that thought goes, if anywhere, but not here.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: So basically, you're proposing we delete this paragraph?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I am.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: We can think about that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I was like, I'm not sure I want to delete it.

MERIKE KAEO: Maybe we just need to think a little bit like what are we actually trying to say here?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Or where does it go? But not here. That's why I don't want to delete the words, we'll find out later. Oh, that idea belongs over here.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I mean, if numerous SSAC members are reading this section and being like, I don't get it, then you need to change it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Is there any other comments from Cancun we need to sort?

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: There was one from Jacques. What was that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I thought we dealt with the one where it depends on DNS at the back end. I think we just put that in the paragraph I asked you to write in four.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: It would be inappropriate to talk about blockchain here because we're really not. I don't think we have any other -- Oh, there's some questions in the findings. I guess is Rod on the call? Rod is on the call.

ROD RASMUSSEN: I'm on the call.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: You've got a question about finding four here.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm distracted here. Hold on a second.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: You made this comment like four months ago. Maybe you can remember why.

ROD RASMUSSEN: So well, there's a voluntary mechanism which is if people want to coordinate. This is the I don't give a F about ICANN or any of you capitalists or globalists or whatever. I'm going to do my own thing. So they're not going to coordinate at all.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But there will be collisions, whether they coordinate or not.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Well, I'm saying that...

RUSS HOUSLEY: They use DNS or they use food.

ROD RASMUSSEN: I mean for those who would find it helpful, I guess that kind of answers the question for. But there's those who, even if they might find it helpful, they weren't going to do it anywhere. So I was just pointing out that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, the new DNS guys are not going to coordinate no matter how much we invite them to.

ROD RASMUSSEN: And I was just trying to get that concept kind of acknowledged there. That's all.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Some people will coordinate and others won't.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But I thought that was the point --

ROD RASMUSSEN: I cut myself off. I just try to point out this is not going to be the silver bullet answer to this problem.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Correct. I think we all agree with that.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Maybe we can clarify this second sentence here. I mean further, we could say it would be good to establish such a voluntary mechanism for those who would find it helpful. We could say something like even though it might not actually help anything

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, even though some will refuse to participate.

GEOFF HUSTON: Is the ICANN board already considering the Warren draft?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, they are.

GEOFF HUSTON: In which case, why is the assertion no mechanism that can facilitate still there in Finding 5? That's why it is. There is a proposed mechanism and it has no imprimatur. It's purely voluntary. But there is something Finding 5 says there is none.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think what we meant is, well, there is none at this moment. Well, that all is also being considered by the IETF right now for subtly different reasons.

GEOFF HUSTON: But they are complementary in so many ways in protocol, out protocol, blah, blah, blah. But I'm just arguing currently no mechanism is kind of painting it a lot darker than it really is. These bodies understand the problem and have received proposals to try and at least to folk who wish to coordinate and cooperate a way out that at least doesn't trample other people's toes. That's a lot to say in a finding.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Maybe we say protocol, proposals are being considered to create the facility for coordination.

GEOFF HUSTON: In which case the finding would well be that there is no imprimatur around such proposals and they rely on voluntary mechanisms for those who would find this helpful because they do rely on voluntary mechanisms.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Just like lots of the Internet.

GEOFF HUSTON: But the advice is the ICANN folk can't shut the gate.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's correct.

GEOFF HUSTON: There's no gate to shut. And that's really the finding. It all relies on the goodwill and good intention of the broader community to make this fly because you can't shut the gate.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, and the other part of the finding is that we know there are parties who will not choose to participate. DNS being one of them, right?

GEOFF HUSTON: That was such a good presentation. Not at the ITF. Not. Yes.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: And then I would delete this first sentence. So I'm thinking something like that.

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, I'd actually say rather than the passive being considered, I'd make it more active as ICANN and at the IETF.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: But would either dot all or sack one, one, three really facilitate coordinated use the domain namespace? I mean, they create these sandboxes where you can go and play and do whatever you want. But is that facilitating what coordinated use?

GEOFF HUSTON: Yes, because it is the DNS saying, we don't control you guys and we're not going to be the coordinator of everyone else. Have your random fun and go figure. We can do the DNS. And we've said, here's a space that has a shadow in the DNS that gives you the bridge. And that's as much as we can do. Everyone's arms are only so long. And so this is a self-serving sentence about what we can do if you use dot alt and whatever else you won't be trading on our toes. What you do between yourselves is not our problem. Correctly so.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I can take an action item to write up a section on SAC 113 and dot all. I think we're at the point where they're not going to change much anymore. Well, SAC 113 is published, but I don't think that all is really going to change that much anymore.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But the board's going through a process to pick the string.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: For SAC 113, yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: By the time this is done, we'll probably know what it is.

GEOFF HUSTON: The race of tortoises. I'll get off the floor.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I see that we've got less than five minutes left, so I suspect there's no other topic to chase on this call.

ROD RASMUSSEN: I'm thinking it's the race of the tortoise and the sloth.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Well, cool. I think we're done, guys.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you very much. I think this was a productive call.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Thanks, everyone.

MERIKE KAEO: Thank you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thanks a lot. Cool.

MERIKE KAEO: Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Bye-bye.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: Bye, thanks all.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]