Dear Andrew I agree with you completely. I'm not sure, though, why you bother (except to create a record, I guess). There have been, by my count, more than a dozen substantive emails (Mike C; Becky; Keith; Ed M; you) that outline the very real differences between the NSO processes (and particularly the PDP process) and the way in which GAC advice is developed (to the extent we know it, since the GAC is not very transparent). There have, likewise, been a similar number of emails pointing out that the GAC's privileged position with the Board in compelled negotiation is unique to the GAC and that a concomitant check on the GAC's ability to forestall the remainder of the community is appropriate and necessary. Yet nobody from the GAC has ever suggested that perhaps the way to solve their problem with the "carve out" is to give up their ability to compel the Board to negotiate. We have, in fact, repeated these points ad infinitum. It isn't that the minority of GAC members who are vocally opposing this on the list don't =really= understand or appreciate these distinctions. Of course they do. They are all very intelligent and thoughtful diplomats who represent their country's interests ably. It is simply that they (or more accurately, their political masters) disagree with the result, want more governmental power, and are attempting to avoid it by obfuscation and by erecting artificial, non-existent procedural hurdles. Paul Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 12:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Aresteh proposal to resolve Recommendation 1 and 11 issues Dear Jorge, On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 05:03:15PM +0000, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
such a obligation to chose (only for the GAC) was never in any CCWG draft
report. Of course this has not appeard in any previous draft report. It is a clever new compromise that's being proposed to address previous apparently irreconcilable goals. If we restrict ourselves strictly only to what has appeared in any of the previous drafts, we will be unable to find the compromise necessary to deliver the CCWG-Accountability's task. That would, I think, be fatal to the IANA transition. It also, I think, would in the long run desperately weaken ICANN. I don't see how any of that is a winning strategy, so I think finding a way to compromise is needed.
It is inconsistent with the multistakeholder model and the principle of equal footing.
I don't see how. The GAC has always behaved differently than other stakeholder constituencies in ICANN, and the proposal formalises that role. It allows GAC to have a choice: behave like everyone else, and then participate in the equal footing you call out; or else behave in a way different to other constituency groups, and then be treated differently too. The analogy you have drawn with the *NSO is not apt, for two reasons. First, the NSOs (and particularly the GNSO) members have direct operational stake in the outcome of PDPs. Second, PDPs have a great deal of process associated with them before they render decisions, and that process includes a lot of public consultation. The same is not true of GAC advice. A more apt analogy to the GAC would be other ACs, and it seems to me that those ACs already labour under the same rules as the GAC would in case it decided not to take the "formal GAC advice" path. That really does follow the principle of equal footing. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community