Hello, A couple of questions on the proposed MEM arbitration process: a. How is it different from the Independent Review Panel Mechanism? In the Board's response to the CCWG proposal, it has correctly restated the three areas that IRP will be invoked for: 1. Hear and resolve claims that ICANN through its Board of Directors or staff has acted or has failed to act in violation of its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws (including any violation of the Bylaws resulting from action taken in response to advice/input from any Advisory Committee or Supporting Organization); 2. Reconcile conflicting decisions of process-specific “expert panels”; and 3. Hear and resolve claims involving rights of the Sole Member under the Articles or Bylaws (subject to voting thresholds). The Board suggests the MEM arbitration mechanism would be more appropriate for No. 3. Given that the MEM and IRP mechanisms are strikingly similar (this is my understanding from a cursory reading of the MEM proposal), why create this distinction? From the MEM standpoint, what is special about this arbitration method that it is competent to adjudicate rights involving the community, that the IRP cannot? b. MEM Arbitration and enforceability in California courts. My concern (again from a preliminary understanding of the MEM proposal) is that the MEM arbitration ecosystem, thanks to its enforceability in Cali courts, will create a community of legal experts and arbitrators in the US that the ICANN community will become excessively reliant on. The influential role that lawyers have played in the CCWG's working is illustrative. If the nature of the ICANN community is expected to change over the course of the next few years (in terms of diverse and international representation), wouldn't this requirement of enforceability in California courts be an artificial obstacle? What stops the MEM model from being enforced in any court of law anywhere in the world - can't this can be incorporated in ICANN's bylaws? Arun -- -