Exactly. My first thought was, why is she not the CCWG-Accountability's (paid) legal adviser? Great stuff, even if a little mild on the Board :-)-O el On 2015-09-09 22:00, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
Thanks for this.
avri
On 09-Sep-15 15:13, Aikman-Scalese, Anne wrote:
Steve, Greg, et al,
Considering all that has been said, I harken back to Dr. Crocker’s comment in last week’s call. He said, very accurately, in my opinion, that the CCWG proposal leans toward changing the Board from a “Board of a Directors to a body of elected representatives.” I believe that it is the nature of this particular proposed change that is driving the bulk of the Board’s resistance to the Community Mechanism Sole Member structure. My perspective (having only been involved since 2010) on this change in roles is as follows:
1. It seems to me that in many situations, the Board has stated that it does not make policy and does not want to make policy, but rather that the Community makes policy and that this is the beauty of the Multi-Stakeholder Model.
2. Based on my limited 5 year experience as well as active participation in the GNSO Policy & Implementation Working Group where we studied various examples of policy-making prior to making our recommendations, I have observed that the Board does in fact make policy and it especially does so when constituencies and stakeholders cannot agree on what the final policy should be. (I apologize for coming “late to the party”, but this was due to active participation in the Policy & Implementation Working Group.)
3. The Board receives policy advice from the GNSO, the GAC, ALAC, and others. The advice received by the Board is not even limited to advice received from the Community. It may in fact receive advice from individual governments or entities such as the European Commission. In many situations, the desire to move forward even in light of strong differences of opinion has resulted in Board policy being made where the Community has not reached consensus. In this regard, individual Board members have also been put in the position of assessing various risks – e.g. the risk of a transfer of authority to some other entity.
4. Further evidence that the Board makes policy comes in the form of the creation of the New gTLD Program Committee, which was required to be free of conflicts of interest precisely because it was known they would make policy when making decisions. In this regard, the NGPC was delegated full Board authority.
5. In its Accountability proposal, the CCWG-ACCT seeks to establish a structure which is much more in line with the Board’s stated desire not to make policy. It brings the stakeholders together in a forum that provides for voting and exercise of powers if the Board does not execute policy as the Sole Member believes it was intended to be executed.
6. The proposed structure also appears to be designed to avoid undue government influence, but I have not heard anyone on the GAC say they are willing to change the current status of GAC advice under the By-Laws.
7. A possible difficulty with the proposed structure is that bringing together the Community in the form of the Community Mechanism Sole Member does not necessarily mean that there will be agreement among stakeholders with respect to establishing and executing policy.
8. Under the current structure, the Board resolves differences among stakeholder groups by making judgments based on input received from all those who provide input. It is essentially this function which I think the Board is reluctant to relinquish to the voting structure of the Sole Member. The directors are qualified and experienced professionals who believe they serve on the Board for the purpose of exercising their best independent professional judgment in matters of concern to the Community and the world with respect to the functioning of the Internet.
9. It therefore gives Board members great pause when they see that even in the best exercise of their independent professional judgment, they are subject to recall via the Sole Member structure and their view may be that this recall could, under certain circumstances, be unfounded.
10. Greg clarified this issue when he said there is a difference between a Board that serves a non-profit MEMBERSHIP corporation (proposed structure) and a Board that serves a non-profit corporation (current structure). However, the Community has been complaining that the Board serves the corporation itself (as it is bound to do) and not the Community and that this is precisely why important Accountability measures are in order prior to the IANA transition.
11. We may be learning that despite a public stance previously taken that the Board does not make policy because the Community makes policy, the Board in fact is most valuable to the Community in its role of resolving differences when the Community is unable to resolve those differences itself.
12. We are very definitely at a “fork in the road” with respect to the role of the ICANN Board of Directors. It is particularly important that everyone be extremely candid about this. I personally would anticipate that if the recommendations of the CCWG-ACCT are adopted, the composition of the Board and the type of Board members being sought (and willing to serve) may well be different from the individuals previously recruited and currently serving.
13. Having said all of the above, I continue to support the CCWG – ACCT Community Mechanism Sole Member proposal – precisely because it is actually a closer reflection of what everyone has been saying is SUPPOSED to happen in the unique and proper functioning of the Multi-Stakeholder Model. If we really believe in this MS Model and believe that it actually works, we should be ready to adopt the Community Mechanism Sole Member structure.
14. On the topic of potential undue government influence and the NTIA view of such influence, the GAC has not yet said it will participate in the Sole Member with a voting role. If I were representing a GAC government, I would have serious concerns about this level of participation as it appears to me it represents a conscious choice to submit to the jurisdiction of the California courts and statutes – or at least arguably so since the Sole Member is the sole member of a California non-profit unincorporated association. (In this regard, I still did not receive an answer with respect to my question regarding the applicability of CA Corporations Code Section 18630 which provides as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a member or person in control of a nonprofit association may be subject to liability for a debt, obligation, or liability of the association under common law principles governing alter ego liability of shareholders of a corporation, taking into account the differences between a nonprofit association and a corporation.” )
15. Because of the recommended formalization of the Sole Member structure, I believe the Sole Member should have a separate budget for enforcement of its member rights under the California statutes. Further, I believe individual directors should agree, upon taking office, not to sue the Sole Member.
16. If the Board continues in its current role with respect to resolving differences and making policy, I think there is actually a higher risk that the control of the Internet and the IANA functions could be subject to undue government influence. (Witness .africa?) Nonetheless, I do personally believe that GAC Advice should continue to have special status under the By-Laws, whether or not the GAC participates in active voting in the Sole Member. The GAC has essentially been the only influence with any “teeth” in the direction of consumer protection in the launching of new gTLDs and that consumer protection is absolutely critical to promoting trust in the worldwide web long term.
17. With respect to the Board’s recommended use of binding arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, this bears discussing with the Community as a whole in the Face to Face meeting. However, it is unquestionable that in practice, arbitration can take a very long time and especially in relation to both sides settling on an arbitrator or arbitrators and waiting for availability of particular arbitrators who may be qualified to arbitrate disputes in this highly specialized arena. Further, not all arbitration rules allow for issuance of injunctive relief. The availability of expedited injunctive relief in court would seem absolutely critical to the process of enforcement by the Sole Member of Community powers. In the private sector, we often conclude agreements which provide for arbitration but do not prohibit seeking injunctive relief pending such arbitration decisions.
I apologize in advance for any statements made out of lack of knowledge or experience. So far in my ICANN education and orientation, it seems that the only way to contribute and to learn as a relative newcomer is to jump in with both feet and be prepared to be embarrassed by someone.
I support discussing the Board’s concerns in a face-to-face meeting of the CCWG-ACCT in Los Angeles September 25 and 26. I also agree with those who have observed that this meeting should be set in the very near future.
Anne
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*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
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