Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary Model

June 15, 2015

      Avri,

I agree with everything you said. 

I admit that the membership model has some merit, but it brings several
problems that have been raised in our WG and reiterated in the public
comments. 

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Tijani BEN JEMAA

Executive Director

Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)

Phone:  + 216 41 649 605

Mobile: + 216 98 330 114

Fax:       + 216 70 853 376

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-----Message d'origine-----
De : accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] De la part de Avri
Doria
Envoyé : lundi 15 juin 2015 15:03
À : accountability-cross-community@icann.org
Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary
Model

Hi,

I agree with those who are argue that there is far greater power in the

Cooperative Model, aka Sidley's misnamed voluntary model, we currently

have than people are acknowledging. This is especially so with the many

improvements we have been discussing.

As we have seen on occasion when enough of us work together, the

multistakeholder process can  force the Board/Staff's hand.  I think

people exagerate the power exercised by the NTIA and its threat of

contract non-renewal.    Also remember that  we will still have a

possible RFP event;  the IANA Functions Review and the Separation Cross

Community WG can serve as the same forcing function if that is the only

sort of thing that convinces corporate ICANN.

Not only will be able to use the combined stakeholder power to force

issues as we done before, we will still have the whole pro

intergovernmental crowd waiting for us to fail so that they save the day

at the ITU or some other IGO.  That should be enough to inspire us.  If

it doesn't, I do not see how something dragging through the courts for

years will make much of a difference. 

As I have argued before, I think the whole membership route offers first

a set of delays while we try to agree on it with the Board, and then

allows for a new set of accountability holes we have yet to fully

explore or discover - my greatest concern.  I believe we are rushing

into someting I think we just don't need for the transition.

But if we go with a membership model as so many insist, I believe that

only one where the SO or AC is the UA should be considered.

avri

On 15-Jun-15 03:03, Roelof Meijer wrote:
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Keith,
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I wonder if with "If a future ICANN Board were to jump the tracks, the
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community will no longer have the NTIA backstop. Without legal
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enforceability, the community would have to trust future ICANN Boards
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and trust future California Attorney Generals.  youre not
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oversimplifying or over-contrasting between the  situation with legal
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enforceability and without.
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I think that in a situation where the board jump the track, the
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community ultimately goes through its process to spill the board and
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the board refuses to go, that board would be paralyzed in all ways,
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face shame and defamation individually on a global scale and would
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ruin their personal careers completely.
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They would dimply not do that.
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Best,
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Roelof
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From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com
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<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>
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Date: zondag 14 juni 2015 03:52
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To: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>
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Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org
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<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>"
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<accountability-cross-community@icann.org
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<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>
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Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart,
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Voluntary Model
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Chris,
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NTIA's current enforcement powers are indirect but very real. Through
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its existing ability to re-bid the IANA Functions contract, NTIA
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ensures that ICANN and its Board of Directors remain true to its
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bylaws. That unique role is set to change.
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If a future ICANN Board were to jump the tracks, the community will no
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longer have the NTIA backstop. Without legal enforceability, the
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community would have to trust future ICANN Boards and trust future
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California Attorney Generals. Why shouldn't we instead trust the
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global multi-stakeholder community itself?
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If a future ICANN community were to try to spill the board, wouldn't
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we want that consensus decision to be legally enforceable? Or do we
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want to allow a future Board to tell the community it was wrong and,
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claiming fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, reject the decision?
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Ultimately, we're deciding whether authority should rest with the
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ICANN Board and the California AG, or with the ICANN community and the
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California AG.
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I'm in favor of the latter.
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Regards,
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Keith
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On Jun 13, 2015, at 6:08 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au
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<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote:
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Hi Paul,
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I was specifically responding to Keiths point so hardly a non-sequitur.
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Cheers,
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Chris
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On 14 Jun 2015, at 02:29 , Paul Rosenzweig
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<paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com
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<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> wrote:
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Chris
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We need more formal powers for the community because much of the
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power of the NTIA was informal. The only thing that could replace
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the NTIA precisely would be the NTIA.  I get that you don't like the
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membership model. But asking why a non-governmental solution is
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different from a governmental one is just a non sequitur.
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Paul
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--
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Sent from myMail app for Android
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Friday, 12 June 2015, 11:12PM -04:00 from Chris Disspain
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<ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
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Greetings All,
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1. on Beckys comment below: if that is correct then surely the
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same applies to the relationship between the SO/AC and its
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Unincorporated Association. If a court cannot enforce a Board
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spill by the SOs/ACs then a court can also not make the UA do
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what the SO or AC wants. Can it?
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2. on Keiths comment below: How does the NTIA currently have
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powers of enforcement over ICANN outside of matters covered in
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the IANA contract? If NTIA was/is prepared to enter into an
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Affirmation of Commitment with ICANN which can be terminated by
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either party and is not legally enforceable, why should we
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insist on a higher standard?
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Cheers,
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Chris
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On 13 Jun 2015, at 02:05 , Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3akdrazek@verisign.com>>
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wrote:
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Thanks Becky,
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I think you highlight a key point.
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Currently, NTIA and the California Attorney General are the
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only enforcement bodies ensuring ICANN remains committed to its
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bylaws.
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The membership structure would give some of that authority to
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the ICANN community through its existing structures -- the SOs
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and ACs.
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Isnt that the definition of transitioning the United States
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government (in its various forms) out of its unique role?
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After NTIA disengages, dont we want the community to have
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shared authority for enforcement, rather than leaving it to the
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California Attorney General alone?
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Regards,
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Keith
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*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu
nity%2dbounces@icann.org>
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu
nity%2dbounces@icann.org>] *On
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Behalf Of *Burr, Becky
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*Sent:* Friday, June 12, 2015 11:07 AM
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*To:* Roelof Meijer; Accountability Cross Community
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*Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] FW: [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised
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Powers Chart, Voluntary Model
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Roelof,
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shi
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As I understand it, Courts view the bylaws as a contract
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between a corporation and its members/shareholders.  If ICANN
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has no members, the bylaws are not a contract with anyone, so
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the only party with authority to enforce would be the Attorney
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General.  (As discussed elsewhere, this is extremely unlikely
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to happen outside of a fraud/corruption situation.)
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The fact that members of SOs are legal entities doesnt change
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this.  Unless they are members of ICANN, they are not a party
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to the bylaws contract.
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B
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J. Beckwith Burr
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*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
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1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
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Office: +
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1.202.533.2932  Mobile:  +1.202.352.6367  / becky.burr@neustar.biz
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3abecky.burr@neustar.biz> /
http://www.neustar.biz
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<http://www.neustar.biz/>
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*From: *Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aRoelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>
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*Date: *Friday, June 12, 2015 at 8:18 AM
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*To: *Accountability Community
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<accountability-cross-community@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu
nity@icann.org>>
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*Subject: *[CCWG-ACCT] FW: [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers
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Chart, Voluntary Model
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Dear all, and especially dear legal colleagues,
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The memo states:
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"If there were a dispute between ICANN and an SO/AC, the
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parties could agree to an IRP and binding arbitration, but
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there would be no mechanism to restrain ICANN from acting
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contrary to these decisions, nor would there be a mechanism to
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challenge an arbitration decision that exceeded the scope of
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authority of the arbitration panel, outside an unlikely,
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independent intervention by the California Attorney General. "
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I understand that the SO/ACs, not being legal entities, cannot
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take legal action to enforce. However, does that really equal
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"no mechanism to restrain ICANN from acting contrary to these
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decisions?
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Most members of SOs are legal entities, many members of ACs
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are too, couldnt those members, being affected parties,
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individually or collectively take legal action?
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Alternatively, I would assume that before the ultimate step of
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talking legal action against ICANN, the community will have
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escalated through its powers and thus has completed the
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procedure to recall the entire board. The power to recall the
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entire board will have to be combined with the power to in one
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way or another appoint an interim board. So, the community,
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through due process, recalls the board. The board, in
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contradiction with the bylaws, refuses to go. The community
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has recalled the board and thus, through the defined process
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(also in the bylaws), appoints an interim board. According to
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the bylaws, this interim board is now the legal representative
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of ICANN. And can take the required legal action (if necessary)
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to force the old board to go away and get lost.
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Would one of these two work?
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Best,
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Roelof Meijer
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*From: *<Hofheimer>, "Joshua T." <jhofheimer@sidley.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajhofheimer@sidley.com>>
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*Date: *donderdag 11 juni 2015 06:09
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*To: *"ccwg-accountability5@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3accwg%2daccountability5@icann.o
rg>"
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<ccwg-accountability5@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3accwg%2daccountability5@icann.o
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*Cc: *Sidley ICANN CCWG <sidleyicannccwg@sidley.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asidleyicannccwg@sidley.com>>,
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ICANN-Adler <ICANN@adlercolvin.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aICANN@adlercolvin.com>>
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*Subject: *[Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary
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Model
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Dear Legal Sub-Team,
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Further to the CCWG request on the call last Friday, attached
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is a memo revising the summary chart describing the viability
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of the enumerated powers under the three models  Member model,
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Designator Model and Voluntary Model.  We also explore the
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impact of not having the SO/ACs organized legal persons to
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represent their interests.
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Cheers,
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Josh
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*JOSHUA* *HOFHEIMER *
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Sidley Austin LLP
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+1.213.896.6061 (LA direct)
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+1.650.565.7561 (PA direct)
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+1.323.708.2405 (cell)
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jhofheimer@sidley.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajhofheimer@sidley.com>
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http://www.sidley.com
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<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.sidley.com_&d=AwMF-
g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=Q
OhQjQwFElYq1-xAGs6TVUWxpVd3OZaCVRq9bV-0pUg&s=8g0nj7XBKequ4xTeqTLzy3EvyRZsOpZ
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http://www.sidley.com/files/upload/signatures/SA-autosig.png
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<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.sidley.com_&d=AwMF-
g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=Q
OhQjQwFElYq1-xAGs6TVUWxpVd3OZaCVRq9bV-0pUg&s=8g0nj7XBKequ4xTeqTLzy3EvyRZsOpZ
lGqNG7PIfFS4&e=> *SIDLEY
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AUSTIN LLP*
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*From:*ccwg-accountability5-bounces@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3accwg%2daccountability5%2dbounc
es@icann.org> [mailto:ccwg-accountability5-bounces@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3accwg%2daccountability5%2dbounc
es@icann.org>] *On
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Behalf Of *Hilton, Tyler
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*Sent:* Monday, June 08, 2015 8:29 PM
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*To:* ccwg-accountability5@icann.org
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3accwg%2daccountability5@icann.o
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*Subject:* [Acct-Legal] Memo - Responses to CCWG GAC Questions
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Dear Legal Sub-team,
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Attached please find a memo responding to the list of questions
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from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) provided to us
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on June 5, 2015.
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Best,
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*TYLER* *HILTON*
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Associate
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Sidley Austin LLP
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555 West Fifth Street
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+1.213.896.6130
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thilton@sidley.com
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<x-msg://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3athilton@sidley.com>
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<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.sidley.com&d=AwMF-g
&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QO
hQjQwFElYq1-xAGs6TVUWxpVd3OZaCVRq9bV-0pUg&s=RZAttuK9gIR-rWhgnzzBCJwmd-AX6TvL
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http://www.sidley.com/files/upload/signatures/SA-autosig.png
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<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.sidley.com_&d=AwMF-
g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=Q
OhQjQwFElYq1-xAGs6TVUWxpVd3OZaCVRq9bV-0pUg&s=8g0nj7XBKequ4xTeqTLzy3EvyRZsOpZ
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