Thank you Bruce for sharing this. Can someone advise if my bold interspersed summary comments (comparing this material with the CCWG's proposal) are accurate? On 3 September 2015 at 10:35, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
Below are some notes relating to Chris's summary that reflects a DRAFT of current thinking.
We will refine these and post the final points into the public comment forum, once we get feedback during this call.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
CCWG-Accountability Proposal Delivery Framework
1. Develop Fundamental Bylaws and Process for Modification
a. Bylaws areas:
i. ICANN's Mission and Core Values.
ii. Reviews imported from the Affirmation of Commitments, including modifications with community consensus.
iii. The requirements for having community input and consultation on development of ICANN Budget, Strategic Plans, Operating Plans and Standard Bylaws. This includes the IANA Functions Budget as well.
iv. Commitment to fund IANA Functions housed within ICANN.
v. IANA Functions Reviews called for within the CWG Report, with commitment to implement recommendations from those reviews.
*AN ABBREVIATED (SHORTER) SET OF FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS*
b. Change process - When Board proposes changes to Fundamental Bylaws (including amendments, additions or deletions):
i. Incorporate into the Bylaws a requirement for community comment and input.
ii. Empower the community to support such a change through a demonstration of consensus in the community. Consensus in this situation is demonstrated through meeting the specified threshold of numbers of SOs or ACs needed to support the proposed change.
iii. Once there is community consensus to support the change, the change is effective upon 3/4 of the Board voting in favour of the change.
*NO CO-DECISION ON CHANGES TO FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS - REMAINS BOARD DECISION FOLLOWING INFORMAL COMMUNITY CONSENSUS PROCESS*
2. IRP Enhancements
a. Roll back modification of standard of review that was in place before 2013.
b. Commitment that revised standard of review, standing panel and procedural improvements will be part of next phase of work on IRP enhancements.
*[NOT MY AREA]*
3. Expand Reconsideration Process and Define Clear Escalation Path For Accountability
a. Expand scope of reconsideration process to define as an initial step in seeking challenge against Board or staff action. Expansion could include:
i. Allowance of Reconsideration Process to be used in allegations that the Board acted in violation of the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.
ii. Increase from current process-driven bases to areas of more substantive concern, such as unfairness of a decision or inconsistency of logic.
b. Following Reconsideration Process, use IRP and build escalation through accountability mechanisms, resulting in development of full appeals process.
*[NOT MY AREA]*
4. Establish new Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM):
===============================================================
a. Process for community to bring challenges against Board action that is alleged to be inconsistent with specified fundamental Bylaws.
b. Binding arbitration process that is enforceable in California Courts
c. ICANN funds MEM arbitrations.
d. The MEM shall not be available for challenges based upon the adoption of ICANN's annual budget or annual operating plan.
*ABOLISH COMMUNITY MECHANISM AS SINGLE MEMBER AND RELY ON AN ARBITRATION PROCESS*
5. Community Involvement in Development of Standard Bylaws Changes, Budgets, Operating Plans and Strategic Plans
a. Incorporate into the Bylaws a requirement for community comment and input on each of these areas.
b. Empower the community to raise timely consensus-based issues or concerns on a proposed Board action ("Community Concerns"). Consensus in this situation is demonstrated through meeting the specified threshold of numbers of SOs or ACs needed to support the raising of an issue or concern.
c. ICANN commits to working with the community to resolve areas of Community Concerns, through a consultation process.
d. Provide a consultation process (borrowing from the GAC/Board consultation requirement), if the Board intends to take action that is inconsistent with the Community Concerns, to work to resolve the inconsistencies where possible, or if not possible, then a 2/3 Board threshold needed for Board to act against the general Community Concerns.
*ABOLITION OF COMMUNITY BUDGET / PLAN VETO POWER*
6. Board Removal/Recall ===========================
a. Institute pre-service letters to require the resignation of each director upon the occurrence of specific events:
i. Serious violation of governance standard, including statutory causes for removal (such as fraud).
ii. Refusal to abide by the processes set forth to enable new community empowerment areas.
iii. Failure to abide by outcome of Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (defined in #5 below).
b. Process for invoking the resignation requirement. Any removal of a director is a very serious action, which must include a special community rationale and justification for removal of any individual directors and a special process for removals that would impact a significant number of voting directors. The process should allow for Board members to have an opportunity to defend against allegations that could support removal, and also include the potential for the imposition of sanctions less severe than removal.
*UNCLEAR - MAY PROPOSE REMOVAL OF COMMUNITY POWER TO RECALL DIRECTORS OR BOARD. * *PROPOSES LIMITED GROUNDS (NOT VALID IN A MEMBERSHIP-BASED MODEL).* *[CCWG PROPOSAL DOES GIVE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND ALLEGATIONS.]*
7. Incorporate Affirmation of Commitments Reviews into Bylaws
a. Consider proper edits to WHOIS review.
b. Commitment to work with community on guidelines for reviews:
i. Review team size and composition.
ii. Budget.
iii. Access to experts.
iv. Access to ICANN documentation.
v. Expectations on process for adoption and implementation of reviews.
vi. Optimization and standardization of review team processes.
*UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS SEEKS TO REWRITE CCWG PROPOSAL (ASIDE FROM KNOWN WHOIS ITEM) OR SOMETHING ELSE. *
8. Implement All ICG Contingencies
a. Confirm CSC is included in enhancements.
b. Work with ccNSO and GNSO to confirm ability to address performance-related issues is appropriately documented.
*PREVIOUS POINTS RENDER ICG CONTINGENCIES UNMET (IN THIS AUTHOR'S OPINION)*
9. Institutionalize in Bylaws the current practice of Board/GAC consultation requirement used only over consensus advice
*SUPPORTS CCWG PROPOSAL?*
10. Identify and commit to a process for defining continuous improvement work how the Board will consider those recommendations
a. Bylaws requirement that continuous improvement ideas must be supported by a high threshold of the community and to uphold the following criteria consistent with the lines of the NTIA Criteria, which are:
i. Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
ii. Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
iii. Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services;
iv. Maintain the openness of the Internet; and
v. Not result in ICANN becoming a government-led or an inter-governmental organization.
b. Utilize existing mechanisms as home for some of the other identified areas of continuous improvement, including ATRT3.
*MAY BE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WS1.* thanks Jordan
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *