Matthew:
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Based on the assumption that we would accept this advice, and that the IRP is the "mechanism for interpretation", we would have to focus on what general principles we can agree on, and only include this set of principles as part of our group's recommendations. Based on my reading of this thread, and the CCWG call discussions, it seems to me that there are some areas of agreement.
We have the general principles. Those of us who believe in mission limitations are not the ones causing the delay here. The problem stems from the realization of certain people that mission limitations might actually prevent ICANN from doing certain things that they might want it to do. So we are discussing what those principles might actually mean in practice. There are legitimate issues to be discussed about the proper scope of contractual enforcement. In my opinion this has been a very useful and clarifying discussion.
First I believe the key principles of the 3rd draft remain acceptable : And most importantly, regarding the discussion about "voluntary commitments", as Avri points out, we might have a way forward if we were to agree that *the scope of acceptable commitments in any agreement should be defined by policy* (with all the related process safeguards, including bottom up nature as well as advisory inputs), instead of implementation. Then it would be up to the policy makers to define whether eligibility conditions are appropriate or not and should be enforced, whether a specific form of stakeholder consultation or governance is acceptable, etc.
What you are proposing here, Matthew, is that we abandon basic, constitutional mission limitations and allow any policy to dictate ICANN's mission. Not acceptable, sorry. It misses the whole point of having a defined and limited mission.