Alan,Leon Tks Still I am not sure the workability of empowering the community to exercise their rights on an accountability which is dependant on another accountability . I suspect that the very objectives of what we have discussed for months may not be acheived. Let ius hear from others .Anyhow thank you again and thanks Malcolm. Bruce, Chris ,,,, and other contributing to find a more simpler way how to create a member mofdel without a real need to UA which I confess would be legally complex to establish and to implement Let us also asking LEON TO SEEK ADVICE FROM OUR LEGAL ADVISER. Regards Kavouss 2015-05-24 19:36 GMT+02:00 Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>:
Kavouss,
We obviously have no specific rules for "ICANN Members" since that position does not currently exist. For all other appointments, we can recall on a person by person basis and I would expect that to not change if we enact specific rules for ICANN Members. Of course, that is just my expectation and cannot control the outcome, but I am not sure why we would do all or nothing.
I do note that elsewhere in our rules, we require people appointed to represent us to, where possible and practical, to consult the ALAC on their position on a given topic, and to follow such advice if given.
Alan
At 24/05/2015 01:27 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Alan Tks for explanation You did not address my last point, in case of decision making , say 5 appointees by majority and disagreement of community for the decision made followed by dismissal, all 5 would be dismissed or only those who voted for that contested decision? Tks Kavouss
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On 24 May 2015, at 17:47, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > wrote:
Two points:
1. The SO/AC could well delegate multiple people. That is why we have suggested a weight of 5 for SO/ACs. In the case of the ALAC, it could well be one person per region (perhaps the five members of the ALAC Leadership Team (ALT) which is regionally balanced).
2. I cannot speak to other groups, but the ALAC has specific and very clear rules for removing its Chair, any member of the ALT, or in fact any appointee to any position. See http://tinyurl.com/ALAC-RoP-2013-04, sections 20 and 22. If we were to go the way of specific people being ICANN Members, we would likely add explicit provisions for this appointment as well.
Alan
At 24/05/2015 09:19 AM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear Malcolm Tks again I hope/ wish it would as simple as you mentioned, However, it is dangerous to delegate all such authority to one person. In case of more than one , how decision will be made . In case of majority , would the community be able to dismiss all even the minority one? In the interval between meeting how community will act? Kavouss
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On 24 May 2015, at 12:17, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 24/05/2015 09:29, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: Dear Malcolm What are those terns and conditions as well as applicable rules?
The SOACs make their own rules. Unless a SOAC creates a rule to the contrary, a chair can be dismissed at will be a SOAC. This makes them completely accountable to the SOAC.
That said, I think worrying about the misuse of the power of membership is misplaced.
As I understand it, the only powers that members have are i) to go to court alleging that ICANN has not followed its own Bylaws; and ii) to inspect a few formal documents that the company is required to have by law.
Is there anything else of which I'm unaware?
I can't see any reason to worry about excessive or inappropriate use of such powers. Courts are familiar with frivolous litigation, and prepared to suppress and sanction it - nor could we immunise ICANN against being sued by anybody in the world on other grounds, even if we tried.
If this is not a worry, and if there are no other relevant powers of which I'm unaware, there is an even simpler option that perhaps we should consider: that the members of ICANN can be anybody in the world who applies to become a member.
This would resolve one of the problems with having part of "the community" as members: that they may decline to go to court when they ought to.
Personally, I think that Chris' scenario of a member going to court to try to force ICANN to act in a way the Board deems to be outside ICANN's powers is pretty fanciful. Such a lawsuit would be doomed to failure: no court will order a corporation to act in a particular way merely because a member asks it, even if the corporation had erred in believing itself precluded from acting in that way.
But a much more realistic scenario is that of a member going to court to restrain the ICANN from acting in a way the Board consider within ICANN's powers, but that the member considers outside scope. A court could rule on whether a given action is outside a corporation's powers, and if it finds that it is, order the corporation to desist.
However, there is a problem: if the Board is acting outside ICANN's scope, quite likely this will not be a rogue Board acting in defiance of the community, but rather a Board acting with the full support of the SOACs: a "rogue community" asking ICANN to act outside its proper scope. Who then is to restrain them?
Having a broad membership would address this problem. So I ask this group, what (if any) problems might be caused by such an option?
Malcolm.
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