Hello Avri,
While people are deciding the SD model sufficient to meet our requirements, I question whether the inability of that model with regard to direct shared decisions on implementation of a separation process is not a serious enough flaw to make the model unacceptable. In the CM model, the community shares the power to decide on approval of a separation recommendation, in the SD model, the community needs to rely on indirect methods like Board approval, appeals, court proceedings and replacing the Board.
I would assume the following path: (1) There is a process in the bylaws that involves the community on deciding to separate IANA from ICANN - assuming this process in the bylaws is clear the outcome of the process resolves the situation - lets assume there a 90% probability that this works (2) If there is a dispute about whether the bylaws have been followed - we use a dispute process with binding arbitration - now I assume we have reached a 99.9% probability that this will resolve the issue. (3) if the board decides not to following the outcome of the binding arbitration - use an enforcement mechanism to remove the board - this is the last 0.1% of the problem and should be kept as simple as possible and with well understood legal processes In this I am assuming that the various groups that elect Board members do enough due diligence to ensure that all Board members are committed to follow the bylaws in step (1). So we are dealing with first some ambiguity in (1) that results in (2) being used - and then a really extreme situation when (3) needs to be used. Regards, Bruce Tonkin -