On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 07:31:50PM +0100, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
Perhaps what "management of TLD" mean for ICANN needs to be clarified and I like to get it clear through example. Is ICANN said to be "managing TLD" in the 2 broad scenarios below:
I don't think they're managing the TLD at all. They're managing the terms of the delegation of that TLD. We're sliding over a technical difference that, in this case, makes the difference.
1. That ICANN by its policy/procedure approves specific TLD to certain applicant
I'd state this instead as "ICANN by its policies and procedures allocates specific names in the root zone for a given operator of that name, subject additionally to the ordinary IANA rules (which are, themselves, generated by ICANN policies and procedures) in order to permit delegation." ICANN's rules here might well involve checks on the action of the operator of that name, but that is not "management" of them except in the sense of any other management of a commercial contract. The operator receives the allocation under certain terms and conditions, and because of that ICANN is in a position to determine whether the terms and conditions are met, in order to fulfill ICANN's job as the manager of the allocation and delegation policies within ICANN's area of responsibilty (the root zone).
2. That ICANN require an already assigned TLD be used/operated in a specific way.
This is just a special case of the same "terms and conditions are met" question above. ICANN's power comes from its ability to remove the delegation from the root zone due to of non-performance on the part of the operator of the name. Because that would be disruptive to the global DNS, ICANN seeks to use other mechanisms (like contracts) to enforce the performance. But the ultimate management power ICANN has is in fact only that of removing the delegation -- in effect, terminating the contract. Like any other normal actor that has operational responsibilities, ICANN seeks to blunt the side effects of such contract termination by requiring escrow and so on, precisely so that one bad actor's non-performance doesn't have nasty side effects. To the extent that ICANN uses this power to expand its ability to force terms on operators of TLDs, I think it is acting outside its remit. I think that worry is one source of opposition here. But I also think that the new accountability measures that are supposed to take effect if ever we finish this work mean that ICANN's incentives to try to expand its control in this way will be tempered by the ability of the community to prevent it doing so. This is why I think the approach Becky has been taking is correct. We need to line up the incentives for the right behaviour, rather than trying to create rules that will make bad behaviour impossible. Rules can always be gamed, whereas correctly-aligned incentives discourage gaming. But none of this will be made easier if we permit over-broad language about consumer protection in the DNS market, since that isn't actually what ICANN does. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com