There are several troubling things in the Board's comments on the Mission Statement. The CCWG Mission Statement had two fundamental constraints on ICANN's powers: a "picket fence," and a requirement that policies imposed by ICANN on DNS participants have to be developed through a consensus-based multi-stakeholder process. The Board's comments appear to do away with both of these constraints. Instead, the Board would substitute a simplified Mission Statement - "to ensure the stable and secure operation of the global, interoperable Internet's unique identifier systems" - a statement that ICANN will only as "reasonably appropriate" to achieve that Mission, and two additional Principles: (1) that "ICANN's entering into and enforcement of Registry and Registrar contracts is an important component of ICANN's work in coordination and allocation of names in the Root Zone of the DNS"; and (2) that "ICANN is not a regulator, and does not regulate content through these contracts." The consensus requirement has disappeared entirely. As I read it, anything that the ICANN Board decides is "reasonably appropriate" for the "stable and secure operation of the [DNS]" is within its power to impose on third parties - whether or not it has been subject of consensus decision-making. And the Mission Statement is watered down still further in regard to the question of ICANN's contracting powers. The CCWG proposal already acknowledged that "ICANN shall have the ability to negotiate, enter into, and enforce agreements with contracted parties in service of its Mission." This was intended to make clear that ICANN's powers to impose conditions on 3d parties through its contracts are limited by the Mission; ICANN can't make an "end run" around the Mission Statement limitations through its contracts. The Board's comment omits that italicized language, which would seem to imply a view that ICANN's power to contract with others (including Registries and Registrars) is NOT subject to ICANN's Mission, and that ICANN can condition access to the DNS on whatever conditions it sees fit to impose. If that's what was intended, I believe it represents a serious difference of opinion. Finally, why does the Board prefer its language in its Principle 2 - "ICANN is not a regulator, and does not regulate content through these contracts" - to the CCWG proposal language "ICANN shall not impose regulations on services that use the Internet's unique identifiers or the content such services carry or provide" ? To use an example we used before: Suppose ICANN requires all registrants to agree to abide by the decisions of its new Consumer Protection Dispute Resolution Procedure (CPDRP),which will evaluate claims of consumer fraud. A challenger says: "That's outside of ICANN's Mission, and it violates the "no content regulation" principle." I think it's fair to say that we want that challenge to succeed - this is precisely the sort of thing we don't want ICANN to be doing in the future. But under the Board's view, ICANN will be able to say: "No, we're not a regulator - and this isn't a 'regulation' of content or anything else - it's just a contract, and we can do what we like through our contracts." Unless I'm misreading your comments, it's difficult for me to see how these views can be reconciled. David At 03:13 PM 12/14/2015, Burr, Becky wrote:
Bruce -
Could I ask for some clarification on the Boards comments on the Mission statement?
1. I understand that ICANN has an operational role with respect to names, but I am not sure why that is not encompassed by concept of implementation of domain name policies? (The Mission statement does not limit ICANNs role to policy development, and specifically includes policy implementation.) So, it is important to understand what the Board means when it refers to allocation and assignment of names in the root zone and to understand why such activities might fall outside of policy implementation. It would help to have concrete examples of the Boards concern here, because I suspect we agree that ICANN does not have authority to allocate and assign new gTLDs outside of a policy development process, or to allocate and assign ccTLDs outside RFC 1591. The Boards view here also has important implications for resolving 2.B. below
2. I understand the Board is concerned about vague language regarding contractual enforcement. But Im a little vague on what language is and is not acceptable to the Board (keeping in mind that none of this is intended as final Bylaws language).
A. Does the Board accept (both conceptually and as a concept in the Bylaws) that ICANN shall act strictly in accordance with, and only as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission?
B. Does the Board propose to replace (in some place other than the Mission Statement) the following two concepts:
ICANN shall not impose regulations on services that use the Internets unique identifiers or the content that such services carry or provide; and ICANN shall have the ability to negotiate, enter into, and enforce agreements with contracted parties in service of its Mission
With these concepts:
ICANNs entering into and enforcement of Registry and Registrar contracts is an important component of ICANNs work in coordination and allocation of names in the Root Zone of the DNS; and ICANN is not a regulator and does not regulate content through these contracts. [Aside - I assume ICANN is merely asserting its status here, and is not actually willing to agree to language prohibiting it from acting as a regulator]
3. Whether or not the following concepts belong in the Bylaws, does the Board agree that:
I. The prohibition on regulation of content is not intended to prevent ICANN policies from taking into account the use of domain names as identifiers in various natural languages; II. Spec 1 of the RA and Spec 4 of the RAA describe activities within ICANNs Mission; and III. The parties to existing Registry Agreements and Registrar Accreditation Agreements are bound by those agreements.
Thanks.
B
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <http://www.neustar.biz>neustar.biz
From: Bruce Tonkin <<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> Date: Monday, December 14, 2015 at 5:49 AM To: Accountability Community <<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: FW: ICANN Board Comments on Third CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations
Hello Jordan,
Thanks for posting to the list.
The comments are also available in the public comment forum at:
We had a half day meeting of the full Board on Thursday 10 Dec, and then spent a few hours again with the full Board finalizing the comments yesterday Sunday 13 Dec. That was in addition to another half day meeting held on Saturday 5 Dec. All dates are relative to my time zone J
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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