Kavouss we are most certainly bound to california law for WS1, as long as ICANN is a cal corporation we are bound to abide by these statutes. ICANN is not yet an international organisation formed by treaty no matter how some wish it was =) Regards, James From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh Date: Friday 9 October 2015 at 3:48 p.m. To: "Chartier, Mike S" Cc: "wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>", CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC We are not bound to that code This is a global community environment not necessarily limited to specific local law Tks Cheers Kavouss Sent from my iPhone On 9 Oct 2015, at 15:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com<mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: Yes, I hear what you’re saying (and don’t have any problem with it, indeed we support the CCWG proposal). I just wonder if it’s an absolute prohibition against any involvement by the rest of the membership. Mike [Non-Lawyer, not admitted in any bars, casinos, or Golden Corrals] From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, October 9, 2015 8:33 AM To: Chartier, Mike S Cc: <egmorris1@toast.net<mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>; CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [WP1] Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC Cal Corp Code 5222(b) says nothing about any role in removing a group-elected director for any party other than that group. Quite the opposite. Clauses 2 and 3 both say such a director can be removed "only by" that group. Any bylaw that gave a role to other groups would be inconsistent with 5222(b). Greg [Lawyer, but not admitted in CA. This does not constitute legal advice such that an attorney-client relationship is created thereby] On Friday, October 9, 2015, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com<mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: I'll yield to the lawyers, but I think the intent and letter is to prevent removal without consent. It may be the case that a requirement for the whole community, including the relevant SO/AC, to consent to removal would still be in compliance. On Oct 8, 2015, at 8:27 PM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net<javascript:;><mailto:egmorris1@toast.net<javascript:;>>> wrote: Hi Chris, I'm not Robin, and I don't know her position, but mine mirrors the California Corporations Code provision for the removal of Board members selected by specific subgroups, specifically §5222(b) which states: (2) If by the provisions of the articles or bylaws the members of any class, voting as a class, are entitled to elect one or more directors, any director so elected may be removed only by the applicable vote of the members of that class. (3) If by the provisions of the articles or bylaws the members within a chapter or other organizational unit, or region or other geographic grouping, voting as such, are entitled to elect one or more directors, any director so elected may be removed only by the applicable vote of the members within the organizational unit or geographic grouping. There are those on the Board who have argued that the fiduciary duty of directors towards the corporation as a whole augers for removal of individual directors buy the whole rather than by the appointing body. The fiduciary responsibility for ICANN directors is actually a creature of statute, a creation of the same California Corporations Code that is favourably disposed, as above, towards removal of individual directors by the selecting body. I'm a strong believer that the security and stability of the DNS is best assured by tried, true and proven corporate structures. I believe that the uniqueness of ICANN is somewhat overstated. ICANN is a California PBC. PBC's have two basic structures under California law: one that is board centric (designator) and one that is member centric (membership). Selection of the model determines who is, to paraphrase a former American president, the final decider. Nothing more. Regardless of our choice as to model, I see no reason to deviate from the route suggested by California statute for the removal of directors or on any other issue of structural detail. The California PBC statute is tried, true and tested. There is case law to buttress the statutes. The statute is not risky and untried, as are our other options. It is made as a uniform whole, with deference to potential conflicts. Stability is my principle concern and, as such, I prefer all choices we make to mirror the statute unless there are strong, special reasons unique to ICANN to deviate from the proven, stable structure of the typical California nonprofit corporation. On this particular issue I see none. Best, Ed ________________________________ From: "Chris Disspain" <ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:;><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:;>>> Sent: Friday, October 9, 2015 12:43 AM To: "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org<javascript:;><mailto:robin@ipjustice.org<javascript:;>>> Cc: wp1@icann.org<javascript:;><mailto:wp1@icann.org<javascript:;>>, "CCWG Accountability" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:;><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:;>>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC Hi Robin, What’s your position on whether it should be the electing SO/AC that can recall or a wider group? Cheers, Chris On 9 Oct 2015, at 10:39 , Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<javascript:;><mailto:robin@ipjustice.org<javascript:;>>> wrote: Not sure I can make the call tomorrow, so I'll state my position against restrictions to individual director recall rights now. Considering the only public comment calling for limitations on the community's right to recall the individual board members was from the board itself, and the consensus has consistently been for NOT restricting recall rights, but for providing rationales for recalls, I don't understand why we are forced to continue to beat this dead horse. If two public comment periods have not been enough to create anything close to consensus to restrict the community's board recall rights, let's put this issue to bed and focus on the issues where the community is far more divided. Thanks, Robin On Oct 8, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: Hi all Here is the proposed agenda for our next call: Friday 9 October at 17h30 UTC for up to two hours. Could all those proposing documents for this meeting please circulate them ASAP, with an email subject line that identifies what your document is? 1. Review of Agenda 2. Second review of comments analysis: a) Budget power b) Affirmation of Commitments c) Community Forum d) Community Mechanism as Sole Member / The Model e) Recall of ICANN Board 3. Approach to documenting our work for 12-Oct deadline 4. Any Other Business Please advise any further / other agenda items... thanks, Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:;><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:;>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz><http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<javascript:;><mailto:WP1@icann.org<javascript:;>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<javascript:;><mailto:WP1@icann.org<javascript:;>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<javascript:;><mailto:WP1@icann.org<javascript:;>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<javascript:;> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1