On 21/06/2015 16:24, Jordan Carter wrote:
The powers we propose (budget, bylaws controls; removal of directors or Board) are the *same* under the three models.
Under the *bylaws only* or *voluntary* model, none of the powers are enforceable in law.
Under the *empowered designators* model, all of the powers except budget / strat plan are enforceable in law.
Under the *SO/AC empowered *model, an SO or AC that opted to make the declaration could enforce any or all of the powers in law.
Jordan, You are referring to the enforceability of the specific community powers created by the working party you chair, WP1. However I'm not sure that is the limit of the distinction between the models. What about the general ability to require adherence to the bylaws? For example, a great deal of the accountability improvements this CCWG proposes are delivered through a reformed IRP. What happens if ICANN fails to implement the IRP, as it is required to under the Bylaws? (e.g. if ICANN simply fail to appoint IRP panelists). Who would have an enforceable remedy, and under what model? My understanding is that an Empowered SO/AC would have the right to go court to demand that ICANN be ordered to implement the IRP. By contrast, under the Designator mode nobody would have the right to go court and ask for an order to correct such a failure. Is that a correct understanding? Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA