Hi all, hi Chris: A few points in line. For some reason this app won't allow me to break the alignment so I have italicised and added JC. On Wednesday, 20 May 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> wrote:
Jordan, All,
Thank you Jordan, for attempting to bring some focus to the current discussion about the UA model, membership structures and all of the related issues.
First of all, I want to acknowledge that I concur with you on a number points.
I agree that we need to develop a model that disrupts ICANN's operation as little as possible. We can argue about how much disruption is either possible or preferable, but the principle is agreed.
I also agree that levels of accountability are not "up to scratch" and, irrespective of the model we arrive at post-transition, these need to be improved. Many of the improvements proposed by the CCWG: to the IRP, reconsideration mechanisms and the role of the ombudsman, the introduction of fundamental bylaws and binding arbitration, and the empowerment of the community to spill the ICANN Board, are also supported.
However, where I disagree with you is in respect to the absolute need for an *additional* mechanism, to supersede the current IANA functions contract, in order to ensure that the community can 'control' the Board because it has the right to bring a legal action in a US court.
*JC: Chris, two things.*
*JC: First, this isn't an additional mechanism. That continues with the argument you have been making at least since the AUIGF nine months ago that "nothing really changes" when the contract with NTIA goes away. That would mark the end of any legally enforceable accountability tool - that is what we have today. Nobody is talking about "Adding" things - this is about maintaining. You seem to be arguing for a subtraction - from legally enforceable accountability to none.*
*JC: Second point, this lawsuits talk puzzles me greatly. We are talking about exercising powers that are granted by the law in which ICANN operates, not about going on Judge Judy or hiring lawyers before we breathe. I can't imagine any logical situation where the membership/UA structure gets sued - but that's certainly a stress test that could be run.*
I disagree with the characterisation that the purpose of the CCWG's work is to wrest "control" from the ICANN Board and deliver it to the community. From your email, I gather that you are fundamentally tying the concept of control to "enforceability", neither of which are goals for the current process. Rather, I believe we are aiming to deliver a structure where ICANN and its Board are held accountable to the community, via the number of improvements I mentioned above.
*JC: Accountability is providing effective review and redress, etc, as defined in our report. Today that's provided by the laws of California and an enforceable contract between ICANN and NTIA. It is a fiction to suggest enforceable control is anywhere other than at the very centre of accountability arrangements. The goal of this CCWG's work is an accountability settlement that can survive the end of the contract. Control, enforcement, are totally central. *
The need to assert absolute "control" or enforceability could only arise in the most catastrophic of circumstances. If we assume a situation where proposed mechanisms for escalation, independent review, *binding *arbitration and direct instruction by the SOs and ACs are not acknowledged by ICANN, wouldn't the entire multi-stakeholder model be irreparably broken? Is addressing this most unlikely scenario worth the significant structural changes a membership model would require?
*JC: the opposite is the case. I invite you to reflect on a situation in business where people haven't sorted out a contract and things go wrong. Is that harder, or easier, to resolve than when things are set out clearly? In my fifteen years of experience in the world of work, problems are *always* more likely to arise when there aren't clear frameworks. Our job is to provide for the security, stability and resilience of the Internet's DNS. That responsibility is a big one - it doesn't really allow for "this will be fine when things are fine" situations.*
Further, you refer to a "long list" of community concerns about ICANN's current operations. I wonder whether these concerns are actually held by individuals (or individual constituencies) on particular issues and have been aggregated in to a larger picture of overall community dissatisfaction? Concerns by distinct groups on particular topics can certainly be dealt with by the increased robustness proposed to ICANN's bylaws and operations. However, I cannot think of a single example of a failure throughout the history of ICANN that did result or would have resulted in the community as one against an action or decision of the ICANN Board.
*JC: I am not sure how this fits. The large list of examples I referred to simply was designed to remind people that things ain't perfect, and our job should be to improve the situation. I think we are in agreement about that.*
To be clear - I am 100% supportive of improvements to accountability. I believe that the CCWG has initiated extremely useful work in identifying these mechanisms.
I remain unconvinced regarding the argument that accountability=control=enforceability, and the subsequent recommendations of the CCWG that arise from this assumption.
*JC: All I ask is that we all keep working through the issues in good faith. There are a number of ways to implement a membership model. There are a number of consequences to a non-enforceable accountability settlement. The likely key consequence is no transition. That's the stakes we are dealing with here. *
*JTC*
Cheers,
Chris
On 20 May 2015, at 15:33 , Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
We need legal persons to be members of ICANN.
They can be individual humans or they can be organisations.
UAs are the lightest touch, most easily controlled, non-human form of person that can fit this mould.
I do not understand the propensity of parts of our community to over-complicate things that look reasonably straight forward from other points of view. Has ICANN always been like this? (Answers own question - it can't have been, otherwise it would never be organised the way it is today....)
cheers Jordan
On 20 May 2015 at 17:21, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Avri, I think that you are generally correct. We are putting this entire infrastructure in place because we want to be able to take ICANN or the Board to court if they do not follow the rules. I tend to agree with the auDA comment that if it ever gets to that stage, we are REALLY in trouble, and a simple court decision is not likelt to fix it.
But that nothwithstanding, we supposedly ned that UA because they can take legal action. But if the UA representatives do not listen to the SO/AC. the SO/AC cannot take that rep to court, because the SO/AC has no legal persona. So we are again left with a discontinuity where something is largely unenforceable and we have to take it on faith that they will do the right thing.
Of course, the UA reps and the Board members we select are basically drawn from the same pool, perhaps separated by a few years.
The difference between a Board member and a UA rep is the Board member has a duty to the corporation, and the UA rep can, in theory, be required to take instruction from the SO/AC. But enforcing that theory may be the rub.
Alan
At 20/05/2015 12:41 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I think I understand the argument about members becoming that to which ICANN, and its Board, are responsible and accountable. From that perspective it sounds really good.
What I have having trouble understanding is an accountability structure were there is a discontinuity between the SOAC and the UA. If each of the Board designating SOAC were the UA, it think I would understand. But I just do not see how the UA are accountable to the people and organizations that participate in each of the SOAC. Yes, the SOAC designates it UA representative, but how is (s)electing one of these any more accountable than (s)electing the Board as we do now. Don't we just move the perceived/possible unaccountability down a layer in the hierarchy?
I think I am as comfortable with complexity as the next person. And I understand how in computer science any problem can solved by adding another layer of indirection, but in this case the extra layer we are creating does not seem to really be accountable to anyone but itself, except by (s)election procedures.
I am sure I am missing some critical bit of understanding and hope someone can explain the chain of accountability in the membership model. I feel that we are still hand-waving a bit in the explanations. In a sense it seems as if we are creating a 'council' that is omnipotent in the powers it is given, except that they can somehow be replaced.
Thanks and apologies for my persistent confusion.
avri
On 20-May-15 01:14, Jordan Carter wrote:
Hi all
This thread is useful to tease out some of the questions and concerns and confusions with the UA model, and as rapporteur for the WP responsible for refining this part of the proposal I am reading it avidly.
I just want to take the opportunity to remind us all why membership (or something analogous) is an important aspect of the reforms we are proposing - no matter the precise details.
At the moment without members, ICANN is fundamentally controlled by the Board. The only external constraint is the IANA functions contract with NTIA. The long list of community concerns and examples detailed by our earlier work in this CCWG shows that even with that constraint, accountability isn't up to scratch.
We are working on a settlement without that NTIA contract. Accountability has to get better even *with* the contract. Fundamentally better, without it.
Either we have a membership structure or some other durable approach that firmly embeds the stewardship of ICANN and the DNS in the ICANN community, or... we remain with Board control.
Given ICANN's history, anyone who is advocating a continuation of Board control is arguing for a model that can't be suitably accountable, and that seems highly likely to fail over time, with real risks to the security and stability of the DNS.
A real, fundamental source of power over the company absent the contract *has* to be established. The membership model is the most suitable one to achieve that that we have considered so far.
So: we need to be creative and thoughtful in how we make that model work in a fashion that disrupts ICANN's general operation as little as possible. But the key there is "as possible." Real change is needed and much refinement and comment is needed.
If there are proposals to achieve the same shift in control from ICANN the corporation to ICANN the community, I hope they come through in the comment period. So far, none have - but there are still two weeks of comments to go.
cheers Jordan
On 20 May 2015 at 10:45, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
This whole thread seems to have massively overcomplicated the question.
Unless I have missed something, the only reason we need "members" is to stand as plaintiff-of-record in a lawsuit against the ICANN Board complaining that the Board has failed to adhere to the corporations bylaws. Such a lawsuit would in reality be conducted by an SO or AC, but a person with legal personality needs to act as plaintiff-of-record.
Why not simply proceed, as Samantha suggested, with the SOACs' Chairs as the members of the corporation? Could the Articles (or Bylaws, as appropriate) not simply identify the SOACs' Chairs as the members, ex officio and pro tempore?
An SOAC Chair that refused to act as plaintiff-of-record when required to do so by his SOAC could simply be replaced. Likewise a Chair that went rogue and initiated a lawsuit without their consent.
You can't make the SOAC a member without turning them into UAs, with all the attendent complexity. But I don't see that there should be any such problem with designating the chair of a SOAC, who will be a natural person, as a member of the corporation; the fact that the SOAC is not a UA is then irrelevant.
In the event that there were any dispute as to whether a particular person is in truth an SOAC Chair, this would surely be a simple preliminary matter of fact for the court. It is surely beyond dispute that if the Articles designated "Alan Greenberg" as the member, it would be a matter of fact as to whether or not the person before the court was indeed Alan Greenberg; surely it is the same as to whether the person before the court is "the current Chair of ALAC", if that should be what is specified in the Articles?
Malcolm.
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