Alles klar Thomas! Danke Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8837 7176 Skype: carlos.raulg Current UTC offset: -6.00 (Costa Rica) On 29 Feb 2016, at 10:48, Thomas Rickert wrote:
Dear Keith, all, below you find a quick summary of where we are on this with respect to our report:
- GAC is a decisional participant unless we get a clear signal (as from RSAC and SSAC) that they don't want to be one.
- All decisional particants can vote yes, no, abstain or do nothing.
- If there is a change in structure, i.e. a decisional participants does not further want to be one, an SO / AC is closed down or if there is an addition, we need a bylaw change. This is what the group responded to the Board's wish to include percentages. The CCWG refused percentages as we need a bylaw change anyway if a change is taking place.
- Should the Board refuse to make / support a required bylaw change, we have the tools in our report.
- Any clarification needed to that effect can be made during the implementation phase.
Thanks, Thomas
Am 27.02.2016 um 21:03 schrieb Drazek, Keith:
Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
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Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
“The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
· Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
· Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
· Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability.”
Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/* from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional explanatory clause:
“The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
Signed,
Phil Corwin
Steve DelBianco
Keith Drazek
James Gannon
Robin Gross
Ed Morris
Brett Schaefer
Greg Shatan
Matthew Shears
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