+1 Mathieu and exactly right. It is convenient, I think, to conflate the new membership structure issue with the jurisdiction issue of where litigation might occur. But the reality (as I wrote about in this blog: http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/04/on-the-issue-of-jurisdiction-over-icann/) is that ICANN will be subject to suit in many places in the world, including California, no matter what it does in terms of membership structures or place of incorporation. I dare say, without having researched the matter in detail, that by virtue of its hub offices in Turkey and Singapore, the scenario Chis posits could also quite colorably result in law suit in those countries where the courts would certainly assert personal jurisdiction over the corporation. I do not know how choice of law rules operate in those jurisdictions (i.e. which substantive law they would choose to apply), nor do I know whether the courts in those jurisdictions would defer to the arbitral ruling or revisit it de novo. One of the advantages of California law is that arbitration decisions are given great deference (a principle also embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act). In short, there is no way to avoid the possibility that ICANN, wherever it is located, and whatever its structure, will be haled into court in any jurisdiction around the globe. Frankly, if Chris were the aggrieved party say as future chair of ICANN :) -- I imagine he might bring the suit for declaratory judgment in Australia Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Sent: Thursday, May 21, 2015 3:14 AM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Question regarding UAs Dear Chris, All, Many thanks for explaining the concern through this step by step scenario. This is taking us closer to a stress test approach, which is not only valuable but also mandatory for our group, as per our Charter. I understand your concern is (quoting your email) "handing ultimate authority to a state based American court and allowing it to make binding and precedent setting decisions about the interpretation of ICANNs mission." There is however something I do not understand in your "steps": Le 21/05/2015 03:45, Chris Disspain a écrit : Second, I would like to use a step-by-step scenario to explain where my concerns lie. Under the CCWGs currently proposed mechanisms: 1. The community, pursuant to powers defined in a fundamental bylaw, and through a vote of that meeting the required threshold for support, directs the Board to do X 2. The Board refuses to do X because it maintains that X is outside of the mission of ICANN 3. The community triggers escalation mechanisms 4. Escalation proceeds to binding arbitration (as defined by another fundamental bylaw) 5. The arbitrator finds in favour of the community and directs ICANN to do X 6. The Board refuses to act, citing, again, that it believes the action is outside of ICANNs mission 7. After the necessary community votes etc., the community now heads to court. In the State of California. I have four questions : - In your scenario the community would "mission creep". I am not clear how in our report the community would direct the Board to do X. Community powers as we have defined them are restricted to reject / review on budgets or bylaws. Could you clarify this part of the scenario ? - If the Board refuses to act on the arbitrator findings, why would the community turn to California Court instead of recall the Board ? - Given that there was a a binding arbitration decision directing Icann to do X, my understanding was that the court of California would have very limited grounds to turn the decision around. Is that not already addressing the concern of allowing a court of california to decide on what is or is not within Icann's mission ? - And finally, is it not the case today that a Court of California could make such a binding decision ? Best Mathieu As I understand it, the role of the court in this scenario would be to determine whether the Board is acting in a way that is serving the public interest within ICANNs mission. It would not be to decide whether, on balance, the community was more right than the Board. Right now as a global multi-stakeholder body we decide the nuances of the meaning of ICANNs mission and the way ICANN acts under that mission by using the multi-stakeholder process and by compromise and nuanced decision making. If we agree to the CCWG recommendations we will not be handing ultimate authority to the members but rather we will be handing ultimate authority to a state based American court and allowing it to make binding and precedent setting decisions about the interpretation of ICANNs mission. Does the ICANN community really want the specific nuances of ICANNs mission to be held up to scrutiny and have decisions made, at the highest level, through such a mechanism? Whilst that may give comfort to, for example, US members of the intellectual property community or US listed registries, it gives me no comfort whatsoever. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au | W: <http://www.auda.org.au/> www.auda.org.au auDA Australias Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 21 May 2015, at 07:51 , Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> > wrote: The enforceability" issue is not about litigation at all, and it isnt really about whether the Board or some newly invented group is more likely to get it right. Rather, its about checks and balances. Without the membership structure, the revised bylaws that empower the community to block certain actions, for example, are by definition advisory they impose no legal obligation whatsoever on the Board and staff. I dont dispute that the Board would have a compelling interest in respecting community input, but as a legal matter without the membership structure, the Board would be required to treat any community vote to block, for example, as merely advisory and would have an affirmative obligation to do what it concludes is consistent with its fiduciary duty. The membership model affirmatively shifts some of that fiduciary responsibility to the community. Its not a statement of who is right or wrong, but who has authority. Steve raises a reasonable question about how the members/unincorporated associations are accountable to their respective communities. But IMHO, the legitimate questions and concerns in this debate are getting obscured by polarizing language and assertions that its inappropriate to express a particular point of view. The argument that there are no examples of situations that did result or would have resulted in the community acting as one against an action or decision of the ICANN Board. The community has never had any authority or tool to do so, so the fact that it never has is irrelevant and the assertion that it would not have is speculation. I certainly would have tried to get the community to overturn the Boards decision to abandon the substantive standard for IRPs in favor of the good faith test. As it happens, none of the existing review and redress mechanisms would have worked in that case, and they probably wouldnt work in the future either. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz/> www.neustar.biz From: Steve DelBianco < <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org> sdelbianco@netchoice.org> Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 at 12:37 PM To: "Chartier, Mike S" < <mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com> mike.s.chartier@intel.com>, Steve Crocker < <mailto:steve@shinkuro.com> steve@shinkuro.com>, Keith Drazek < <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> kdrazek@verisign.com> Cc: Accountability Community < <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Question regarding UAs I dont think theres any question that the Boards primary duty (not their only duty) is to ICANN the Corporation. In addition to Mikes citation of ICANN bylaws Section 7 (below), see ICANNs Management Operating Principles (2008): "The third and perhaps most critical point of tension is between the accountability to the participating community to perform functions in keeping with the expectations of the community and the corporate and legal responsibilities of the Board to meet its fiduciary obligations. Source: ICANN Accountability & Transparency Frameworks and Principles, Jan-2008, p.5, at <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_en_syste m_files_files_acct-2Dtrans-2Dframeworks-2Dprinciples-2D10jan08-2Den.pdf&d=Aw MGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k& m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkXfJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=-nHIJ38MbHZo2QiXUiLPqBi6Yeae sFEbRqTO3RL3Jew&e=> https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-trans-frameworks-principles -10jan08-en.pdf From: "Chartier, Mike S" Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 at 9:56 AM To: Steve Crocker, Keith Drazek Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Question regarding UAs No comment on actual practice, but from a textual basis (which is what matters now since we are debating new text), I cant see any inconsistency between the following statements: Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies. the ICANN Board, which has a fiduciary obligation to first serve the interests of the corporation, From: <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Steve Crocker Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 9:47 AM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Question regarding UAs I didnt take it personally. I took it as a factually inaccurate statement that creates misunderstanding. Future boards are bound by the same rules as the past and current boards. The language you used is taken by many as a basis for believing there is a significant difference in alignment toward public responsibility between the ICANN Board and some newly invented grouping of community members. It aint so and its inappropriate to suggest so. Steve On May 20, 2015, at 9:39 AM, Drazek, Keith < <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote: Steve, With all due respect, I think youre taking this too personally and/or making it too personal. This is not about the current ICANN Board. None of us know what future ICANN Boards will do, or what future ICANN Boards will permit ICANNs management to do. Will future Boards always exercise appropriate oversight over management? Could there be instances where ICANNs legal counsel advises a future Board to make a decision that is counter to the interests of the community to protect the financial interests of the corporation? I see the proposed community membership structure simply as a check on the power of the Board, nothing more. Its not about controlling or replacing the Board. The Board has its legitimate function, but its decisions cannot be unchallengeable. The community must have the ability to tell the Board it got a decision wrong and to enforce the will of the multi-stakeholder community in rare/limited instances and based on a very high threshold of community agreement/consensus. I would certainly trust the proposed community members, representing their SOs and ACs, to be balanced, inclusive and trustworthy in protecting the interests of the overall community -- in their role as the aforementioned check on the powers of the Board. Not as a replacement. Would you trust a future Board of sixteen unknown individuals more than you trust the multi-stakeholder, bottom-up, consensus-based community and process? It appears so. I stand by and reaffirm my previous email. I hope my clarification helps. Sincerely, Keith From: Steve Crocker [ <mailto:steve@shinkuro.com> mailto:steve@shinkuro.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 8:27 AM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: Stephen D. Crocker; Chris Disspain; Accountability Cross Community; <mailto:mshears@cdt.org> mshears@cdt.org; <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net> egmorris1@toast.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Question regarding UAs On May 20, 2015, at 7:44 AM, Drazek, Keith < <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote: Hi Chris, I think there's a fundamental flaw in your assessment. You appear to be looking at this question through the lens of the past and present, where NTIA holds the enforcement function ("enforceability") through its ability to rebid and transfer the IANA functions contract if the ICANN Board and management acts inappropriately. That is the existing and necessary check on the Board's decision-making power. Without NTIA in its current role, the community MUST have the ability to check the Board's power, and the only way to secure that check is to create legal enforceability. Otherwise, the Board has ultimate authority, even if its decisions are inconsistent with the interests and desires of the community ICANN is supposed to serve. You are proposing a transfer of power from NTIA to the ICANN Board, which has a fiduciary obligation to first serve the interests of the corporation. Alternatively, proponents of legal enforceability are in favor of transferring final authority to ICANN's multi-stakeholder community. Keith, Edward and Edward, We have covered the point above several times and its long past time to stop throwing this half-trust around. Yes, ICANN is legally a corporation, and, yes, directors of a corporation have a duty to protect the corporation. But that generality has a far different meaning in a for profit corporation like Verisign than it does in a not-for-profit public benefit corporation like ICANN. The directors are obliged to pursue the purpose and mission stated in the incorporation papers and the bylaws. The directors serve the community, and we do so by exercising oversight over the corporation toward that end. There will always be differences of opinion about the particular details, but those sorts of differences of opinion will arise in *any* governance model. The prevailing assumption in much of the correspondence on this list is that the proposed members will somehow be more balanced, more inclusive and more trustworthy in protecting the interests of the overall community than the ICANN Board is. Thats simply false. And I think you know that it is. Please correct yourself and apologize. Thanks, Steve We should all be looking at this through the lens of the future, when NTIA no longer holds the tether and is only participating through the GAC. How do we, the multi-stakeholder community, ensure that ICANN and its future Boards and management are truly accountable once the NTIA back-stop is gone? The answer is to ensure the Board's decisions, in very limited areas, can be challenged and overturned by a significant majority of the community. We need to protect against the "catastrophic" scenario you referenced. According to our independent legal advisors, the best (and perhaps only) way to guarantee this is through legal enforceability. You asked, "Is addressing this most unlikely scenario worth the significant structural changes a membership model would require?" I believe the answer is yes. Not only worth it, but necessary. Regards, Keith On May 20, 2015, at 2:40 AM, Chris Disspain < <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: For clarity, the last sentence of paragraph 8 below should read: "However, I cannot think of a single example of a failure throughout the history of ICANN that did result or would have resulted in the community acting as one against an action or decision of the ICANN Board." Cheers, Chris On 20 May 2015, at 16:13 , Chris Disspain < <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: Jordan, All, Thank you Jordan, for attempting to bring some focus to the current discussion about the UA model, membership structures and all of the related issues. First of all, I want to acknowledge that I concur with you on a number points. I agree that we need to develop a model that disrupts ICANNs operation as little as possible. We can argue about how much disruption is either possible or preferable, but the principle is agreed. I also agree that levels of accountability are not up to scratch and, irrespective of the model we arrive at post-transition, these need to be improved. Many of the improvements proposed by the CCWG: to the IRP, reconsideration mechanisms and the role of the ombudsman, the introduction of fundamental bylaws and binding arbitration, and the empowerment of the community to spill the ICANN Board, are also supported. However, where I disagree with you is in respect to the absolute need for an additional mechanism, to supersede the current IANA functions contract, in order to ensure that the community can control the Board because it has the right to bring a legal action in a US court. I disagree with the characterisation that the purpose of the CCWGs work is to wrest control from the ICANN Board and deliver it to the community.
From your email, I gather that you are fundamentally tying the concept of control to enforceability, neither of which are goals for the current process. Rather, I believe we are aiming to deliver a structure where ICANN and its Board are held accountable to the community, via the number of improvements I mentioned above.
The need to assert absolute control or enforceability could only arise in the most catastrophic of circumstances. If we assume a situation where proposed mechanisms for escalation, independent review, binding arbitration and direct instruction by the SOs and ACs are not acknowledged by ICANN, wouldnt the entire multi-stakeholder model be irreparably broken? Is addressing this most unlikely scenario worth the significant structural changes a membership model would require? Further, you refer to a long list of community concerns about ICANNs current operations. I wonder whether these concerns are actually held by individuals (or individual constituencies) on particular issues and have been aggregated in to a larger picture of overall community dissatisfaction? Concerns by distinct groups on particular topics can certainly be dealt with by the increased robustness proposed to ICANNs bylaws and operations. However, I cannot think of a single example of a failure throughout the history of ICANN that did result or would have resulted in the community as one against an action or decision of the ICANN Board. To be clear I am 100% supportive of improvements to accountability. I believe that the CCWG has initiated extremely useful work in identifying these mechanisms. I remain unconvinced regarding the argument that accountability=control=enforceability, and the subsequent recommendations of the CCWG that arise from this assumption. Cheers, Chris On 20 May 2015, at 15:33 , Jordan Carter < <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: We need legal persons to be members of ICANN. They can be individual humans or they can be organisations. UAs are the lightest touch, most easily controlled, non-human form of person that can fit this mould. I do not understand the propensity of parts of our community to over-complicate things that look reasonably straight forward from other points of view. Has ICANN always been like this? (Answers own question - it can't have been, otherwise it would never be organised the way it is today....) cheers Jordan On 20 May 2015 at 17:21, Alan Greenberg < <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: Avri, I think that you are generally correct. We are putting this entire infrastructure in place because we want to be able to take ICANN or the Board to court if they do not follow the rules. I tend to agree with the auDA comment that if it ever gets to that stage, we are REALLY in trouble, and a simple court decision is not likelt to fix it. But that nothwithstanding, we supposedly ned that UA because they can take legal action. But if the UA representatives do not listen to the SO/AC. the SO/AC cannot take that rep to court, because the SO/AC has no legal persona. So we are again left with a discontinuity where something is largely unenforceable and we have to take it on faith that they will do the right thing. Of course, the UA reps and the Board members we select are basically drawn from the same pool, perhaps separated by a few years. The difference between a Board member and a UA rep is the Board member has a duty to the corporation, and the UA rep can, in theory, be required to take instruction from the SO/AC. But enforcing that theory may be the rub. Alan At 20/05/2015 12:41 AM, Avri Doria wrote: Hi, I think I understand the argument about members becoming that to which ICANN, and its Board, are responsible and accountable. From that perspective it sounds really good. What I have having trouble understanding is an accountability structure were there is a discontinuity between the SOAC and the UA. If each of the Board designating SOAC were the UA, it think I would understand. But I just do not see how the UA are accountable to the people and organizations that participate in each of the SOAC. Yes, the SOAC designates it UA representative, but how is (s)electing one of these any more accountable than (s)electing the Board as we do now. Don't we just move the perceived/possible unaccountability down a layer in the hierarchy? I think I am as comfortable with complexity as the next person. And I understand how in computer science any problem can solved by adding another layer of indirection, but in this case the extra layer we are creating does not seem to really be accountable to anyone but itself, except by (s)election procedures. I am sure I am missing some critical bit of understanding and hope someone can explain the chain of accountability in the membership model. I feel that we are still hand-waving a bit in the explanations. In a sense it seems as if we are creating a 'council' that is omnipotent in the powers it is given, except that they can somehow be replaced. Thanks and apologies for my persistent confusion. avri On 20-May-15 01:14, Jordan Carter wrote:
Hi all
This thread is useful to tease out some of the questions and concerns and confusions with the UA model, and as rapporteur for the WP responsible for refining this part of the proposal I am reading it avidly.
I just want to take the opportunity to remind us all why membership (or something analogous) is an important aspect of the reforms we are proposing - no matter the precise details.
At the moment without members, ICANN is fundamentally controlled by the Board. The only external constraint is the IANA functions contract with NTIA. The long list of community concerns and examples detailed by our earlier work in this CCWG shows that even with that constraint, accountability isn't up to scratch.
We are working on a settlement without that NTIA contract. Accountability has to get better even *with* the contract. Fundamentally better, without it.
Either we have a membership structure or some other durable approach that firmly embeds the stewardship of ICANN and the DNS in the ICANN community, or... we remain with Board control.
Given ICANN's history, anyone who is advocating a continuation of Board control is arguing for a model that can't be suitably accountable, and that seems highly likely to fail over time, with real risks to the security and stability of the DNS.
A real, fundamental source of power over the company absent the contract *has* to be established. The membership model is the most suitable one to achieve that that we have considered so far.
So: we need to be creative and thoughtful in how we make that model work in a fashion that disrupts ICANN's general operation as little as possible. But the key there is "as possible." Real change is needed and much refinement and comment is needed.
If there are proposals to achieve the same shift in control from ICANN the corporation to ICANN the community, I hope they come through in the comment period. So far, none have - but there are still two weeks of comments to go.
cheers Jordan
On 20 May 2015 at 10:45, Malcolm Hutty < <mailto:malcolm@linx.net> malcolm@linx.net <mailto: <mailto:malcolm@linx.net> malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
This whole thread seems to have massively overcomplicated the question.
Unless I have missed something, the only reason we need "members" is to stand as plaintiff-of-record in a lawsuit against the ICANN Board complaining that the Board has failed to adhere to the corporations bylaws. Such a lawsuit would in reality be conducted by an SO or AC, but a person with legal personality needs to act as plaintiff-of-record.
Why not simply proceed, as Samantha suggested, with the SOACs' Chairs as the members of the corporation? Could the Articles (or Bylaws, as appropriate) not simply identify the SOACs' Chairs as the members, ex officio and pro tempore?
An SOAC Chair that refused to act as plaintiff-of-record when required to do so by his SOAC could simply be replaced. Likewise a Chair that went rogue and initiated a lawsuit without their consent.
You can't make the SOAC a member without turning them into UAs, with all the attendent complexity. But I don't see that there should be any such problem with designating the chair of a SOAC, who will be a natural person, as a member of the corporation; the fact that the SOAC is not a UA is then irrelevant.
In the event that there were any dispute as to whether a particular person is in truth an SOAC Chair, this would surely be a simple preliminary matter of fact for the court. It is surely beyond dispute that if the Articles designated "Alan Greenberg" as the member, it would be a matter of fact as to whether or not the person before the court was indeed Alan Greenberg; surely it is the same as to whether the person before the court is "the current Chair of ALAC", if that should be what is specified in the Articles?
Malcolm.
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<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avast.com_&d=AwMGaQ &c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N9 4BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkXfJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=xbjKy9osurgbceJkE1Q_MWeBGs9WL5ue oUj8U9f2Djc&e=> http://www.avast.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=AwMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=N94BFwt7XlN1luKY2YsAlg92HkX fJ8UfYuQCH-3B3bY&s=Q-eiGB-sv0V29BiD3kbPQqSJQp1CknEJTAoowRdEcME&e=> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************