Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond. I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s suggestion (link<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>) that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 — if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change despite board resistance. Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (link<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/00...>) describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time. Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements, thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model after the IANA transition. Consider this: Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require, with adequate enforceability. Plus, we ensure those powers are enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what that new ICANN governance structure look like. That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority of ACs and SOs: 1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws. 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model) I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what we’ve heard recently, the board will support the powers described above. But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of this IANA transition: Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure, either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance model that might even include moving to Membership. To Bruce’s point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global internet users and protected from capture. This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration. Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is based on what others have said recently. —Steve DelBianco