I share Brett's concerns. In terms of compromise, as long as GAC retains its full consensus requirement for advice I am ok with requiring a 2/3 board majority to overturn it. However (related to the European proposal), I completely reject any solution which allows something to be called "GAC advice" if it does not have full consensus - even if it can be overturned by a bare majority of the board. The consideration of GAC advice constitutes a major commitment of time and has the potential to undermine or overthrow a painstaking consensus policy development process in the GNSO. GAC advice should therefore have to pass over a fairly high bar before it becomes a formal part of the policy development process. It cannot be just a majority or even a supermajority of governments (again I revert to the sovereignty issue which no one from the GAC has bothered to address.) The GAC should not under any circumstances be allowed to call a position "advice" if it does not have full consensus. --MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Schaefer, Brett Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 4:58 PM To: Mathieu Weill Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] TR: ST18 subgroup report Nov 23
I do not understand why this presents only the European GAC proposal and Thomas Rickert's proposal. This implies that these were the only two options discussed, which is far from correct. They were last minute attempts to find consensus in the group -- and failed to achieve it.
A substantial number of participants supported requiring a full consensus in support of GAC advice if it was to trigger the obligation to try an reach a mutually acceptable solution. The without substantial objection language is ambiguous in meaning and also fails to specify who would determine if a minority was substantial or not.
What if the GAC amends OP 47 to define a substantial minority as no more than 10 (or 5, 8, 15, whatever) governments? Would that be binding on the Board?
________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>
On Nov 23, 2015, at 11:44 AM, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> wrote:
Dear Colleagues,
Please find attached a report from the ST18 subgroup, for discussion during the CCWG call in about 12 hours. This is a co-chair summary, with options about which we will discuss in order to define our group’s way forward for the Draft Report.
I want to express my warmest appreciation and thanks to all the ST18 subgroup colleagues who participated with great interest to our work, and especially to the colleagues who provided constructive inputs to these discussions.
Best Mathieu
De : Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Envoyé : lundi 23 novembre 2015 18:39 À : s18@icann.org<mailto:s18@icann.org> Objet : ST18 subgroup report Nov 23
Dear Colleagues,
Please find attached the (very summarized) report of our work that will be presented tomorrow in the CCWG. It will be circulated momentarily to the full group.
Thanks again for all the constructive and valuable inputs you have provided to advance this key item of our work.
Best, Mathieu <ST18 subgroup report Nov 23.pptx> <ST18 subgroup report Nov 23.pdf> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community