Subject to the following comments, I would support this, and I suspect it would have general acceptance within At-Large. The caveats: - There are a number of ALAC comments to the current proposal that will still apply and will be critical. Pending the details analysis and resolution of the comments, I remain optimistic. - Steve's message does not talk about "the model", so I presume it will be some variation of the board proposal (often referred to as MEM, even though the MEM is only a component of it). That proposal calls for the AC/SOs to take formal action through their Chairs. That idea was rejected by the CCWG quite a while ago for a number of reasons (reluctance of the people filling the Chair position to get involved at a personal level, the difficulty associated with an ongoing action at the time the Chair changes are the prime ones that I recall). The CCWG moved to UA and then the Empowered AC/SO as a result, and then to the Community Mechanism. The proved to be a stumbling block, but perhaps the Empowered AC/SO or Community Mechanism could be adapted to work here. Alan At 03/10/2015 05:00 PM, Chris Disspain wrote:
Steve,
Thank you for this. It chimes In essence with what I, and some others, have been saying for a while.
If we can coalesce around the powers you have listed (there may still be issues for some around the budget power and some differences around detail but nothing insurmountable IMO) and agree a pathway for ICANN 3.0 and beyond then I believe we can walk together as a community through the transition.
Happy to do whatever it takes to bring this to fruition in Dublin or shortly thereafter.
Cheers,
Chris
On 4 Oct 2015, at 07:34, Steve DelBianco <<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond.
I was thinking about Jonathan Zuckâs suggestion (<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005764.html>link) that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change despite board resistance.
Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/006098.html>link) describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time.
Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements, thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model after the IANA transition.
Consider this:
Letâs use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require, with adequate enforceability. Plus, we ensure those powers are enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what that new ICANN governance structure look like.
That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority of ACs and SOs:
1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws. 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable in any court recognizing international arbitration results even if ICCANNâs board refused to participate in the binding arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model)
I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what weâve heard recently, the board will support the powers described above.
But thereâs one more we have to add before losing the leverage of this IANA transition:
Letâs put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure, either because the powers above arenât working, or just because the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance model that might even include moving to Membership. To Bruceâs point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global internet users and protected from capture.
This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration.
Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is based on what others have said recently.
Steve DelBianco
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community