DearAll, If IANA functions are tasked yo PTI , it must have its specifically separated budget. A clear cut process Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 16 May 2015, at 02:49, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
hi Mathieu, all:
I sense a bit of a gap between what we have proposed in respect of the budget powers, and what the CWG has asked for.
May I suggest that we directly ask whether the overall budget process proposed in our first public comment really meets the needs set out by the CWG? After all, they have said detail down to project level or greater is required for the IANA budget, but we have not made any statements about how much detail we expect.
Our budget is also a very blunt one - it is to send back the whole budget, not to have focused community input and changes into the IANA budget itself.
The question I think this raises is: do we, or the CWG, need to design a specific, different process about the IANA budget?
I don't have a view about the answer but I think it's a question we should put to the CWG.
bests Jordan
On 15 May 2015 at 23:47, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
Dear colleagues,
As you know, the CWG-Stewardship 2nd public comment is open until May 20th (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-2015-04...). Since this report lays out some dependencies between the proposals of the CWG and our group's, we decided during our CCWG call on May 5th to prepare a CCWG submission to this public comment period.
Below is a draft CCWG submission, which would be sent on behalf of the co-chairs. Substance is based on our initial draft proposal. Please share your feedbacks before Monday 18 May to enable finalization of the submission in a timeframe consistent with the CWG public comment period.
Best, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu
--------- Dear CWG-Stewardship co-chairs,
This submission is in response to your group's 2nd draft proposal, open for public comment on 22 April 2015. We submit these comments as co-chairs of the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability), based on the proposed accountability enhancements recently published by our group (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-201...), and open to public comment.
First, we would like to underline the quality of the ongoing coordination between co-chairs of our respective groups. We have enjoyed regular and effective discussions since the launch of our group in December 2014. Our groups have been updated regularly about progress made as well as issues faced, and the interdependency and interrelation between our work has led to key correspondence being exchanges on a regular basis. As CCWG-Accountability co-chairs, we have been provided with the opportunity to speak with the CWG-Stewardship on two occasions, and you also introduced the key elements of your 2nd draft proposal to the CCWG-Accountability.
As outlined in your public comment announcement "the CWG-Stewardship's proposal has dependencies on and is expressly conditioned upon the CCWG-Accountability process." Overall, it is our understanding that the CCWG-Accountability's initial proposals meet the CWG-Stewardship expectations. We would like to stress that, within our group's deliberations, the willingness to meet these requirements have been uncontroversial.
Our comments will focus on the specific requirements that you outline : • Ability for the community to have more rights regarding the development and consideration of the ICANN budget; The CCWG-Accountability initial proposals address this requirement directly in Section 5.2, which introduces a new power for the community to "consider strategic & operating plans and budgets after they are approved by the Board (but before they come into effect) and reject them based on perceived inconsistency with the purpose, Mission and role set out in ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws, the global public interest, the needs of ICANN stakeholders, financial stability or other matters of concern to the community."
• Empowering the multistakeholder community to have certain rights with respect to the ICANN Board, including the ICANN Board's oversight of the IANA operations, specifically, the ability to appoint and remove members of the ICANN Board, and to recall the entire Board; The CCWG-Accountability initial proposals introduce new powers for the community, which include the ability to remove individual Directors (section 5.5) or recall the entire Board (section 5.6). These proposals would address the CWG-Stewardship requirement.
• The IANA Function Review, created to conduct periodic and special reviews of the IANA Functions, should be incorporated into the ICANN bylaws; The CCWG-Accountability proposes to incorporate the review system defined in the Affirmation of Commitments into ICANN's Bylaws, including the ability to start new reviews (section 6.2, page 60). Based on your group's proposal, the CCWG introduced a recommendation to create a new review, based on the requirements you set forth.
• The CSC, created to monitor the performance of the IANA Functions and escalate non-remediated issues to the ccNSO and GNSO, should be incorporated into the ICANN bylaws. While this specific requirement was not addressed by the CCWG-Accountability, it would not contradict any of our proposals. It might be more appropriate if this recommendation was drafted and specified directly as one of the CWG-Stewardship recommendations.
• As such, any appeal mechanism developed by the CCWG-Accountability should not cover ccTLD delegation / re-delegation issues as these are expected to be developed by the ccTLD community through the appropriate processes.” When addressing enhancements to review and appeal mechanisms (both in sections 4.1 - IRP and 4.2 Reconsideration process), the CCWG-Accountability initial proposals state that "as requested by the CWG-Stewardship, decisions regarding ccTLD delegations or revocations would be excluded from standing, until relevant appeal mechanisms have been developed by the ccTLD community, in coordination with other interested parties."
• All of the foregoing mechanisms are to be provided for in the ICANN bylaws as "fundamental bylaws" requiring community ascent in order for amendment. The CCWG Accountability initial proposals describe the scope of the "fundamental bylaws" in section 3.2.4. It is proposed that the "Reviews that are part of the CWG-Stewardship’s work – the IANA Function Review and any others they may require, as well as the creation of a Customer Standing Committee" would be considered Fundamental Bylaws. As such, any change of such Bylaws would require prior approval by the community.
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize our deep appreciation of the outstanding work the CWG-Stewardship has conducted and our confidence that our respective groups' interdependence will be resolved to the satisfaction of stakeholder needs and expectations. We remain committed to closely coordinating on any further evolution of your requirements based on this 2nd round of public comment.
Best regards, Mathieu
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
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A better world through a better Internet
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