Fwd: [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials
Dear Colleagues, Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. Best regards, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors <ccwg-advisors@icann.org>, jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Hello All Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment mechanism: (1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation. (2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large? (3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the times? (4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto. (5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) /and beyond/? Legislators in democratic nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists? Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications. Greetings Jan
Many thanks. Interesting points on inclusiveness, balance and evolution, appropriate representation of the global public interest... which have to be considered carefully. Best Jorge Cancio Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 20.04.2015 um 12:02 schrieb Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>>: Dear Colleagues, Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. Best regards, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se><mailto:jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors <ccwg-advisors@icann.org><mailto:ccwg-advisors@icann.org>, jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> <jordan@internetnz.net.nz><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Hello All Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment mechanism: (1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation. (2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large? (3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the times? (4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto. (5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) and beyond? Legislators in democratic nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists? Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications. Greetings Jan <Portion de message joint> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Thanks Jan for this thoughtful and thought-provoking piece. I especially liked this because it draws attention to a weakness in our mode of operation. our CCWG is appointed by ICANN stakeholder groups, along with open participation from the community. But those who will have to come to consensus on its outcomes are all (by construction of the group) ICANN insiders, and it is ICANN SOs and ACs that will have to approve the output. In that context it is tricky to see how we can in particular assure both ourselves and the broader Internet community that we are dealing adequately with #5 in Jan's list. I certainly have not had the chance to analyse our proposals with this in mind. Seems to me these are questions we will have to come to grips with as we get community comment, and could help guide us to some questions to ask the community (as I am sure we will get responses from well beyond the "insiders"). Our final proposal when it does emerge in September or October will certainly need to deal with this. best Jordan On 20 April 2015 at 22:01, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
Dear Colleagues,
Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors.
Best regards, Mathieu
-------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors <ccwg-advisors@icann.org> <ccwg-advisors@icann.org>, jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>
Hello All
Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment mechanism:
(1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation.
(2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large?
(3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the times?
(4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto.
(5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) *and beyond*? Legislators in democratic nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists?
Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications.
Greetings
Jan
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *
Agreed I think that the public comment period is going to be very important. We need to make sure that we really have time and effort put into examining the comments from outside the ICANN world. Without that level of assurance that we are looking for ‘validation’ from the greater community I feel that we may run afoul of our own success. We need to show not only that we have solicited input but that we have taken that input seriously and considered its merits on an even playing field with internal comments. Also I would note my dislike of some of the comments on the list about what some members see as the interference of non-appointed participants in the work of the CCWG, lets all remember that everyone here is on an equal footing in all matters until we come to the point of a consensus call. There are participants doing some great work on both work streams and lets not denigrate their efforts. This goes for the work of the CWG also of course. James From: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Date: Tuesday 21 April 2015 11:02 To: Mathieu Weill <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr<mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>> Cc: Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se<mailto:jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Thanks Jan for this thoughtful and thought-provoking piece. I especially liked this because it draws attention to a weakness in our mode of operation. our CCWG is appointed by ICANN stakeholder groups, along with open participation from the community. But those who will have to come to consensus on its outcomes are all (by construction of the group) ICANN insiders, and it is ICANN SOs and ACs that will have to approve the output. In that context it is tricky to see how we can in particular assure both ourselves and the broader Internet community that we are dealing adequately with #5 in Jan's list. I certainly have not had the chance to analyse our proposals with this in mind. Seems to me these are questions we will have to come to grips with as we get community comment, and could help guide us to some questions to ask the community (as I am sure we will get responses from well beyond the "insiders"). Our final proposal when it does emerge in September or October will certainly need to deal with this. best Jordan On 20 April 2015 at 22:01, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> wrote: Dear Colleagues, Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. Best regards, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se><mailto:jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors <ccwg-advisors@icann.org><mailto:ccwg-advisors@icann.org>, jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz><jordan@internetnz.net.nz><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Hello All Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment mechanism: (1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation. (2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large? (3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the times? (4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto. (5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) and beyond? Legislators in democratic nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists? Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications. Greetings Jan _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter A better world through a better Internet
Dear Co-Chairs, would you please point out to Mr Gannon, that we are not all on an equal footing here. We are from different chartering organizations in the first place. But then is also quite expected tactics to accuse of something which has not been done ("denigration of efforts", "interference") to detract from criticism of issues. Do describe this mess as a success is also quite revealing, but then I have noted my dislike already previously. greetings, el On 2015-04-21 11:11, James Gannon wrote:
Agreed I think that the public comment period is going to be very important. We need to make sure that we really have time and effort put into examining the comments from outside the ICANN world. Without that level of assurance that we are looking for ‘validation’ from the greater community I feel that we may run afoul of our own success. We need to show not only that we have solicited input but that we have taken that input seriously and considered its merits on an even playing field with internal comments.
Also I would note my dislike of some of the comments on the list about what some members see as the interference of non-appointed participants in the work of the CCWG, lets all remember that everyone here is on an equal footing in all matters until we come to the point of a consensus call. There are participants doing some great work on both work streams and lets not denigrate their efforts.
This goes for the work of the CWG also of course.
James [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Excellent, thoughtful points to ponder from Prof. Scholte, many thanks to him. On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 3:52 PM, Dr Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Dear Co-Chairs,
would you please point out to Mr Gannon, that we are not all on an equal footing here. We are from different chartering organizations in the first place.
But then is also quite expected tactics to accuse of something which has not been done ("denigration of efforts", "interference") to detract from criticism of issues.
Do describe this mess as a success is also quite revealing, but then I have noted my dislike already previously.
greetings, el
On 2015-04-21 11:11, James Gannon wrote:
Agreed I think that the public comment period is going to be very important. We need to make sure that we really have time and effort put into examining the comments from outside the ICANN world. Without that level of assurance that we are looking for ‘validation’ from the greater community I feel that we may run afoul of our own success. We need to show not only that we have solicited input but that we have taken that input seriously and considered its merits on an even playing field with internal comments.
Also I would note my dislike of some of the comments on the list about what some members see as the interference of non-appointed participants in the work of the CCWG, lets all remember that everyone here is on an equal footing in all matters until we come to the point of a consensus call. There are participants doing some great work on both work streams and lets not denigrate their efforts.
This goes for the work of the CWG also of course.
James [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- - @arunmsukumar <http://www.twitter.com/arunmsukumar> Senior Fellow, Centre for Communication Governance <http://www.ccgdelhi.org> National Law University, New Delhi Ph: +91-9871943272
participants (6)
-
Arun Sukumar -
Dr Eberhard Lisse -
James Gannon -
Jordan Carter -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
Mathieu Weill