Dear Colleagues, Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. Best regards, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan Aart Scholte <jan.scholte@globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors <ccwg-advisors@icann.org>, jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Hello All Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment mechanism: (1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a voting representation. (2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN stakeholders in the world at large? (3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change with the times? (4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto. (5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) /and beyond/? Legislators in democratic nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists? Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications. Greetings Jan