got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN's Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders. Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here's what she's been able to determine: Q: What would this look like? Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group. Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal? A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It's clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c). Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization? A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable. Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN? A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws. Q: How would the members remain accountable? To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time. Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy? Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism. Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same? A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process. Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues? A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge. I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views. Jonathan Zuck President 202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org<mailto:jzuck@actonline.org> | Skype: jvzuck ACT | The App Association [https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/twitter.png]<https://twitter.com/actonline> [https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/fb.png]<https://www.facebook.com/actonline.org> [https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/actonline.png]<http://actonline.org/>
Thanks Jonathan, interesting and useful assistance. cheers Jordan On 28 January 2015 at 07:05, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN's Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here's what she's been able to determine:
*Q: What would this look like?*
*Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (*supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) *would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group*.
*Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal?*
*A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It's clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c).*
*Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization?*
*A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable.*
*Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN?*
*A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws. *
*Q: How would the members remain accountable?*
*To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time.*
*Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy?*
*Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism. *
*Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same?*
*A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process.*
*Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues?*
*A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge.*
I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views.
Jonathan Zuck
*President*
202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck
ACT | The App Association
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All, I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote: All, I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards. ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders. I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Rudolph Daniel *Sent:* Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM *To:* Eric Brunner-Williams *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here? From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote: Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote: All, I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards. ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders. I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid
consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board
continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:
accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" < ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public
trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community,
in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
My preference is that the Members would be the AC/SOs themselves. If any really tough decision are to be made (moving IANA, recalling Board members, etc), that should be done by the orgs themselves and not representatives of them. Alan At 27/01/2015 08:32 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Hi Rudolph,
In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for.
Regards, Keith
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>rudi.daniel@gmail.com> wrote:
No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess "we" is the community that have reached a fairly
solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role "we" seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to "shareholder" accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck"
<<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure
the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From:
<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the
public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN's Board of Directors would become accountable to the
community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
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Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy. And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Hi Rudolph,
In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for.
Regards, Keith
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com> wrote:
No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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But each organization could define its own threshold for recall. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:34 AM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy. And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
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That is correct, but still, who can speak for someone who doesn't want the organization to speak for him/her? el On 2015-01-28 08:50, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
But each organization could define its own threshold for recall. [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
I wonder in which direction you would see a solution to this, Eberhard. To work properly, and especially if that influence will increase, the influence of stakeholders will have to be organized in one way or another. Which is probably why the SO’s and AC’s were created. Without them, I suggest, there would be a lot more noise, combined with (even) less progress. Could a gathering of all individual stakeholders ever come up with any useful decision on the crucial subjects that we forsee? Cheers, Roelof From: Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 06:33 To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>" <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy. And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
+1 Roelof. Also, in response to Eberhard's previous post: I'm curious why you think a ccTLD manager's choice to not join the ccNSO equates to an unworkable accountability model for those who have opted to join and participate and bind themselves to ccNSO policy. If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. As you have acknowledged, unlike the gTLD registries (and the broader community interested in gTLD policies), ccTLD managers have a built-in accountability mechanism...their ability to "leave to become unbound by ccNSO developed policy." As you well know, the gTLD registries and the GNSO do not currently enjoy that luxury. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 9:19 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure I wonder in which direction you would see a solution to this, Eberhard. To work properly, and especially if that influence will increase, the influence of stakeholders will have to be organized in one way or another. Which is probably why the SO's and AC's were created. Without them, I suggest, there would be a lot more noise, combined with (even) less progress. Could a gathering of all individual stakeholders ever come up with any useful decision on the crucial subjects that we forsee? Cheers, Roelof From: Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 06:33 To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>" <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy. And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess "we" is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role "we" seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to "shareholder" accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN's Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition.
It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, "...only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management." Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN's accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
Keith, To respond to your question -- Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests? Having worn both hats, I can't think of any. Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function. Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract. To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Eric,
To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that?
In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests.
As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community.
I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least.
Regards,
Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition.
It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall.
Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability.
The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally."
However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery.
In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management?
I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Thanks Eric. I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly. The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management responsibilities...that's the immediate responsibility of the CWG Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable) accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will necessarily come together prior to transition, of course. If there's any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA's latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday in DC (excerpt below): http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-str... "The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN's accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group (CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem, a list of "stress tests", and the specific short term issues that need to be addressed prior to the transition. As we have consistently stated, it is critical that this group conduct "stress testing" of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN - be it the Board, staff or any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current accountability tools like the reviews called for by the Affirmation of Commitments." Also, since Verisign's RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA's March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-ro... Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative agreement with Verisign? A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related and parallel transition in these responsibilities. Hope this helps clarify a bit. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, To respond to your question -- Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests? Having worn both hats, I can't think of any. Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function. Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract. To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, "...only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management." Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN's accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Keith, If a "members" mechanism is proposed as a (possibly quite small) part of an overall attempt to improve accountability related to a still conditional transition, then we can, as Alan proposed, and I suppose ALAC proposes, simply promote SOs and ACs to "members", or we can ask what "members" are necessary and why. So yes, I'm considering one notion of "member" -- one implicit in your note to Eberhard -- the assumption that registry operators, or rather, the delegees and contractees -- must be members. Larry's remarks are not relevant to the idea, casually floated by several here, that the necessary means to replace the NTIA as a nominal source of oversight is reorganization to a membership form. You'll notice in your excerpt Larry didn't choose to mention any specific mechanism, reorganization to a membership form in particular, as a means to address the example questions he did choose to cite. Membership could stand some clarification, it doesn't necessarily mean replication of the existing bylaws entities as members -- as this would simply promote the promoted and exclude the excluded, which is unlikely to substantively improve accountability should, in addition to a reorganization, a transition actually takes place. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon P.S. Yes, I mentioned Verisign's RZM role as an exception to the general question, a "unique circumstance". On 1/28/15 2:49 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks Eric.
I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly.
The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management responsibilities…that’s the immediate responsibility of the CWG Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable) accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will necessarily come together prior to transition, of course.
If there’s any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA’s latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday in DC (excerpt below):
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-str...
“The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN’s accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through the Enhancing /ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group/ (/CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem, a list of “stress tests”, and the specific short term issues that need to be addressed prior to the transition. /As we have consistently stated, it is critical that this group conduct “stress testing” of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN – be it the Board, staff or any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current accountability tools like the reviews called for by the /Affirmation of Commitments.”/
//
/Also, since Verisign’s RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA’s March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic:/
//
/http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-ro...
//
*Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative agreement with Verisign?*
A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related and parallel transition in these responsibilities.//
Hope this helps clarify a bit.
Regards, Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Keith,
To respond to your question --
Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests?
Having worn both hats, I can't think of any.
Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function.
Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract.
To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Eric,
To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that?
In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests.
As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community.
I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least.
Regards,
Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition.
It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall.
Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability.
The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally."
However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery.
In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management?
I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
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Thanks Eric, I appreciate your response. My replies inline below. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 7:34 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, If a "members" mechanism is proposed as a (possibly quite small) part of an overall attempt to improve accountability related to a still conditional transition, then we can, as Alan proposed, and I suppose ALAC proposes, simply promote SOs and ACs to "members", or we can ask what "members" are necessary and why.
KCD: Agreed. It's absolutely fair to question the need for members, especially if there are other viable alternatives that deliver the same levels of accountability under California not-for-profit corporate law. Again, this is a prime example of why we need specialized legal expertise and advice. Also agreed, as I said previously, that the membership mechanism would be only a small (but important) part of an overall accountability regime, and one that would be used only in proscribed, exceptional and last-resort circumstances.
So yes, I'm considering one notion of "member" -- one implicit in your note to Eberhard -- the assumption that registry operators, or rather, the delegees and contractees -- must be members.
KCD: I don't think individual registries (delegees and contractees) need to become members of ICANN. Rather, I think their respective existing stakeholder groups could become the statutory members, represented by elected/appointed group Chairs. This would ensure that individual registries who choose to keep ICANN at arms-length are not forced into a relationship they don't want. Obviously more details to work through on this front.
Larry's remarks are not relevant to the idea, casually floated by several here, that the necessary means to replace the NTIA as a nominal source of oversight is reorganization to a membership form. You'll notice in your excerpt Larry didn't choose to mention any specific mechanism, reorganization to a membership form in particular, as a means to address the example questions he did choose to cite.
KCD: I didn't suggest that Larry said anything about membership, pro or con. I referred to NTIA's position and Larry's comments to underscore that the Accountability track is much broader than the narrow focus of the CWG on IANA Stewardship Transition.
Membership could stand some clarification, it doesn't necessarily mean replication of the existing bylaws entities as members -- as this would simply promote the promoted and exclude the excluded, which is unlikely to substantively improve accountability should, in addition to a reorganization, a transition actually takes place.
KCD: Completely agree that more clarification is required. The SO-AC-SG suggestion was just one preliminary proposal. If there's a way to augment it, let's get those detailed suggestions on the table so we can discuss and evaluate.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon P.S. Yes, I mentioned Verisign's RZM role as an exception to the general question, a "unique circumstance". On 1/28/15 2:49 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Thanks Eric. I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly. The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management responsibilities...that's the immediate responsibility of the CWG Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable) accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will necessarily come together prior to transition, of course. If there's any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA's latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday in DC (excerpt below): http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-str... "The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN's accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group (CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem, a list of "stress tests", and the specific short term issues that need to be addressed prior to the transition. As we have consistently stated, it is critical that this group conduct "stress testing" of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN - be it the Board, staff or any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current accountability tools like the reviews called for by the Affirmation of Commitments." Also, since Verisign's RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA's March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-ro... Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative agreement with Verisign? A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related and parallel transition in these responsibilities. Hope this helps clarify a bit. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, To respond to your question -- Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests? Having worn both hats, I can't think of any. Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function. Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract. To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, "...only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management." Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN's accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Keith, The case against aggregates (of delegees and their agents) has been made by Eberhard. I won't repeat it. The case for merely replicating the Bylaws entities (SOs and ACs) as "members" -- the "least change" (or preservation of existing privileged access) -- has been made by several, overlooking Eberhard's observation -- perhaps due to casual GNSO centric assumptions. Continuing to examine basic interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, after exhausting the interests of delegees and contractees, their agents (registrars where that model has been implemented), need not also necessarily be promoted to "member" as there is no unique-to-delegation-databases interest in the RMZ. Again, the continued function of the Root Management Zone is a general interest, so no specific "member" need be created to ensure this interest is present in some hypothetical membership organization exercising oversight. The contracted parties within GNSO have ordinary business interests in the fees paid and the budgeted use, and an ordinary business interest in the Corporation's budgets is a viable candidate for a membership interest. The odd thing about contemplating reorganization of the Corporation to "member" form is that we get a second bite of the apple -- we need not simply do what Esther and Mike and Louis did in 1998 in attempting to kluge up something that might be sufficient -- they lost an SO (the IETF/W3C/ETSI as the PSO in the '02 flurry of bylaws changes) and close to insolvent at several points. We can shed some thus far uncorrected errors, e.g., the independent existence of "business" and "access providers" as policy originating stakeholders/constituencies in the GNSO, and consider actors Esther and Mike and Louis overlooked yet are present in our current discourse -- Human Rights, Cultural Rights, Languages (to which our IDN projects accomplish in part), etc. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/29/15 6:36 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks Eric, I appreciate your response. My replies inline below. Regards, Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 7:34 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Keith,
If a "members" mechanism is proposed as a (possibly quite small) part of an overall attempt to improve accountability related to a still conditional transition, then we can, as Alan proposed, and I suppose ALAC proposes, simply promote SOs and ACs to "members", or we can ask what "members" are necessary and why.
KCD:Agreed. It’s absolutely fair to question the need for members, especially if there are other viable alternatives that deliver the same levels of accountability under California not-for-profit corporate law. Again, this is a prime example of why we need specialized legal expertise and advice. Also agreed, as I said previously, that the membership mechanism would be only a small (but important) part of an overall accountability regime, and one that would be used only in proscribed, exceptional and last-resort circumstances.
So yes, I'm considering one notion of "member" -- one implicit in your note to Eberhard -- the assumption that registry operators, or rather, the delegees and contractees -- must be members.
KCD: I don’t think individual registries (delegees and contractees) need to become members of ICANN. Rather, I think their respective existing stakeholder groups could become the statutory members, represented by elected/appointed group Chairs. This would ensure that individual registries who choose to keep ICANN at arms-length are not forced into a relationship they don’t want. Obviously more details to work through on this front.
Larry's remarks are not relevant to the idea, casually floated by several here, that the necessary means to replace the NTIA as a nominal source of oversight is reorganization to a membership form. You'll notice in your excerpt Larry didn't choose to mention any specific mechanism, reorganization to a membership form in particular, as a means to address the example questions he did choose to cite.
KCD: I didn’t suggest that Larry said anything about membership, pro or con. I referred to NTIA’s position and Larry’s comments to underscore that the Accountability track is much broader than the narrow focus of the CWG on IANA Stewardship Transition.
Membership could stand some clarification, it doesn't necessarily mean replication of the existing bylaws entities as members -- as this would simply promote the promoted and exclude the excluded, which is unlikely to substantively improve accountability should, in addition to a reorganization, a transition actually takes place.
KCD: Completely agree that more clarification is required. The SO-AC-SG suggestion was just one preliminary proposal. If there’s a way to augment it, let’s get those detailed suggestions on the table so we can discuss and evaluate.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
P.S. Yes, I mentioned Verisign's RZM role as an exception to the general question, a "unique circumstance".
On 1/28/15 2:49 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks Eric.
I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly.
The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management responsibilities…that’s the immediate responsibility of the CWG Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable) accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will necessarily come together prior to transition, of course.
If there’s any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA’s latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday in DC (excerpt below):
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-str...
“The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN’s accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through the Enhancing /ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group/ (/CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem, a list of “stress tests”, and the specific short term issues that need to be addressed prior to the transition. /As we have consistently stated, it is critical that this group conduct “stress testing” of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN – be it the Board, staff or any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current accountability tools like the reviews called for by the /Affirmation of Commitments.”/
//
/Also, since Verisign’s RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA’s March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic:/
//
/http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-ro...
//
*Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative agreement with Verisign?*
A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related and parallel transition in these responsibilities.
Hope this helps clarify a bit.
Regards, Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Keith,
To respond to your question --
Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests?
Having worn both hats, I can't think of any.
Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function.
Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract.
To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Eric,
To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that?
In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests.
As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community.
I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least.
Regards,
Keith
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition.
It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall.
Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability.
The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally."
However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery.
In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management?
I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
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Eric, Your continued focus on the Root Zone Management and associated interests in a secure and stable root is but a small subset of the community's overall work. Registries, contractees and delegees (and the rest of the community) have far broader accountability needs than simply ensuring the root is operated in an acceptable manner. That broader reform is the work of the Accountability CCWG. The "continued function of the Root Management Zone" is really the focus of the IANA Stewardship Transition CWG and I believe our charter is explicit that the CCWG Accountability defers to the CWG Transition in that area. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2015 12:00 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, The case against aggregates (of delegees and their agents) has been made by Eberhard. I won't repeat it. The case for merely replicating the Bylaws entities (SOs and ACs) as "members" -- the "least change" (or preservation of existing privileged access) -- has been made by several, overlooking Eberhard's observation -- perhaps due to casual GNSO centric assumptions. Continuing to examine basic interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, after exhausting the interests of delegees and contractees, their agents (registrars where that model has been implemented), need not also necessarily be promoted to "member" as there is no unique-to-delegation-databases interest in the RMZ. Again, the continued function of the Root Management Zone is a general interest, so no specific "member" need be created to ensure this interest is present in some hypothetical membership organization exercising oversight. The contracted parties within GNSO have ordinary business interests in the fees paid and the budgeted use, and an ordinary business interest in the Corporation's budgets is a viable candidate for a membership interest. The odd thing about contemplating reorganization of the Corporation to "member" form is that we get a second bite of the apple -- we need not simply do what Esther and Mike and Louis did in 1998 in attempting to kluge up something that might be sufficient -- they lost an SO (the IETF/W3C/ETSI as the PSO in the '02 flurry of bylaws changes) and close to insolvent at several points. We can shed some thus far uncorrected errors, e.g., the independent existence of "business" and "access providers" as policy originating stakeholders/constituencies in the GNSO, and consider actors Esther and Mike and Louis overlooked yet are present in our current discourse -- Human Rights, Cultural Rights, Languages (to which our IDN projects accomplish in part), etc. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/29/15 6:36 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Thanks Eric, I appreciate your response. My replies inline below. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 7:34 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, If a "members" mechanism is proposed as a (possibly quite small) part of an overall attempt to improve accountability related to a still conditional transition, then we can, as Alan proposed, and I suppose ALAC proposes, simply promote SOs and ACs to "members", or we can ask what "members" are necessary and why.
KCD: Agreed. It's absolutely fair to question the need for members, especially if there are other viable alternatives that deliver the same levels of accountability under California not-for-profit corporate law. Again, this is a prime example of why we need specialized legal expertise and advice. Also agreed, as I said previously, that the membership mechanism would be only a small (but important) part of an overall accountability regime, and one that would be used only in proscribed, exceptional and last-resort circumstances.
So yes, I'm considering one notion of "member" -- one implicit in your note to Eberhard -- the assumption that registry operators, or rather, the delegees and contractees -- must be members.
KCD: I don't think individual registries (delegees and contractees) need to become members of ICANN. Rather, I think their respective existing stakeholder groups could become the statutory members, represented by elected/appointed group Chairs. This would ensure that individual registries who choose to keep ICANN at arms-length are not forced into a relationship they don't want. Obviously more details to work through on this front.
Larry's remarks are not relevant to the idea, casually floated by several here, that the necessary means to replace the NTIA as a nominal source of oversight is reorganization to a membership form. You'll notice in your excerpt Larry didn't choose to mention any specific mechanism, reorganization to a membership form in particular, as a means to address the example questions he did choose to cite.
KCD: I didn't suggest that Larry said anything about membership, pro or con. I referred to NTIA's position and Larry's comments to underscore that the Accountability track is much broader than the narrow focus of the CWG on IANA Stewardship Transition.
Membership could stand some clarification, it doesn't necessarily mean replication of the existing bylaws entities as members -- as this would simply promote the promoted and exclude the excluded, which is unlikely to substantively improve accountability should, in addition to a reorganization, a transition actually takes place.
KCD: Completely agree that more clarification is required. The SO-AC-SG suggestion was just one preliminary proposal. If there's a way to augment it, let's get those detailed suggestions on the table so we can discuss and evaluate.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon P.S. Yes, I mentioned Verisign's RZM role as an exception to the general question, a "unique circumstance". On 1/28/15 2:49 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Thanks Eric. I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly. The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management responsibilities...that's the immediate responsibility of the CWG Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable) accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will necessarily come together prior to transition, of course. If there's any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA's latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday in DC (excerpt below): http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-str... "The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN's accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group (CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem, a list of "stress tests", and the specific short term issues that need to be addressed prior to the transition. As we have consistently stated, it is critical that this group conduct "stress testing" of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN - be it the Board, staff or any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current accountability tools like the reviews called for by the Affirmation of Commitments." Also, since Verisign's RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA's March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-ro... Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative agreement with Verisign? A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related and parallel transition in these responsibilities. Hope this helps clarify a bit. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, To respond to your question -- Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a delegee's interests and a contractee's interests? Having worn both hats, I can't think of any. Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that continued function. Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by contractees, which are governed solely by contract. To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in the cloud of "membership" proposals. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, "...only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management." Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN's accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Eric Brunner-Williams Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I beg to differ. It is not as if the Root Zone Management has been done very well, as I have elaborated in my previous post. We need to hold the IANA Function Manager accountable, whoever it is, whether it changes, or whatever :-)-O el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 29, 2015, at 19:24, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Eric,
Your continued focus on the Root Zone Management and associated interests in a secure and stable root is but a small subset of the community’s overall work.
Registries, contractees and delegees (and the rest of the community) have far broader accountability needs than simply ensuring the root is operated in an acceptable manner. That broader reform is the work of the Accountability CCWG.
The “continued function of the Root Management Zone” is really the focus of the IANA Stewardship Transition CWG and I believe our charter is explicit that the CCWG Accountability defers to the CWG Transition in that area.
Regards, Keith
[...]
That’s why the two parallel processes, CWG and CCWG, are interrelated, interdependent, inextricably intertwined and, before too long, must sync up. ;-) Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2015 12:35 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure I beg to differ. It is not as if the Root Zone Management has been done very well, as I have elaborated in my previous post. We need to hold the IANA Function Manager accountable, whoever it is, whether it changes, or whatever :-)-O el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 29, 2015, at 19:24, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Eric, Your continued focus on the Root Zone Management and associated interests in a secure and stable root is but a small subset of the community’s overall work. Registries, contractees and delegees (and the rest of the community) have far broader accountability needs than simply ensuring the root is operated in an acceptable manner. That broader reform is the work of the Accountability CCWG. The “continued function of the Root Management Zone” is really the focus of the IANA Stewardship Transition CWG and I believe our charter is explicit that the CCWG Accountability defers to the CWG Transition in that area. Regards, Keith [...]
Keith, this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers). And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld). Before AND after the transition. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 28, 2015, at 18:50, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
+1 Roelof.
Also, in response to Eberhard’s previous post:
I'm curious why you think a ccTLD manager's choice to not join the ccNSO equates to an unworkable accountability model for those who have opted to join and participate and bind themselves to ccNSO policy.
If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition.
As you have acknowledged, unlike the gTLD registries (and the broader community interested in gTLD policies), ccTLD managers have a built-in accountability mechanism...their ability to "leave to become unbound by ccNSO developed policy." As you well know, the gTLD registries and the GNSO do not currently enjoy that luxury.
Best, Keith
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 9:19 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I wonder in which direction you would see a solution to this, Eberhard. To work properly, and especially if that influence will increase, the influence of stakeholders will have to be organized in one way or another. Which is probably why the SO’s and AC’s were created. Without them, I suggest, there would be a lot more noise, combined with (even) less progress. Could a gathering of all individual stakeholders ever come up with any useful decision on the crucial subjects that we forsee?
Cheers,
Roelof
From: Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 06:33 To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "directors@omadhina.net" <directors@omadhina.net> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy.
And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen.
el
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Hi Rudolph,
In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for.
Regards, Keith
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com> wrote:
No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
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Thanks Eberhard. Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to. I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face. What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community. To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not. These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA. A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments. At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers). And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld). Before AND after the transition. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 18:50, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: +1 Roelof. Also, in response to Eberhard’s previous post: I'm curious why you think a ccTLD manager's choice to not join the ccNSO equates to an unworkable accountability model for those who have opted to join and participate and bind themselves to ccNSO policy. If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. As you have acknowledged, unlike the gTLD registries (and the broader community interested in gTLD policies), ccTLD managers have a built-in accountability mechanism...their ability to "leave to become unbound by ccNSO developed policy." As you well know, the gTLD registries and the GNSO do not currently enjoy that luxury. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 9:19 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure I wonder in which direction you would see a solution to this, Eberhard. To work properly, and especially if that influence will increase, the influence of stakeholders will have to be organized in one way or another. Which is probably why the SO’s and AC’s were created. Without them, I suggest, there would be a lot more noise, combined with (even) less progress. Could a gathering of all individual stakeholders ever come up with any useful decision on the crucial subjects that we forsee? Cheers, Roelof From: Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 06:33 To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>" <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Will not fly, because for example not all ccTLD Managers are members of the ccNSO, and nothing prevents a ccTLD Manager from leaving to become unbound by ccNSO developed ICANN Policy. And the structures are so diverse internally that once someone is elected a recall is never going to happen. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 03:32, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
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Keith, there have been a number of revocations against the ccTLD Manager's wishes which are more or less all irregular. There is one non-delegation still pending which is irregular. There are a number of delegations that are highly irregular. What recourse does the railroaded ccTLD Manager have? None within ICANN. The position advanced by some within the GAC that states have an intrinsic sovereignty over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO code and hence can do whatever they want with the ccTLD Manager discarding any property rights developed by the wayside is wrong. The notion that the IANA Function Manager would follow the wishes of the government over them of the ccTLD Manager as a matter of Policy is wrong. That some governments do not follow the rule of law that we want ICANN to follow, should not be to their advantage. (A position that I voiced already at ICANN Wellington) The Framework of Interpretation Working Group and its predecessor spent 5 years of work of interpreting the (pre-)existing policy documents into reasonable Principles. That the IANA Function Manager should discard them for any reason is wrong, in particular if a GAC rep decides to interrupt the proceedings. I can go on and on about why we need Accountability. Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 28, 2015, at 21:42, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks Eberhard.
Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to.
Oops :-)-O
I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face.
What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community.
I am not saying this, I am saying that the IANA Function Manager must be held accountable to individual ccTLD Managers, for acts or omissions that affect those individual ccTLD Managers.
To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not.
It has nothing to do with participating in the PDP, it is the BILATERAL relationship between an individual ccTLD Manager and the IANA function Manager. I can't care less whether any "community", SO, AC or whatever is involved, they have no impact on individual ccTLD Managers. So if the IANA Function Manager does anything affecting ccTLD Manager .ZZ said ccTLD Manager for .ZZ does not have to turn to someone else, try to convince them to intervene and so on, but needs a DIRECT avenue of recourse against the IANA function Manager.
These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA.
A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments.
At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out.
I am not against the "membership" idea per se, though I don't see what value this additional layer will add other than bureaucracy, but the DIRECT recourse for ccTLD Managers MUST be included. I will not accept a worsening of an already bad situation in the guise of improvement.
Best, Keith
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Keith,
this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers).
And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld).
Before AND after the transition.
el
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
[...]
Eberhard, Thank you for the detailed, constructive and comprehensive response. I agree that the direct and bilateral relationship you describe is important and I have no interest in undermining it. The improvements we seek and secure should be improvements for all. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 28, 2015, at 4:18 PM, "Dr Eberhard W Lisse" <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote: Keith, there have been a number of revocations against the ccTLD Manager's wishes which are more or less all irregular. There is one non-delegation still pending which is irregular. There are a number of delegations that are highly irregular. What recourse does the railroaded ccTLD Manager have? None within ICANN. The position advanced by some within the GAC that states have an intrinsic sovereignty over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO code and hence can do whatever they want with the ccTLD Manager discarding any property rights developed by the wayside is wrong. The notion that the IANA Function Manager would follow the wishes of the government over them of the ccTLD Manager as a matter of Policy is wrong. That some governments do not follow the rule of law that we want ICANN to follow, should not be to their advantage. (A position that I voiced already at ICANN Wellington) The Framework of Interpretation Working Group and its predecessor spent 5 years of work of interpreting the (pre-)existing policy documents into reasonable Principles. That the IANA Function Manager should discard them for any reason is wrong, in particular if a GAC rep decides to interrupt the proceedings. I can go on and on about why we need Accountability. Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 21:42, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Thanks Eberhard. Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to. Oops :-)-O I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face. What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community. I am not saying this, I am saying that the IANA Function Manager must be held accountable to individual ccTLD Managers, for acts or omissions that affect those individual ccTLD Managers. To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not. It has nothing to do with participating in the PDP, it is the BILATERAL relationship between an individual ccTLD Manager and the IANA function Manager. I can't care less whether any "community", SO, AC or whatever is involved, they have no impact on individual ccTLD Managers. So if the IANA Function Manager does anything affecting ccTLD Manager .ZZ said ccTLD Manager for .ZZ does not have to turn to someone else, try to convince them to intervene and so on, but needs a DIRECT avenue of recourse against the IANA function Manager. These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA. A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments. At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out. I am not against the "membership" idea per se, though I don't see what value this additional layer will add other than bureaucracy, but the DIRECT recourse for ccTLD Managers MUST be included. I will not accept a worsening of an already bad situation in the guise of improvement. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers). And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld). Before AND after the transition. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini [...]
So, how do we import this? el On 2015-01-28 23:35 , Drazek, Keith wrote:
Eberhard,
Thank you for the detailed, constructive and comprehensive response.
I agree that the direct and bilateral relationship you describe is important and I have no interest in undermining it.
The improvements we seek and secure should be improvements for all.
Regards, Keith
Eberhard outlines the complexities of the cc’s relationship with ICANN, and the unique challenges it presents to our work. In order to help us move forward, I would note that: * These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement. * Our proposed accountability mechanisms (membership, trust, whatever) should try to address them, if possible. * However, if they fall short of the second point, that doesn’t mean we should abandon the idea. It simply indicates that we need to go further to accommodate the cc community. In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues. But consider including them as part of a portfolio of options that might include separate accountability mechanisms that address the unique needs of ccTLDs (or others) not served by the general proposal. Hope that made sense. J. From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 15:35 To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.NET<mailto:directors@omadhina.NET>>, CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Eberhard, Thank you for the detailed, constructive and comprehensive response. I agree that the direct and bilateral relationship you describe is important and I have no interest in undermining it. The improvements we seek and secure should be improvements for all. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 28, 2015, at 4:18 PM, "Dr Eberhard W Lisse" <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote: Keith, there have been a number of revocations against the ccTLD Manager's wishes which are more or less all irregular. There is one non-delegation still pending which is irregular. There are a number of delegations that are highly irregular. What recourse does the railroaded ccTLD Manager have? None within ICANN. The position advanced by some within the GAC that states have an intrinsic sovereignty over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO code and hence can do whatever they want with the ccTLD Manager discarding any property rights developed by the wayside is wrong. The notion that the IANA Function Manager would follow the wishes of the government over them of the ccTLD Manager as a matter of Policy is wrong. That some governments do not follow the rule of law that we want ICANN to follow, should not be to their advantage. (A position that I voiced already at ICANN Wellington) The Framework of Interpretation Working Group and its predecessor spent 5 years of work of interpreting the (pre-)existing policy documents into reasonable Principles. That the IANA Function Manager should discard them for any reason is wrong, in particular if a GAC rep decides to interrupt the proceedings. I can go on and on about why we need Accountability. Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 21:42, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Thanks Eberhard. Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to. Oops :-)-O I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face. What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community. I am not saying this, I am saying that the IANA Function Manager must be held accountable to individual ccTLD Managers, for acts or omissions that affect those individual ccTLD Managers. To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not. It has nothing to do with participating in the PDP, it is the BILATERAL relationship between an individual ccTLD Manager and the IANA function Manager. I can't care less whether any "community", SO, AC or whatever is involved, they have no impact on individual ccTLD Managers. So if the IANA Function Manager does anything affecting ccTLD Manager .ZZ said ccTLD Manager for .ZZ does not have to turn to someone else, try to convince them to intervene and so on, but needs a DIRECT avenue of recourse against the IANA function Manager. These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA. A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments. At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out. I am not against the "membership" idea per se, though I don't see what value this additional layer will add other than bureaucracy, but the DIRECT recourse for ccTLD Managers MUST be included. I will not accept a worsening of an already bad situation in the guise of improvement. Best, Keith From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers). And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld). Before AND after the transition. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini [...]
These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement.
In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues.
Agree James. Speaking on behalf of auDA I believe that the ccTLD community should solve the issues being debated on this thread, not the CCWG. Some of the over-arching accountability mechanisms the CCWG ends up recommending may well be useful for ccTLDs in certain circumstances BUT a ccTLD specific mechanism to deal with re-delegation ‘disputes’ is a matter for the ccTLD community to create and for the ccNSO to then endorse under its policy development process. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 29 Jan 2015, at 09:29 , James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
Eberhard outlines the complexities of the cc’s relationship with ICANN, and the unique challenges it presents to our work.
In order to help us move forward, I would note that: These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement. Our proposed accountability mechanisms (membership, trust, whatever) should try to address them, if possible. However, if they fall short of the second point, that doesn’t mean we should abandon the idea. It simply indicates that we need to go further to accommodate the cc community.
In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues. But consider including them as part of a portfolio of options that might include separate accountability mechanisms that address the unique needs of ccTLDs (or others) not served by the general proposal.
Hope that made sense.
J.
From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 15:35 To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.NET>, CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Eberhard,
Thank you for the detailed, constructive and comprehensive response.
I agree that the direct and bilateral relationship you describe is important and I have no interest in undermining it.
The improvements we seek and secure should be improvements for all.
Regards, Keith
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 28, 2015, at 4:18 PM, "Dr Eberhard W Lisse" <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Keith,
there have been a number of revocations against the ccTLD Manager's wishes which are more or less all irregular. There is one non-delegation still pending which is irregular. There are a number of delegations that are highly irregular.
What recourse does the railroaded ccTLD Manager have? None within ICANN.
The position advanced by some within the GAC that states have an intrinsic sovereignty over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO code and hence can do whatever they want with the ccTLD Manager discarding any property rights developed by the wayside is wrong.
The notion that the IANA Function Manager would follow the wishes of the government over them of the ccTLD Manager as a matter of Policy is wrong.
That some governments do not follow the rule of law that we want ICANN to follow, should not be to their advantage. (A position that I voiced already at ICANN Wellington)
The Framework of Interpretation Working Group and its predecessor spent 5 years of work of interpreting the (pre-)existing policy documents into reasonable Principles. That the IANA Function Manager should discard them for any reason is wrong, in particular if a GAC rep decides to interrupt the proceedings.
I can go on and on about why we need Accountability.
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 28, 2015, at 21:42, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks Eberhard.
Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to.
Oops :-)-O
I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face.
What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community.
I am not saying this, I am saying that the IANA Function Manager must be held accountable to individual ccTLD Managers, for acts or omissions that affect those individual ccTLD Managers.
To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not.
It has nothing to do with participating in the PDP, it is the BILATERAL relationship between an individual ccTLD Manager and the IANA function Manager.
I can't care less whether any "community", SO, AC or whatever is involved, they have no impact on individual ccTLD Managers.
So if the IANA Function Manager does anything affecting ccTLD Manager .ZZ said ccTLD Manager for .ZZ does not have to turn to someone else, try to convince them to intervene and so on, but needs a DIRECT avenue of recourse against the IANA function Manager.
These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA.
A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments.
At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out.
I am not against the "membership" idea per se, though I don't see what value this additional layer will add other than bureaucracy, but the DIRECT recourse for ccTLD Managers MUST be included.
I will not accept a worsening of an already bad situation in the guise of improvement.
Best, Keith
From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Keith,
this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers).
And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld).
Before AND after the transition.
el
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
[...]
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Chris, that may be so, though I disagree, again because it does not work for the non-members of the ccNSO, it does not address the bilateral relationship, and, more importantly it has failed. And the Board is at fault there too. Railroading the incumbent ccTLD Manager, putting un-consented revocation and transfer on the consent agenda, ticking off check lists without looking beyond "traffic lights", issuing boilerplate "rationales" are as wrong as serious misconduct of proposed (incoming) ccTLD Managers such as repatriating a ccTLD from inside the country to a foreign spam haven within minutes after the transfer. And you know exactly who I mean. What we need to do is to get the FoI Principles established. And, come to think of it, as far as the ccNSO is concerned (as per your suggestion) we can just run them as a PDP because all the heavy lifting has been done, and the ccNSO unanimously approves of them. Maybe we can even fast track them. We also need the IANA function Manager to publish ALL criteria it requires from a proposed (incoming) Manager. it would even make applications easier to make, and to evaluate. greetings, el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 29, 2015, at 01:21, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement.
In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues.
Agree James. Speaking on behalf of auDA I believe that the ccTLD community should solve the issues being debated on this thread, not the CCWG. Some of the over-arching accountability mechanisms the CCWG ends up recommending may well be useful for ccTLDs in certain circumstances BUT a ccTLD specific mechanism to deal with re-delegation ‘disputes’ is a matter for the ccTLD community to create and for the ccNSO to then endorse under its policy development process.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
[...]
I forgot, Kieran is right, part of this is the processes / "tick the box" mentality, for whatever reason, including a lack of accountability :-)-O el On 2015-01-29 07:54 , Dr Eberhard W Lisse wrote:
Chris,
that may be so, though I disagree, again because it does not work for the non-members of the ccNSO, it does not address the bilateral relationship, and, more importantly it has failed.
And the Board is at fault there too.
Railroading the incumbent ccTLD Manager, putting un-consented revocation and transfer on the consent agenda, ticking off check lists without looking beyond "traffic lights", issuing boilerplate "rationales" are as wrong as serious misconduct of proposed (incoming) ccTLD Managers such as repatriating a ccTLD from inside the country to a foreign spam haven within minutes after the transfer. And you know exactly who I mean.
What we need to do is to get the FoI Principles established.
And, come to think of it, as far as the ccNSO is concerned (as per your suggestion) we can just run them as a PDP because all the heavy lifting has been done, and the ccNSO unanimously approves of them. Maybe we can even fast track them.
We also need the IANA function Manager to publish ALL criteria it requires from a proposed (incoming) Manager. it would even make applications easier to make, and to evaluate.
greetings, el
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 29, 2015, at 01:21, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote:
* These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement.
In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues.
Agree James. Speaking on behalf of auDA I believe that the ccTLD community should solve the issues being debated on this thread, not the CCWG. Some of the over-arching accountability mechanisms the CCWG ends up recommending may well be useful for ccTLDs in certain circumstances BUT a ccTLD specific mechanism to deal with re-delegation ‘disputes’ is a matter for the ccTLD community to create and for the ccNSO to then endorse under its policy development process.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain| Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
[...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse 4-5 St Annes Walk, Alderney <directors@omadhina.net> Guernsey, GY9 3JZ Omadhina Internet Services Ltd British Channel Islands -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Hi Eberhard: To your point here: "that may be so, though I disagree, again because it does not work for the non-members of the ccNSO, it does not address the bilateral relationship, and, more importantly it has failed. " I don't think "failed" is the right term, versus "doesn't go far enough" or "is incomplete." If a proposal were to be an improvement for all SO/ACs, -except- the ccNSO, and (also importantly) it does not create harm or exacerbate existing problems, then I think we should not reject it, but consider it part of the solution package and keep working. Thanks- J. From: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 23:54 To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>" <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Chris, that may be so, though I disagree, again because it does not work for the non-members of the ccNSO, it does not address the bilateral relationship, and, more importantly it has failed. And the Board is at fault there too. Railroading the incumbent ccTLD Manager, putting un-consented revocation and transfer on the consent agenda, ticking off check lists without looking beyond "traffic lights", issuing boilerplate "rationales" are as wrong as serious misconduct of proposed (incoming) ccTLD Managers such as repatriating a ccTLD from inside the country to a foreign spam haven within minutes after the transfer. And you know exactly who I mean. What we need to do is to get the FoI Principles established. And, come to think of it, as far as the ccNSO is concerned (as per your suggestion) we can just run them as a PDP because all the heavy lifting has been done, and the ccNSO unanimously approves of them. Maybe we can even fast track them. We also need the IANA function Manager to publish ALL criteria it requires from a proposed (incoming) Manager. it would even make applications easier to make, and to evaluate. greetings, el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 29, 2015, at 01:21, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: * These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement. In short, I don't think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone's issues. Agree James. Speaking on behalf of auDA I believe that the ccTLD community should solve the issues being debated on this thread, not the CCWG. Some of the over-arching accountability mechanisms the CCWG ends up recommending may well be useful for ccTLDs in certain circumstances BUT a ccTLD specific mechanism to deal with re-delegation 'disputes' is a matter for the ccTLD community to create and for the ccNSO to then endorse under its policy development process. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd [...]
James, the "failed" refers to Chris' suggestion that the ccNSO can set policy successfully. And I stand by this. el On 2015-01-29 17:54 , James M. Bladel wrote:
Hi Eberhard:
To your point here: "that may be so, though I disagree, again because it does not work for the non-members of the ccNSO, it does not address the bilateral relationship, and, more importantly it has failed. “
I don’t think “failed” is the right term, versus “doesn’t go far enough” or “is incomplete.” If a proposal were to be an improvement for all SO/ACs, -except- the ccNSO, and (also importantly) it does not create harm or exacerbate existing problems, then I think we should not reject it, but consider it part of the solution package and keep working.
Thanks—
J. [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
It does and I agree Best, Roelof From: James Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com<mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 23:29 To: Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>, Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.NET<mailto:directors@omadhina.NET>>, CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Eberhard outlines the complexities of the cc’s relationship with ICANN, and the unique challenges it presents to our work. In order to help us move forward, I would note that: * These problems exist today, under the current IANA/ICANN arrangement. * Our proposed accountability mechanisms (membership, trust, whatever) should try to address them, if possible. * However, if they fall short of the second point, that doesn’t mean we should abandon the idea. It simply indicates that we need to go further to accommodate the cc community. In short, I don’t think we should give up on one or more proposals that do not solve everyone’s issues. But consider including them as part of a portfolio of options that might include separate accountability mechanisms that address the unique needs of ccTLDs (or others) not served by the general proposal. Hope that made sense. J. From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 15:35 To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.NET<mailto:directors@omadhina.NET>>, CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Eberhard, Thank you for the detailed, constructive and comprehensive response. I agree that the direct and bilateral relationship you describe is important and I have no interest in undermining it. The improvements we seek and secure should be improvements for all. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 28, 2015, at 4:18 PM, "Dr Eberhard W Lisse" <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote: Keith, there have been a number of revocations against the ccTLD Manager's wishes which are more or less all irregular. There is one non-delegation still pending which is irregular. There are a number of delegations that are highly irregular. What recourse does the railroaded ccTLD Manager have? None within ICANN. The position advanced by some within the GAC that states have an intrinsic sovereignty over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO code and hence can do whatever they want with the ccTLD Manager discarding any property rights developed by the wayside is wrong. The notion that the IANA Function Manager would follow the wishes of the government over them of the ccTLD Manager as a matter of Policy is wrong. That some governments do not follow the rule of law that we want ICANN to follow, should not be to their advantage. (A position that I voiced already at ICANN Wellington) The Framework of Interpretation Working Group and its predecessor spent 5 years of work of interpreting the (pre-)existing policy documents into reasonable Principles. That the IANA Function Manager should discard them for any reason is wrong, in particular if a GAC rep decides to interrupt the proceedings. I can go on and on about why we need Accountability. Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini On Jan 28, 2015, at 21:42, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Thanks Eberhard. Having spent several years active on the ccNSO Council, I am very aware of the unique concerns of ccTLD managers and the history you refer to. Oops :-)-O I know there are many ccTLDs who have strong reservations against engaging within the ICANN community and I understand why. It’s a shame, but I recognize it’s the reality we face. What I don’t understand is the reasoning behind your argument that, due to a subset of ccTLD managers who choose to avoid the ICANN community, a membership structure comprised of those who *do* participate would be somehow unacceptable in holding ICANN Management accountable to its community. I am not saying this, I am saying that the IANA Function Manager must be held accountable to individual ccTLD Managers, for acts or omissions that affect those individual ccTLD Managers. To your second point below, fortunately, for “such a TLD,” the parallel, interrelated and interdependent CWG Transition effort should address the operational accountability of the IANA Function Manager to the ccTLD registries and gTLD registries (as direct customers and first affected parties) regardless of whether they participate in the ICANN policy development community or not. It has nothing to do with participating in the PDP, it is the BILATERAL relationship between an individual ccTLD Manager and the IANA function Manager. I can't care less whether any "community", SO, AC or whatever is involved, they have no impact on individual ccTLD Managers. So if the IANA Function Manager does anything affecting ccTLD Manager .ZZ said ccTLD Manager for .ZZ does not have to turn to someone else, try to convince them to intervene and so on, but needs a DIRECT avenue of recourse against the IANA function Manager. These broader ICANN Accountability discussions are about creating a bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structure to replace the backstop we’ll lose when NTIA disengages. It’s about ensuring that ICANN management is directly accountable to the community it serves. Allow me to re-state what I’ve said several times recently….I view any possible membership structure, rooted in the existing (or evolving) ICANN community structures, as a lever of last resort with very narrowly scoped powers and responsibilities. It would not be a replacement for other critical components of a robust accountability regime, such as those established by the CWG Transition to serve the direct customers of IANA. A membership structure or approach is only one of several options, and I expect we will seriously consider a blend of various options to arrive at the most appropriate balance of cross-community accountability. The SO-AC-SG membership structure may be a new concept, but it also makes sense because it relies on community participants to appoint the members and to ensure the appointed member (whether an individual or entity) is acting in the interests of that community as determined by their respective processes. How much more bottom-up, consensus-based and multi-stakeholder could it get? If the suggested list of eleven SO-AC-SG groups is somehow insufficient, let’s discuss how it could be augmented with other appropriate groups that have the same commitments. At this point, I think we should be adding to the list of options before us, not dismissing anything out of hand just because there are details and nuances and sensitivities to be hashed out. I am not against the "membership" idea per se, though I don't see what value this additional layer will add other than bureaucracy, but the DIRECT recourse for ccTLD Managers MUST be included. I will not accept a worsening of an already bad situation in the guise of improvement. Best, Keith From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Dr Eberhard W Lisse Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:27 PM To: CCWG Accountability Cc: directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Keith, this is the part of the problem, you are not aware how this works for ccTLDs or rather what ICANN has done to some ccTLD (Managers). And, such a ccTLD doesn't bother about ICANN's accountability to the community, it bothers about the lack of the IANA Function Manager's accountability to it (the ccTld). Before AND after the transition. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini [...]
Part of my „pitch” last week in Frankfurt, I fully agree, Keith Cheers, Roelof From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 02:32 To: Rudolph Daniel <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Hi Rudolph, In this context, ICANN's "shareholders" or "members" would be the elected or appointed Chairs of the existing ICANN community's bottom-up, consensus-based, multi-stakeholder structures. If those Chairs aren't ethical, then they could and should be replaced by their respective groups. I believe this would give us a built-in and permanent accountability loop rooted in the multi-stakeholder system, which is precisely what NTIA has asked for. Regards, Keith Sent from my iPhone On Jan 27, 2015, at 6:50 PM, "Rudolph Daniel" <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> wrote: No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
It is even doubtful that shareholders would be (ethically or not) in pursuit of accountability in general or of being accountable themselves. My guess would be that many of them would be in pursuit of (long or short term) profits on the shares they hold… Cheers, Roelof From: Rudolph Daniel <rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>> Date: woensdag 28 januari 2015 00:49 To: Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure No nuance missing Jonathan. :) Likening to shareholders reminded me that shareholders are not always ethical in their pursuit of accountability. RD On Jan 27, 2015 6:58 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Hmmm. I guess “we” is the community that have reached a fairly solid consensus that new accountability mechanisms need to be put in place at ICANN. And the role “we” seek them to play is exactly what EBW outlined below as aspirational. The issue is structural reform that empowers the community to hold the board of ICANN accountable going forward. Likening it to “shareholder” accountability is not about turning ICANN into a commercial organization, merely addressing concerns surrounding liability. What nuance am I missing here?
From: Rudolph Daniel [mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:55 PM To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: Accountability Cross Community; Eric Brunner-Williams Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Not sure I get who 'we' is and 'seek them to play' ? RD
On Jan 27, 2015 6:44 PM, "Jonathan Zuck" <JZuck@actonline.org<mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> wrote:
Agree but the point of accountability mechanisms is to ensure the board continues to play the role we seek them to play.
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Rudolph Daniel Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:38 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
I would think, and certainly it has been suggested elsewhere that public accountably be less of the shareholder kind and more of the ethical variety. RD
On Jan 27, 2015 3:04 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net<mailto:ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>> wrote:
All,
I would not like to see the Board's duty as stewards of the public trust -- exercising reasonable care, inquisitive, ... the strictest standard of duty of care in American law -- reduced to the pursuit of quarterly profits maximization prevalent in for-profit Boards.
ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
I suggest our standards are, by initial design, higher than the likeness proposed.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Excellent Jonathan Thank you (or your counsel) very much!!! Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8837 7176 (New Number) Enviado desde mi iPhone
El ene 27, 2015, a las 12:05 PM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> escribió:
The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders. Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here’s what she’s been able to determine:
Q: What would this look like? Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group.
Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal? A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It’s clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c).
Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization? A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable.
Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN? A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws.
Q: How would the members remain accountable? To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time.
Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy? Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism.
Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same? A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process.
Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues? A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge.
I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views.
Jonathan Zuck President 202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck
ACT | The App Association
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Nice to see some firm details on this. The optics of 11 people overseeing a Board of 20 is a little odd. That said, I think one area where the "multistakeholder model" is veering off into the impossible is this habit of creating massive committees every time there is an issue ("ALAC wants 4 people; the GAC wants 5; the GNSO wants 9"). What I do like is the idea of the members being obliged to represent their groups rather than this abused concept of acting in the organization's overall best interests - which for a decade has been shorthand for "what the legal department says". On the other hand, ICANN is so status driven and so many posts are seen as stepping stones to being on the Board rather than standing on their own terms, that I worry the reality of this member group would be yet more politics, self-promotion and behind-the-scenes deals. If you could find members or introduce rules that meant they would genuinely represent their group's overall view, then I think this approach could be a good approach. Rules I would consider: * Members cannot have been on the ICANN Board previously * Members are barred from sitting on the ICANN Board for 5 years after their term is up Kieren On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here’s what she’s been able to determine:
*Q: What would this look like?*
*Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (*supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) *would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group*.
*Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal?*
*A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It’s clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c).*
*Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization?*
*A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable.*
*Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN?*
*A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws. *
*Q: How would the members remain accountable?*
*To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time.*
*Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy?*
*Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism. *
*Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same?*
*A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process.*
*Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues?*
*A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge.*
I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views.
Jonathan Zuck
*President*
202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck
ACT | The App Association
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Kieren , Jonathan, Would you envisage the 11 getting paid ( equally) ? Regards, Phil From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kieren McCarthy Sent: 27 January 2015 20:13 To: Jonathan Zuck Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure Nice to see some firm details on this. The optics of 11 people overseeing a Board of 20 is a little odd. That said, I think one area where the "multistakeholder model" is veering off into the impossible is this habit of creating massive committees every time there is an issue ("ALAC wants 4 people; the GAC wants 5; the GNSO wants 9"). What I do like is the idea of the members being obliged to represent their groups rather than this abused concept of acting in the organization's overall best interests - which for a decade has been shorthand for "what the legal department says". On the other hand, ICANN is so status driven and so many posts are seen as stepping stones to being on the Board rather than standing on their own terms, that I worry the reality of this member group would be yet more politics, self-promotion and behind-the-scenes deals. If you could find members or introduce rules that meant they would genuinely represent their group's overall view, then I think this approach could be a good approach. Rules I would consider: * Members cannot have been on the ICANN Board previously * Members are barred from sitting on the ICANN Board for 5 years after their term is up Kieren On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote: The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders. Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here’s what she’s been able to determine: Q: What would this look like? Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group. Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal? A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It’s clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c). Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization? A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable. Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN? A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws. Q: How would the members remain accountable? To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time. Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy? Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism. Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same? A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process. Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues? A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge. I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views. Jonathan Zuck President 202-331-2130 X 101 <tel:202-331-2130%20X%20101> | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck ACT | The App Association <https://twitter.com/actonline> Description: Image removed by sender. https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/twitter.png <https://www.facebook.com/actonline.org> Description: Image removed by sender. https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/fb.png <http://actonline.org/> Description: Image removed by sender. https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6442666/actonline.png _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Phil Buckingham <phil@dotadvice.co.uk> wrote:
Kieren , Jonathan,
Would you envisage the 11 getting paid ( equally) ?
It certainly should not be a position less being a paid position, which i think makes chartering SO/ACs as a whole (!representation) to be a more reliable/sustainable approach. I see there is an option to have membership by group and i think it could be further looked into. As its already been said, featuring CCs outside of ICANN community could be problematic in this scenario, however what could be compelling is for the existing processes to be maintained while the power of membership is only exercised as one of the last resorts. Also when such need arises, one would want to ensure that the respective SO/AC processes is open enough to accommodate the views of the non-ICANNers. (ref: I believe/expect that CCs outside ICANN community are participating in OR at least following the CCWG and CWG, so same ethics applied in those WG can be ensured within the SO/AC) Regards
Regards,
Phil
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Kieren McCarthy *Sent:* 27 January 2015 20:13 *To:* Jonathan Zuck *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Nice to see some firm details on this.
The optics of 11 people overseeing a Board of 20 is a little odd.
That said, I think one area where the "multistakeholder model" is veering off into the impossible is this habit of creating massive committees every time there is an issue ("ALAC wants 4 people; the GAC wants 5; the GNSO wants 9").
What I do like is the idea of the members being obliged to represent their groups rather than this abused concept of acting in the organization's overall best interests - which for a decade has been shorthand for "what the legal department says".
On the other hand, ICANN is so status driven and so many posts are seen as stepping stones to being on the Board rather than standing on their own terms, that I worry the reality of this member group would be yet more politics, self-promotion and behind-the-scenes deals.
If you could find members or introduce rules that meant they would genuinely represent their group's overall view, then I think this approach could be a good approach.
Rules I would consider:
* Members cannot have been on the ICANN Board previously
* Members are barred from sitting on the ICANN Board for 5 years after their term is up
Kieren
On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here’s what she’s been able to determine:
*Q: What would this look like?*
*Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (*supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) *would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group*.
*Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal?*
*A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It’s clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c).*
*Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization?*
*A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable.*
*Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN?*
*A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws. *
*Q: How would the members remain accountable?*
*To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time.*
*Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy?*
*Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism. *
*Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same?*
*A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process.*
*Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues?*
*A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge.*
I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views.
Jonathan Zuck
*President*
202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck
ACT | The App Association
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
I have been thinking about this too for the last days, and I am wondering if we are not just adding another layer? Which eventually as Kieran says will lead to the same jockeying, same power relationships and no significant changes? Should we not perhaps better reform the Board, which from what I read is seen as evil? My own view is that all very reasonable people turn into very unreasonable people when appointed to the Board, and so far, only one, who I asked when he was appointed to promise that this would not happen to him has not. On the other director appointed at the same time, sitting in the same bar with is, the jury is still somewhat out. el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jan 27, 2015, at 22:12, Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com> wrote:
Nice to see some firm details on this.
The optics of 11 people overseeing a Board of 20 is a little odd.
That said, I think one area where the "multistakeholder model" is veering off into the impossible is this habit of creating massive committees every time there is an issue ("ALAC wants 4 people; the GAC wants 5; the GNSO wants 9").
What I do like is the idea of the members being obliged to represent their groups rather than this abused concept of acting in the organization's overall best interests - which for a decade has been shorthand for "what the legal department says".
On the other hand, ICANN is so status driven and so many posts are seen as stepping stones to being on the Board rather than standing on their own terms, that I worry the reality of this member group would be yet more politics, self-promotion and behind-the-scenes deals.
If you could find members or introduce rules that meant they would genuinely represent their group's overall view, then I think this approach could be a good approach.
Rules I would consider:
* Members cannot have been on the ICANN Board previously * Members are barred from sitting on the ICANN Board for 5 years after their term is up
Kieren
On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote: The idea of ICANN membership has come up as a means to anchor the organization in the existing bottom-up, multi-stakeholder community, thereby ensuring its continued legitimacy. The very essence of work stream 1 is that ICANN’s Board of Directors would become accountable to the community, in much the same way that the Boards of publicly-traded companies are ultimately accountable to their shareholders.
Some good and reasonable questions have been raised on the list about the legality and complexity of a possible membership structure under California not-for-profit corporate law. I tasked my in-house counsel with researching some of these questions and, while recognizing that the CCWG still needs independent expert advice, here’s what she’s been able to determine:
Q: What would this look like?
Briefly, the idea is that the head of each of the 11 current ICANN groups (supporting organizations, advisory committees, and stakeholder groups) would become one of the members of ICANN, and would continue to serve as an ICANN member until someone else took over the leadership of that group.
Q: Is the proposed membership structure legal?
A: Under California non-profit law, a tax-exempt organization may be comprised of members. A tax-exempt organization has broad leeway to create a membership structure that best suits its particular needs. It’s clear under California law that individuals may be members. Cal. Corp. Code 5310(a). Moreover, California law does not restrict membership to legally organized groups. Cal. Corp. Code 5313. Thus, it is appropriate for an individual, identified by a group (whether incorporated or unincorporated) to be a member. Alternately, membership can be granted to a group, which can then authorize a person to vote on its behalf. Cal. Corp. Code 5056(c).
Q: Will the Government Advisory Committee have a member? Can a government representative be a member of a non-profit organization?
A: Yes. As an Advisory Committee, the GAC would have one member on ICANN. California non-profit law permits a government representative (including a representative of a foreign government) to be a member of a non-profit organization. However, if the GAC determines that it prefers to remain only an advisory body and not take on this new membership role, the model is still viable.
Q: Will the new membership structure be flexible enough to accommodate future changes to ICANN?
A: Yes. Future changes to ICANN membership status would be approved by the members. For example, if a new stakeholder group, supporting organization or advisory committee is created under the bylaws, the current members could offer membership to that entity by a 3/4 vote. Similarly, the current members could remove a current member by a 3/4 vote. The required flexibility would just need to be incorporated into the updated bylaws.
Q: How would the members remain accountable?
To ensure full accountability, the 11 members would serve on behalf of their respective memberships and could be recalled or replaced by their group at any time.
Q: How to prevent membership from being GNSO-heavy?
Any concerns about the 11 members being too GNSO-heavy could be addressed via a weighted voting structure or similar mechanism.
Q: How will the new membership structure prevent organizational capture? Will each member be treated the same?
A: The new membership structure prevents organizational capture by giving each stakeholder group only one representative member to ICANN and requiring a 3/4 vote for significant decisions, thereby ensuring significant consensus. Each member receives one vote of equal weight to the other members. For instance, governments are represented by the GAC Chair, and have only one collective voice out of 11 in the accountability process.
Q: Will the membership process preclude those unable or unwilling to pay membership dues?
A: Membership would be free to all eligible members. Participation in the existing group of supporting organizations and advisory committees will not be altered, and will remain free of charge.
I hope this helps to inform our discussions while we wait for the independent legal experts to give us their views.
Jonathan Zuck
President
202-331-2130 X 101 | jzuck@actonline.org | Skype: jvzuck
ACT | The App Association
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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participants (15)
-
"Carlos Raúl G." -
Alan Greenberg -
Chris Disspain -
Dr Eberhard Lisse -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse
-
Drazek, Keith -
Eric Brunner-Williams -
James M. Bladel -
Jonathan Zuck -
Jordan Carter -
Kieren McCarthy -
Phil Buckingham -
Roelof Meijer -
Rudolph Daniel -
Seun Ojedeji