Fwd: An mplication of accountability models being discussed
I'd like to post a response to a recent post of mine. John has sharpened my memory with some useful detail. I trust that this wording from the original AoC will be included in a future version of the bylaws; I believe that is the plan. George Begin forwarded message:
From: John Poole <jp1@expri.com> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed Date: July 10, 2015 at 9:57:30 PM EDT To: George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com>
George-- Well said--I am an "observer of the CCWG" so cannot post directly--the AOC confirms the "public interest" (defined as what is in the best interests of the global internet community NOT just special interest groups or "stakeholders" within ICANN) should be the standard by which the Board makes its decisions"--
AOC ... 3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
Best regards, John Poole
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:13 PM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote: All,
[This message contains my personal opinion and is not related to any formal ICANN Board function. My opinions may of course reflect insights that I've had as a result of Board service, but they're still my personal insights, and not ICANN positions, either formal or informal.]
First, I accept the idea that the ICANN Board is accountable -- in fact, with multiple accountability requirements, including the Attorney General of the State of California (California law), ICANN Inc. (as a Director), the "community" (bylaws provisions), and the global public interest (Affirmation of Commitments). Personally, I also embrace another dimension of accountability; my actions must contribute to the health and growth of the Internet, as opposed to weakening them. That's clearly a subjective measure, as is the interpretation of what is the global public interest.
A problem arises for me when there appears to be a conflict between satisfying one or more of these obligations while working agains others. For the most part, they coincide, but not necessarily always. For me, the most important accountability requirement that I have is to the health and growth of the Internet, and if I were to have to act against that in any significant way as a member of the Board, I would quit the Board.
Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
It's somewhat more complex than that. ICANN uses the multistakeholder model precisely because it brings together stakeholder groups with specific interests that are often in conflict or opposition. It brings them together because only if they are together can they attempt to find compromise positions for progress. But sometimes that requires decisions that support one side's position and go against another's. GAC advice provides an excellent example; the Board may make a decision to accept or not accept, with follow up consequences either way.
The issue comes up because of the CCWG discussion about removal of Board Directors. Such removal may well depend upon whether, in those cases of divergence of accountabilities, Board members choose a direction that does not reflect what the community wants, or what a major part of the community wants but a minority may not want.
This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
George
There are four AoC reviews. In my view, it would be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Accountability and Transparency Review and the Security, Stability and Resiliency Review into the bylaws, but it would not be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Whois Review and the Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice Review in their present form. The Whois Review terms were flawed from the beginning, and the Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review is tied too tightly to the current status of the gTLD program. Steve On Jul 11, 2015, at 6:40 AM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to post a response to a recent post of mine. John has sharpened my memory with some useful detail. I trust that this wording from the original AoC will be included in a future version of the bylaws; I believe that is the plan.
George
Begin forwarded message:
From: John Poole <jp1@expri.com> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed Date: July 10, 2015 at 9:57:30 PM EDT To: George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com>
George-- Well said--I am an "observer of the CCWG" so cannot post directly--the AOC confirms the "public interest" (defined as what is in the best interests of the global internet community NOT just special interest groups or "stakeholders" within ICANN) should be the standard by which the Board makes its decisions"--
AOC ... 3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
Best regards, John Poole
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:13 PM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote: All,
[This message contains my personal opinion and is not related to any formal ICANN Board function. My opinions may of course reflect insights that I've had as a result of Board service, but they're still my personal insights, and not ICANN positions, either formal or informal.]
First, I accept the idea that the ICANN Board is accountable -- in fact, with multiple accountability requirements, including the Attorney General of the State of California (California law), ICANN Inc. (as a Director), the "community" (bylaws provisions), and the global public interest (Affirmation of Commitments). Personally, I also embrace another dimension of accountability; my actions must contribute to the health and growth of the Internet, as opposed to weakening them. That's clearly a subjective measure, as is the interpretation of what is the global public interest.
A problem arises for me when there appears to be a conflict between satisfying one or more of these obligations while working agains others. For the most part, they coincide, but not necessarily always. For me, the most important accountability requirement that I have is to the health and growth of the Internet, and if I were to have to act against that in any significant way as a member of the Board, I would quit the Board.
Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
It's somewhat more complex than that. ICANN uses the multistakeholder model precisely because it brings together stakeholder groups with specific interests that are often in conflict or opposition. It brings them together because only if they are together can they attempt to find compromise positions for progress. But sometimes that requires decisions that support one side's position and go against another's. GAC advice provides an excellent example; the Board may make a decision to accept or not accept, with follow up consequences either way.
The issue comes up because of the CCWG discussion about removal of Board Directors. Such removal may well depend upon whether, in those cases of divergence of accountabilities, Board members choose a direction that does not reflect what the community wants, or what a major part of the community wants but a minority may not want.
This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
George
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
The Whois Review terms were flawed from the beginning This is precisely the problem. This review and the way it is worded is a critical component of ICANN's agreement with the US government and a fundamental accountability check. It was discussed, approved and signed by ICANN with full Board review. And yet, rather than adhere to its terms, rather than feel obliged to follow through, rather than stick to its responsibilities, you feel it is your right after the fact to decide as an individual that it is flawed and so doesn't need to be considered fully. This in a nutshell is why the community feels there is a horrendous lack of accountability: because the Board feels it can simply ignore anything it doesn't happen to agree with, regardless of how important it is. The same culture also exists within the staff. What the accountability changes need to introduce is a system that makes it impossible for the Board or staff to simply wish away the obligations they have to the community. If there is indeed an issue that the Board feels needs revision, it should have no choice but to actively seek the permission of the community to approach it differently. Until then, there should be an obligation to do what was agreed regardless of how you happen to feel about it at any given period of time. Kieren
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 8:10 PM Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
There are four AoC reviews. In my view, it would be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Accountability and Transparency Review and the Security, Stability and Resiliency Review into the bylaws, but it would not be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Whois Review and the Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice Review in their present form. The Whois Review terms were flawed from the beginning, and the Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review is tied too tightly to the current status of the gTLD program.
Steve
On Jul 11, 2015, at 6:40 AM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to post a response to a recent post of mine. John has sharpened my memory with some useful detail. I trust that this wording from the original AoC will be included in a future version of the bylaws; I believe that is the plan.
George
Begin forwarded message:
*From: *John Poole <jp1@expri.com> *Subject: **Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed* *Date: *July 10, 2015 at 9:57:30 PM EDT *To: *George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com>
George-- Well said--I am an "observer of the CCWG" so cannot post directly--the AOC confirms the "public interest" (defined as what is in the best interests of the global internet community NOT just special interest groups or "stakeholders" within ICANN) should be the standard by which the Board makes its decisions"--
AOC ... 3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including *commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions *made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS *are made in the public interest* and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the *outcomes of which reflect the public interest*, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. *ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, *ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
Best regards, John Poole
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:13 PM, George Sadowsky < george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
[This message contains my personal opinion and is not related to any formal ICANN Board function. My opinions may of course reflect insights that I've had as a result of Board service, but they're still my personal insights, and not ICANN positions, either formal or informal.]
First, I accept the idea that the ICANN Board is accountable -- in fact, with multiple accountability requirements, including the Attorney General of the State of California (California law), ICANN Inc. (as a Director), the "community" (bylaws provisions), and the global public interest (Affirmation of Commitments). Personally, I also embrace another dimension of accountability; my actions must contribute to the health and growth of the Internet, as opposed to weakening them. That's clearly a subjective measure, as is the interpretation of what is the global public interest.
A problem arises for me when there appears to be a conflict between satisfying one or more of these obligations while working agains others. For the most part, they coincide, but not necessarily always. For me, the most important accountability requirement that I have is to the health and growth of the Internet, and if I were to have to act against that in any significant way as a member of the Board, I would quit the Board.
Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
It's somewhat more complex than that. ICANN uses the multistakeholder model precisely because it brings together stakeholder groups with specific interests that are often in conflict or opposition. It brings them together because only if they are together can they attempt to find compromise positions for progress. But sometimes that requires decisions that support one side's position and go against another's. GAC advice provides an excellent example; the Board may make a decision to accept or not accept, with follow up consequences either way.
The issue comes up because of the CCWG discussion about removal of Board Directors. Such removal may well depend upon whether, in those cases of divergence of accountabilities, Board members choose a direction that does not reflect what the community wants, or what a major part of the community wants but a minority may not want.
This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
George
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
The idea of picking and choosing reviews from the AoC for incorporation into the Bylaws concerns me, to say the least. If we are folding ICANN's AoC commitments into the Bylaws, it should be done across the board, absent some truly compelling argument about obsolescence. The reviews can be changed once they are in the bylaws, though it won't be so easy. I suppose the result of leaving some reviews out of the Bylaws would be that these reviews would stay in the AoC. On its surface, that might not sound like a big deal, but given the ability of either party to terminate on 120 days notice, and the lack of oversight of AoC matters vs. bylaws (as proposed by the CCWG), and it starts seeming rather tenuous, to say the least. It would also mean that these were seen as disfavored or short-term reviews, putting them further at risk. Greg Shatan On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 10:03 AM, Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com
wrote:
The Whois Review terms were flawed from the beginning This is precisely the problem. This review and the way it is worded is a critical component of ICANN's agreement with the US government and a fundamental accountability check. It was discussed, approved and signed by ICANN with full Board review. And yet, rather than adhere to its terms, rather than feel obliged to follow through, rather than stick to its responsibilities, you feel it is your right after the fact to decide as an individual that it is flawed and so doesn't need to be considered fully. This in a nutshell is why the community feels there is a horrendous lack of accountability: because the Board feels it can simply ignore anything it doesn't happen to agree with, regardless of how important it is. The same culture also exists within the staff. What the accountability changes need to introduce is a system that makes it impossible for the Board or staff to simply wish away the obligations they have to the community. If there is indeed an issue that the Board feels needs revision, it should have no choice but to actively seek the permission of the community to approach it differently. Until then, there should be an obligation to do what was agreed regardless of how you happen to feel about it at any given period of time. Kieren
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 8:10 PM Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
There are four AoC reviews. In my view, it would be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Accountability and Transparency Review and the Security, Stability and Resiliency Review into the bylaws, but it would not be appropriate to incorporate the terms of the Whois Review and the Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice Review in their present form. The Whois Review terms were flawed from the beginning, and the Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review is tied too tightly to the current status of the gTLD program.
Steve
On Jul 11, 2015, at 6:40 AM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to post a response to a recent post of mine. John has sharpened my memory with some useful detail. I trust that this wording from the original AoC will be included in a future version of the bylaws; I believe that is the plan.
George
Begin forwarded message:
*From: *John Poole <jp1@expri.com> *Subject: **Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed* *Date: *July 10, 2015 at 9:57:30 PM EDT *To: *George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com>
George-- Well said--I am an "observer of the CCWG" so cannot post directly--the AOC confirms the "public interest" (defined as what is in the best interests of the global internet community NOT just special interest groups or "stakeholders" within ICANN) should be the standard by which the Board makes its decisions"--
AOC ... 3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including *commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions *made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS *are made in the public interest* and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the *outcomes of which reflect the public interest*, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. *ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, *ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
Best regards, John Poole
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:13 PM, George Sadowsky < george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
[This message contains my personal opinion and is not related to any formal ICANN Board function. My opinions may of course reflect insights that I've had as a result of Board service, but they're still my personal insights, and not ICANN positions, either formal or informal.]
First, I accept the idea that the ICANN Board is accountable -- in fact, with multiple accountability requirements, including the Attorney General of the State of California (California law), ICANN Inc. (as a Director), the "community" (bylaws provisions), and the global public interest (Affirmation of Commitments). Personally, I also embrace another dimension of accountability; my actions must contribute to the health and growth of the Internet, as opposed to weakening them. That's clearly a subjective measure, as is the interpretation of what is the global public interest.
A problem arises for me when there appears to be a conflict between satisfying one or more of these obligations while working agains others. For the most part, they coincide, but not necessarily always. For me, the most important accountability requirement that I have is to the health and growth of the Internet, and if I were to have to act against that in any significant way as a member of the Board, I would quit the Board.
Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
It's somewhat more complex than that. ICANN uses the multistakeholder model precisely because it brings together stakeholder groups with specific interests that are often in conflict or opposition. It brings them together because only if they are together can they attempt to find compromise positions for progress. But sometimes that requires decisions that support one side's position and go against another's. GAC advice provides an excellent example; the Board may make a decision to accept or not accept, with follow up consequences either way.
The issue comes up because of the CCWG discussion about removal of Board Directors. Such removal may well depend upon whether, in those cases of divergence of accountabilities, Board members choose a direction that does not reflect what the community wants, or what a major part of the community wants but a minority may not want.
This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
George
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (4)
-
George Sadowsky -
Greg Shatan -
Kieren McCarthy -
Steve Crocker