I'd like to post a response to a recent post of mine. John has sharpened my memory with some useful detail. I trust that this wording from the original AoC will be included in a future version of the bylaws; I believe that is the plan. George Begin forwarded message:
From: John Poole <jp1@expri.com> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed Date: July 10, 2015 at 9:57:30 PM EDT To: George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com>
George-- Well said--I am an "observer of the CCWG" so cannot post directly--the AOC confirms the "public interest" (defined as what is in the best interests of the global internet community NOT just special interest groups or "stakeholders" within ICANN) should be the standard by which the Board makes its decisions"--
AOC ... 3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.
4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
Best regards, John Poole
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:13 PM, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote: All,
[This message contains my personal opinion and is not related to any formal ICANN Board function. My opinions may of course reflect insights that I've had as a result of Board service, but they're still my personal insights, and not ICANN positions, either formal or informal.]
First, I accept the idea that the ICANN Board is accountable -- in fact, with multiple accountability requirements, including the Attorney General of the State of California (California law), ICANN Inc. (as a Director), the "community" (bylaws provisions), and the global public interest (Affirmation of Commitments). Personally, I also embrace another dimension of accountability; my actions must contribute to the health and growth of the Internet, as opposed to weakening them. That's clearly a subjective measure, as is the interpretation of what is the global public interest.
A problem arises for me when there appears to be a conflict between satisfying one or more of these obligations while working agains others. For the most part, they coincide, but not necessarily always. For me, the most important accountability requirement that I have is to the health and growth of the Internet, and if I were to have to act against that in any significant way as a member of the Board, I would quit the Board.
Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
It's somewhat more complex than that. ICANN uses the multistakeholder model precisely because it brings together stakeholder groups with specific interests that are often in conflict or opposition. It brings them together because only if they are together can they attempt to find compromise positions for progress. But sometimes that requires decisions that support one side's position and go against another's. GAC advice provides an excellent example; the Board may make a decision to accept or not accept, with follow up consequences either way.
The issue comes up because of the CCWG discussion about removal of Board Directors. Such removal may well depend upon whether, in those cases of divergence of accountabilities, Board members choose a direction that does not reflect what the community wants, or what a major part of the community wants but a minority may not want.
This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
George