Regarding definitions of consensus
Hello Anne, 1. >> What level of consensus would operate to initiate enforcement action? What level would be necessary within any given SO/AC to initiate enforcement and then what level for the entire Community to consider and develop Consensus? That is a good question. We didn’t want to be prescriptive here. Different parts of the ICANN structure use different models for consensus. E.g. the GAC uses a non-objection approach to determine consensus. The GNSO typically defines consensus for policy matters as a 2/3 super-majority vote. I would expect that each SO and AC would determine what they consider to be consensus as part of their operating procedures (some of which are in the bylaws and some are documented outside of the bylaws. We then talk about "To initiate formal MEM proceedings, the agreed number of SOs and ACs must support the petition.". This is for the CCWG to decide - but for example you might want a minimum of two SOs, and perhaps no objections from any of the ACs. The CCWG charter defined consensus as: " The recommendations from the CCWG do not become “consensus” recommendations until they have been formally approved by the chartering organizations. The chartering organizations for the CCWG are: GNSO, ASO, ccNSO, ALAC, GAC and SSAC."
Does the Board anticipate there would be any delays resulting from the MEM “consensus enforcement decision” process as opposed to the Sole Member voting process?
We assumed the same time frame.
2. What would determine the composition of the MEM and what level of voting by that group would be necessary before enforcement is initiated?
The MEM Issue group would comprise representatives of the SOs and ACs that wished to initiate action. It is then up to that Group I think to determine how they want to operate.
3. If the MEM has capacity to sue for enforcement as stated in the Board proposal, what is its legal personhood
My understanding is that the chairs of the ACs and SOs that are members of the MEM issue group could enforce the action as legal persons, or you could form an incorporated association for the purpose of initiating and enforcing the arbitration. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Dear Bruce, If I may add two follow-up questions: are all SO and AC envisaged to participate in the MEM decision-process (i.e. to decide whether a decision is taken or not)? What happens if various SO/AC decide not to participate at all in such processes and/or is there a minimal threshold of participation in the MEM for the MEM to become operational? Apologies if these questions have already been answered elsewhere... Thanks and regards Jorge -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Bruce Tonkin Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. September 2015 11:34 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding definitions of consensus Hello Anne, 1. >> What level of consensus would operate to initiate enforcement action? What level would be necessary within any given SO/AC to initiate enforcement and then what level for the entire Community to consider and develop Consensus? That is a good question. We didn’t want to be prescriptive here. Different parts of the ICANN structure use different models for consensus. E.g. the GAC uses a non-objection approach to determine consensus. The GNSO typically defines consensus for policy matters as a 2/3 super-majority vote. I would expect that each SO and AC would determine what they consider to be consensus as part of their operating procedures (some of which are in the bylaws and some are documented outside of the bylaws. We then talk about "To initiate formal MEM proceedings, the agreed number of SOs and ACs must support the petition.". This is for the CCWG to decide - but for example you might want a minimum of two SOs, and perhaps no objections from any of the ACs. The CCWG charter defined consensus as: " The recommendations from the CCWG do not become “consensus” recommendations until they have been formally approved by the chartering organizations. The chartering organizations for the CCWG are: GNSO, ASO, ccNSO, ALAC, GAC and SSAC."
Does the Board anticipate there would be any delays resulting from the MEM “consensus enforcement decision” process as opposed to the Sole Member voting process?
We assumed the same time frame.
2. What would determine the composition of the MEM and what level of voting by that group would be necessary before enforcement is initiated?
The MEM Issue group would comprise representatives of the SOs and ACs that wished to initiate action. It is then up to that Group I think to determine how they want to operate.
3. If the MEM has capacity to sue for enforcement as stated in the Board proposal, what is its legal personhood
My understanding is that the chairs of the ACs and SOs that are members of the MEM issue group could enforce the action as legal persons, or you could form an incorporated association for the purpose of initiating and enforcing the arbitration. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello Jorge,
If I may add two follow-up questions: are all SO and AC envisaged to participate in the MEM decision-process (i.e. to decide whether a decision is taken or not)?
No - I think the concept is that all SOs and ACs are informed of the proposed action, and some minimum threshold (presumably more than 1) need to agree to join the SO or AC that initiated the petition for discussion.
What happens if various SO/AC decide not to participate at all in such processes
Nothing.
and/or is there a minimal threshold of participation in the MEM for the MEM to become operational?
Yes the idea was that there should be a minimum threshold. We left it to the CCWG to discuss what would be appropriate. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Dear Bruce, don't you think that there would still be a risk of capture by "activist" SO/ACs? or is there some other kind of brake which would avoid that one or two SO/AC abuse the MEM process to block/paralyse the organisation? In addition: when reading the Board proposals I remember this sentence (p. 58): "For example, a decision to exercise the community power could require at least two SOs to support exercising the community power, and no more than one AC providing advice against exercising the community power." Would that mean for instance that for example two SOs could prevail with spilling the whole Board, even when another SO would abstain, another AC would oppose and a second AC would be unable to decide due to an internal stalemate? Shouldn't it be so that the thresholds should be calculated on the basis of all existing SO and AC? For instance, now we have 3 SOs and 2+2 ACs (if I remember well). Shouldn't the required majority be calculated on that basis? Otherwise we could end up with only 2 SOs deciding for the community as a whole - which would not meet the required "multistekeholder" principle. thanks Jorge -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Bruce Tonkin Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. September 2015 12:56 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding definitions of consensus Hello Jorge,
If I may add two follow-up questions: are all SO and AC envisaged to participate in the MEM decision-process (i.e. to decide whether a decision is taken or not)?
No - I think the concept is that all SOs and ACs are informed of the proposed action, and some minimum threshold (presumably more than 1) need to agree to join the SO or AC that initiated the petition for discussion.
What happens if various SO/AC decide not to participate at all in such processes
Nothing.
and/or is there a minimal threshold of participation in the MEM for the MEM to become operational?
Yes the idea was that there should be a minimum threshold. We left it to the CCWG to discuss what would be appropriate. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello Jorge,
or is there some other kind of brake which would avoid that one or two SO/AC abuse the MEM process to block/paralyse the organisation?
I think this the balance that the CCWG needs to determine with consultation across the community.
when reading the Board proposals I remember this sentence (p. 58): "For example, a decision to exercise the community power could require at least two SOs to support exercising the community power, and no more than one AC providing advice against exercising the community power."
That was one suggestion - the CCWG may consider other alternatives. The thresholds may vary depending on the power. E.g you may have a higher threshold to change a fundamental bylaw compared to other bylaws - I believe that concept is broadly consistent with the approach taken in the CCWG proposal.
Would that mean for instance that for example two SOs could prevail with spilling the whole Board, even when another SO would abstain, another AC would oppose and a second AC would be unable to decide due to an internal stalemate?
Shouldn't it be so that the thresholds should be calculated on the basis of all existing SO and AC? For instance, now we have 3 SOs and 2+2 ACs (if I remember well). Shouldn't the required majority be calculated on that basis?
For removal of the whole board, the Board agreed with the thresholds proposed by the CCWG. i.e. a 75% threshold.. I would assume that means that you need at least 6 of the 7 SOs and ACs to agree.
Otherwise we could end up with only 2 SOs deciding for the community as a whole - which would not meet the required "multi-stakeholder" principle.
Ye s I think there is a difference between the threshold needed to initiate an action to decide whether the board breached a bylaw, compared to the threshold needed to change a fundamental bylaw. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Thanks! The right balance is really the key - and to this end participation from all SO/AC seems important if the adequate multistakeholder mix is to be maintained. Regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 18.09.2015 um 11:32 schrieb Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>:
Hello Jorge,
or is there some other kind of brake which would avoid that one or two SO/AC abuse the MEM process to block/paralyse the organisation?
I think this the balance that the CCWG needs to determine with consultation across the community.
when reading the Board proposals I remember this sentence (p. 58): "For example, a decision to exercise the community power could require at least two SOs to support exercising the community power, and no more than one AC providing advice against exercising the community power."
That was one suggestion - the CCWG may consider other alternatives. The thresholds may vary depending on the power. E.g you may have a higher threshold to change a fundamental bylaw compared to other bylaws - I believe that concept is broadly consistent with the approach taken in the CCWG proposal.
Would that mean for instance that for example two SOs could prevail with spilling the whole Board, even when another SO would abstain, another AC would oppose and a second AC would be unable to decide due to an internal stalemate?
Shouldn't it be so that the thresholds should be calculated on the basis of all existing SO and AC? For instance, now we have 3 SOs and 2+2 ACs (if I remember well). Shouldn't the required majority be calculated on that basis?
For removal of the whole board, the Board agreed with the thresholds proposed by the CCWG. i.e. a 75% threshold.. I would assume that means that you need at least 6 of the 7 SOs and ACs to agree.
Otherwise we could end up with only 2 SOs deciding for the community as a whole - which would not meet the required "multi-stakeholder" principle.
Ye s I think there is a difference between the threshold needed to initiate an action to decide whether the board breached a bylaw, compared to the threshold needed to change a fundamental bylaw.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello, Perhaps there is no need to re-invent the wheel on that part of the board's proposal, i think a number of the CMSM mechanism (related to voting threshold/consensus building process) can be applied to MEM as well. Regards On Fri, Sep 18, 2015 at 8:01 AM, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Bruce,
don't you think that there would still be a risk of capture by "activist" SO/ACs?
or is there some other kind of brake which would avoid that one or two SO/AC abuse the MEM process to block/paralyse the organisation?
In addition: when reading the Board proposals I remember this sentence (p. 58): "For example, a decision to exercise the community power could require at least two SOs to support exercising the community power, and no more than one AC providing advice against exercising the community power."
Would that mean for instance that for example two SOs could prevail with spilling the whole Board, even when another SO would abstain, another AC would oppose and a second AC would be unable to decide due to an internal stalemate?
Shouldn't it be so that the thresholds should be calculated on the basis of all existing SO and AC? For instance, now we have 3 SOs and 2+2 ACs (if I remember well). Shouldn't the required majority be calculated on that basis?
Otherwise we could end up with only 2 SOs deciding for the community as a whole - which would not meet the required "multistekeholder" principle.
thanks
Jorge
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Bruce Tonkin Gesendet: Donnerstag, 17. September 2015 12:56 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding definitions of consensus
Hello Jorge,
If I may add two follow-up questions: are all SO and AC envisaged to participate in the MEM decision-process (i.e. to decide whether a decision is taken or not)?
No - I think the concept is that all SOs and ACs are informed of the proposed action, and some minimum threshold (presumably more than 1) need to agree to join the SO or AC that initiated the petition for discussion.
What happens if various SO/AC decide not to participate at all in such processes
Nothing.
and/or is there a minimal threshold of participation in the MEM for the MEM to become operational?
Yes the idea was that there should be a minimum threshold. We left it to the CCWG to discuss what would be appropriate.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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participants (3)
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Bruce Tonkin -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
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