Hello Jorge,
or is there some other kind of brake which would avoid that one or two SO/AC abuse the MEM process to block/paralyse the organisation?
I think this the balance that the CCWG needs to determine with consultation across the community.
when reading the Board proposals I remember this sentence (p. 58): "For example, a decision to exercise the community power could require at least two SOs to support exercising the community power, and no more than one AC providing advice against exercising the community power."
That was one suggestion - the CCWG may consider other alternatives. The thresholds may vary depending on the power. E.g you may have a higher threshold to change a fundamental bylaw compared to other bylaws - I believe that concept is broadly consistent with the approach taken in the CCWG proposal.
Would that mean for instance that for example two SOs could prevail with spilling the whole Board, even when another SO would abstain, another AC would oppose and a second AC would be unable to decide due to an internal stalemate?
Shouldn't it be so that the thresholds should be calculated on the basis of all existing SO and AC? For instance, now we have 3 SOs and 2+2 ACs (if I remember well). Shouldn't the required majority be calculated on that basis?
For removal of the whole board, the Board agreed with the thresholds proposed by the CCWG. i.e. a 75% threshold.. I would assume that means that you need at least 6 of the 7 SOs and ACs to agree.
Otherwise we could end up with only 2 SOs deciding for the community as a whole - which would not meet the required "multi-stakeholder" principle.
Ye s I think there is a difference between the threshold needed to initiate an action to decide whether the board breached a bylaw, compared to the threshold needed to change a fundamental bylaw. Regards, Bruce Tonkin