Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
I'm in complete agreement with Jordan on this and share the shock and disappointment in this board response to the work of the multi-stakeholder process to hold the board accountable. This is a pivotal moment in which the community can capitulate to the continued abuse of the power we see from ICANN's board, or we can actually stand up and do something about it. I suppose it is the natural reaction of any entity that holds total power and risks losing some of that power to behave in such a way, but it does show that ICANN has not matured sufficiently to be cut lose from oversight any time soon. Truly saddening. Robin On Oct 5, 2015, at 7:44 PM, Jordan Carter wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
---------------------------------------- From: "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org> Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 3:54 AM To: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: "Steve Crocker" <steve.crocker@icann.org>, "Accountability Cross Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I'm in complete agreement with Jordan on this and share the shock and disappointment in this board response to the work of the multi-stakeholder process to hold the board accountable. This is a pivotal moment in which the community can capitulate to the continued abuse of the power we see from ICANN's board, or we can actually stand up and do something about it. I suppose it is the natural reaction of any entity that holds total power and risks losing some of that power to behave in such a way, but it does show that ICANN has not matured sufficiently to be cut lose from oversight any time soon. Truly saddening. I'm trying to hold out hope, but sadly and reluctantly I'm coming to this point of view as well. From the 88 questions dumped on the CCWG the night before the Paris meeting to the current red lines, the Board has shown a lack of understanding and respect for a multi-stakeholder model based upon respect and equality. I would be reluctant to turn lose, with no oversight by any public body, as the global n and n authority, a private body so dominated by a group as limited in number and as unrepresentative as the ICANN Board. As to the later I would ask only that those concerned about the representativeness of the SOAC's to take a look at the body most critical of them: the lack of gender equality, in particular, is very striking. Sad.
Dear Mr. Crocker, Steve Alternative Proposal ( Plabn B ) was first nitiated by Jonathan and complemented by Steve and amended by me ( replacing Voting with consensus building ) Regards Kavouss 2015-10-06 9:21 GMT+02:00 Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
------------------------------ *From*: "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org> *Sent*: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 3:54 AM *To*: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> *Cc*: "Steve Crocker" <steve.crocker@icann.org>, "Accountability Cross Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I'm in complete agreement with Jordan on this and share the shock and disappointment in this board response to the work of the multi-stakeholder process to hold the board accountable. This is a pivotal moment in which the community can capitulate to the continued abuse of the power we see from ICANN's board, or we can actually stand up and do something about it. I suppose it is the natural reaction of any entity that holds total power and risks losing some of that power to behave in such a way, but it does show that ICANN has not matured sufficiently to be cut lose from oversight any time soon. Truly saddening.
I'm trying to hold out hope, but sadly and reluctantly I'm coming to this point of view as well. From the 88 questions dumped on the CCWG the night before the Paris meeting to the current red lines, the Board has shown a lack of understanding and respect for a multi-stakeholder model based upon respect and equality. I would be reluctant to turn lose, with no oversight by any public body, as the global n and n authority, a private body so dominated by a group as limited in number and as unrepresentative as the ICANN Board. As to the later I would ask only that those concerned about the representativeness of the SOAC's to take a look at the body most critical of them: the lack of gender equality, in particular, is very striking. Sad.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
@ Jordan – well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of “a review of structure” as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves – very ineffective. Anne [cid:image001.gif@01D0FFA7.E9684350] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com> wrote:
@ Jordan – well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of “a review of structure” as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves – very ineffective.
Anne
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP*
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725*
*AAikman@lrrlaw.com <AAikman@lrrlaw.com>** | www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM *To:* Steve Crocker *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
------------------------------
This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Keep in mind that the Board's comment "suggested" that WS2 should not exist as a work stream of this group, and instead should be redirected to various other groups and processes to be created for or tasked with these responsibilities. So, if we are adopting the Board's view of how the community should relate to the Board after the transition, are we not adopting the Board's view of WS2? Or are we standing firm on that point? On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 12:40 AM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com> wrote:
@ Jordan – well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of “a review of structure” as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves – very ineffective.
Anne
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP*
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 <520.629.4428> | (F) 520.879.4725 <520.879.4725>*
*AAikman@lrrlaw.com <AAikman@lrrlaw.com>** | www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM *To:* Steve Crocker *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
------------------------------
This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
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Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya < gurcharya@gmail.com> :
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne < AAikman@lrrlaw.com > wrote:
@ Jordan – well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of “a review of structure” as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves – very ineffective. Anne Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com | www.LRRLaw.com From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org ] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker < steve.crocker@icann.org > wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 ( office) | +64-21-442-649 ( mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet ----------------------------------------------------------------------
This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
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I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn’t the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> wrote: @ Jordan – well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of “a review of structure” as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves – very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</compose?To=Accountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ No virus found in this message. 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Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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hi, And with the Board stating that ICANN is not representative, we are sending a strong message to the UN and all of those who think that the UN system is the proper place for names and number governance. I wonder whether in the process of killing membership with this argument, and argument I disagree with, the board has begun to undercut ICANN's viability in the international arena. Was this action in keeping with its fiduciary responsibilties? avri On 06-Oct-15 13:24, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
-- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
[https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...]
Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725
AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/>
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
A better world through a better Internet
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I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</compose?To=Accountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c/compose?To=Accountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ No virus found in this message. 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I think it is imperative for the board to provide us its rationale in writing for why neither a designator model nor a membership model is in the global public interest in its view. It would be a shame if we didn't require this much of the board before we abandon the output of a bottom-up multi-stakeholder process in favor of a model cooked-up at the 11th hour by Jones Day. We've had to publicly document the rationale for every decision we've made along the way - at every step - and the board should do the same. It really isn't a fair process for Steve or Fadi to send-off emails with redlines that have the effect of killing our proposal without us requiring them to provide their rationales for public scrutiny as is required in our charter. Robin On Oct 6, 2015, at 11:03 AM, Phil Corwin wrote:
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel’s 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG’s Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best forICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN’s outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to “be careful” should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the “global public interest”, points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board’s concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did – much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best, Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
-- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
[https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...]
Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725
AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/>
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
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Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
A better world through a better Internet
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Phil, I too would like to understand what process we are using re: the board. It is especially mystifying given that just in August the NTIA's Third Quarterly Report on the IANA transition stated: "ICANN has indicated that it expects to receive both the ICG and CCWG proposals at roughly the same time and that it will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA." The reference it cites is "ICANN 52 Board Statement on ICANN Sending IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability Proposals to NTIA" of 2/12/2015 https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-3-2015-02-12-en which states: "When ICANN receives these proposals, we will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA." So, I'd like to know how we reconcile the report of the NTIA from August, and the Board Statement from February; with the Board Resolution of last year that's cited in the CCWG charter- but we don't seem to be following either. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Phil Corwin Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 2:03 PM To: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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Mike: They never said they wouldn't do everything they could to modify the proposals before they were received. And while they committed to send them on without modification, they never pledged that they would refrain from stating lack of Board support (or even outright opposition) when they transmitted them to NTIA. That's my take. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: Chartier, Mike S [mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 2:56 PM To: Phil Corwin; "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Phil, I too would like to understand what process we are using re: the board. It is especially mystifying given that just in August the NTIA's Third Quarterly Report on the IANA transition stated: "ICANN has indicated that it expects to receive both the ICG and CCWG proposals at roughly the same time and that it will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA." The reference it cites is "ICANN 52 Board Statement on ICANN Sending IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability Proposals to NTIA" of 2/12/2015 https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-3-2015-02-12-en which states: "When ICANN receives these proposals, we will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA." So, I'd like to know how we reconcile the report of the NTIA from August, and the Board Statement from February; with the Board Resolution of last year that's cited in the CCWG charter- but we don't seem to be following either. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Phil Corwin Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 2:03 PM To: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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I guess the question is, can someone point to this point of when the board "receives" the proposal. From the charter I don't see anything post the "board consideration". On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:01 PM, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> wrote: Mike: They never said they wouldn’t do everything they could to modify the proposals before they were received. And while they committed to send them on without modification, they never pledged that they would refrain from stating lack of Board support (or even outright opposition) when they transmitted them to NTIA. That’s my take. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: Chartier, Mike S [mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 2:56 PM To: Phil Corwin; "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: RE: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Phil, I too would like to understand what process we are using re: the board. It is especially mystifying given that just in August the NTIA's Third Quarterly Report on the IANA transition stated: "ICANN has indicated that it expects to receive both the ICG and CCWG proposals at roughly the same time and that it will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA." The reference it cites is “ICANN 52 Board Statement on ICANN Sending IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability Proposals to NTIA” of 2/12/2015 https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-3-2015-02-12-en which states: “When ICANN receives these proposals, we will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA.” So, I’d like to know how we reconcile the report of the NTIA from August, and the Board Statement from February; with the Board Resolution of last year that’s cited in the CCWG charter- but we don’t seem to be following either. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Phil Corwin Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 2:03 PM To: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel’s 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG’s Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN’s outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to “be careful” should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the “global public interest”, points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board’s concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did – much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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Hi Phil, thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk. I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat? This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them. The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia? I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting. As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin. Wolfgang I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org</compose?To=Accountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c/compose?To=Accountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com%3chttp:/www.avg.com>> Version: 2015.0.6140 / Virus Database: 4419/10680 - Release Date: 09/22/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Thanks for the further thoughts, Wolfgang. I see far more agreement than difference --especially on power sharing vs. shifting -- and look forward to building on that common ground in Dublin and beyond. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 3:14 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk. I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat? This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them. The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia? I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting. As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin. Wolfgang I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV. However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added) While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn. Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states: 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter. If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda. Best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi Phil, this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful! Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections.... -- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: I strongly agree with Jordan. I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'. In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective. Anne [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/www.lrrlaw.com/>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3chttp:/www.internetnz.nz>> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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Hi, Phil, I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired the NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees with Wolfgang's completely. I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and eloquently. Regards, George
On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
[https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...]
Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
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Hello George. I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom. I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more representative and protective of the global Internet community and its interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its objectives each and every year. Best regards, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Hi, Phil, I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired the NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees with Wolfgang's completely. I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and eloquently. Regards, George
On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
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202-559-8750/Fax
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Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.o rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou nces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu nity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________
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InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
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This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
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Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all that bad, please consider: * The criteria for selection are secret * The meetings are secret * The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the candidates themselves, as a bad thing * A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it worked (lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to formal advice) * It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment to discussions about how real elections might actually work * It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure to communicate with candidates * It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to explain their decisions. * It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis * It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a terrific job The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not matured to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations achieve every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely hard to be selected. Kieren On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
Hello George.
I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom.
I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more representative and protective of the global Internet community and its interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its objectives each and every year.
Best regards, Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi, Phil,
I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired the NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees with Wolfgang's completely.
I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and eloquently.
Regards,
George
On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang < wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
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"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto: gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto: AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.o rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou nces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu nity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto: steve.crocker@icann.org%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
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Hi Kieran, in the interest of transparency here are some additional comments: 1. Kieran applied under the NomCom 2005 for the position of a board director. He made his application public and encouraged the NomCom to publish the names of all applicants. I was a voting member of the 2005 NomCom (nomintaed by ALAC) and George Sadowsky chaired the NomCom. The NomCom operates under the principle of confidentiality. This principle protects the candidate. It is not part of a conspiracy. It is, BTW, difficult to organize a conspiracy among 16 voting members coming from different constituencies of the community nominated by ACs and SOs within nine months. The principle of confidentiality guarantees that applicants who are not selected are not seen in the public as "loosers". This is the difference to an election where you have public campaigns which ends with winners and loosers. I explained this to Kieran in 2005 at length. We continue to disagree on this issue. However, when it came to the final selection, Kieran had no malus. He was treated equally to all the other good candidates. And we had a lot of good candidates. Kieran was not selected. I recommended Kieran to join ICANN Staff what he did. He has written extensively about his positive and negaitve experiences afterwards. No further comment needed. 2. The selection process in the NomCom follows different principles. The final list of candidates who meet all the high level criteria are mainly all excellent candidates. The final selection is made against a number of additional criteria which takes into consideration factors like geography, gender, skills etc. If you have five lawyers in the board there is no need to send an additional lawyer even if there is an excellent candidate. If you have five technical experts in the board but not managers it is better to send a manager and not another technical experts. With other words you will have always excellent candidates which are not selected because they do not fit into the specific constellation of the year (as Kieran in 2005). A candidate does not risk to be treated as a looser if he is not selected. He just can reapply and nobody will know that he was not selected the previous year. The final selection is indeed different from year to year because the board changes from year to year. And with this changes there are new needs for skill, gender and geography balances. We have elections for the Board: The SOs and the ALAC - which send 7 directors to the Board - have elections among their communities. So the final composition of the board comes from a mix of elections adn selections. 3. Kieran is right that the NomCom was established in the 2002 reform to substitute the elections. I was part of the election as adviser to the Membership Advisory Committtee (MAG) in 1999 and as member of the Membership Information Task Force (MITF) in 2000. I supported the election and was excited. But I learned also some lessons. In Asia it was the Japanese government which encouraged Japanese corporations to invite their employees to register as voters to get a Japanese director. When Taiwan and Korea realized the opportunity they started different campaigns but too late. Japan won. In Europe the German Magazine Der Spiegel announced the elections of the "World Government for the Internet". As a result 70 per cent of the registered voters in Europe came from Germany. No chance for somebody from Italy, the UK or Estonia to get elected. And in the final it was a German hacker which won against a German Telekom Manager. The plan, that the election will bring representatives of Internet users into the board, failed partly. In Asia we got a manager from Fuijutsi, in Latin America a banker form the Banco do Brazil. Good directors but not really representatives of civil society and individual Internet users. 4. When Carl Bildt proposed a reformed election (Montevideao, September 2001) where not every all E-mail address holder should have the right to vote but only domain name holders there was a broad protest against this mechanism: Only landowners would then have right to vote. Students which use an e-mail address of their university would be excluded from the election. The plan was never excuted. With this experience I finally accepted the new mixed mechanism with a NomCom. However I could imagine that we have more election within the SOs and ACs with public campaigns in the future. 5. Nevertheless I would recommend to continue with the principle of confidentially in the NomCom. You will get a different set of candidates. If you invite candidates to start a public campaign you will get different people. It would need probably money for a campaign and you would politisize a more technical process which needs specific skills and broader understanding of the complexity of the multistakeholder community. The risk would be high to get candidates like Donald Trump or Sarah Palin. Not sure whether this would be good for ICANN and the community. http://www.circleid.com/posts/removing_principle_of_confidentiality_in_icann... 6. A final point: Sometimes I am perplexed when you argue that the SOs and ACs make wrong decisions by sending bad people to the NomCom and bad people to the Board but you are sure that - if they form a sole Membership Organisation - everything will be ok. My experiences tell me that SOs and ACs send good people to the NomCom. Sometimes it could be better, but in general this is ok. I also experienced that SOs and ACs send good people to the board. Sometimes it could be better. But in general is is not bad. I trust the SOs and ACs and the community. But I know that many things has to be enhanced also within the ACs and SOs, including to make them more accountable to their constituencies, to do more outreach to underepresented groups, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America and to be more sensitive to the interests of individual Internet users and civil society interests, including human rights. 7. And BTW - @ Eberhard: In the 13 years of the NomCom only George and I myself made its way as former NomCom Chairs into the Board. And I myself was only the substitute for a director who stepd down. I served two years in the board for two retired directors. The other way around - that former Board members became members of the NomCom - did happen. Hagen Hultzsch, Mike Robert, Michael Palage and others joined the NomCom and helped to find the right directors. Their contributions were helpful. My recommendation for Eberhard is: Please apply for the CNSO seat in the NomCom. It is always better to tell other people what the NomCom is and how it works if you know it from inside and not what you hear from rumor. I repeat what I did say in my previous e-Mail. The NomCom is probably the most democratic element in the ICANN ecosystem. Wolfgang Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all that bad, please consider: * The criteria for selection are secret * The meetings are secret * The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the candidates themselves, as a bad thing * A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it worked (lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to formal advice) * It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment to discussions about how real elections might actually work * It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure to communicate with candidates * It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to explain their decisions. * It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis * It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a terrific job The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not matured to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations achieve every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely hard to be selected. Kieren On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
Hello George.
I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom.
I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more representative and protective of the global Internet community and its interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its objectives each and every year.
Best regards, Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi, Phil,
I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired the NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees with Wolfgang's completely.
I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and eloquently.
Regards,
George
On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang < wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity.. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
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"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto: gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto: AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.o rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou nces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu nity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto: steve.crocker@icann.org%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
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Fascinatinger and fascinatinger. el On 2015-10-07 16:31, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote: [...]
7. And BTW - @ Eberhard: In the 13 years of the NomCom only George and I myself made its way as former NomCom Chairs into the Board. And I myself was only the substitute for a director who stepd down. I served two years in the board for two retired directors. The other way around - that former Board members became members of the NomCom - did happen. Hagen Hultzsch, Mike Robert, Michael Palage and others joined the NomCom and helped to find the right directors. Their contributions were helpful. [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Thank you, Wolfgang, for putting the issues regarding the NomCom into a proper and accurate perspective. In my opinion, your comprehensive explanations are correct, and are supported by the facts. I hope that members of the community will judge the value and operation of the NomCom on its merits and on the facts rather than on the basis of isolated published opinion. George
On Oct 7, 2015, at 10:31 AM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Kieran,
in the interest of transparency here are some additional comments:
1. Kieran applied under the NomCom 2005 for the position of a board director. He made his application public and encouraged the NomCom to publish the names of all applicants. I was a voting member of the 2005 NomCom (nomintaed by ALAC) and George Sadowsky chaired the NomCom. The NomCom operates under the principle of confidentiality. This principle protects the candidate. It is not part of a conspiracy. It is, BTW, difficult to organize a conspiracy among 16 voting members coming from different constituencies of the community nominated by ACs and SOs within nine months. The principle of confidentiality guarantees that applicants who are not selected are not seen in the public as "loosers". This is the difference to an election where you have public campaigns which ends with winners and loosers. I explained this to Kieran in 2005 at length. We continue to disagree on this issue. However, when it came to the final selection, Kieran had no malus. He was treated equally to all the other good candidates. And we had a lot of good candidates. Kieran was not selected. I recommended Kieran to join ICANN Staff what he did. He has written extensively about his positive and negaitve experiences afterwards. No further comment needed.
2. The selection process in the NomCom follows different principles. The final list of candidates who meet all the high level criteria are mainly all excellent candidates. The final selection is made against a number of additional criteria which takes into consideration factors like geography, gender, skills etc. If you have five lawyers in the board there is no need to send an additional lawyer even if there is an excellent candidate. If you have five technical experts in the board but not managers it is better to send a manager and not another technical experts. With other words you will have always excellent candidates which are not selected because they do not fit into the specific constellation of the year (as Kieran in 2005). A candidate does not risk to be treated as a looser if he is not selected. He just can reapply and nobody will know that he was not selected the previous year. The final selection is indeed different from year to year because the board changes from year to year. And with this changes there are new needs for skill, gender and geography balances. We have elections for the Board: The SOs and the ALAC - which send 7 directors to the Board - have elections among their communities. So the final composition of the board comes from a mix of elections adn selections.
3. Kieran is right that the NomCom was established in the 2002 reform to substitute the elections. I was part of the election as adviser to the Membership Advisory Committtee (MAG) in 1999 and as member of the Membership Information Task Force (MITF) in 2000. I supported the election and was excited. But I learned also some lessons. In Asia it was the Japanese government which encouraged Japanese corporations to invite their employees to register as voters to get a Japanese director. When Taiwan and Korea realized the opportunity they started different campaigns but too late. Japan won. In Europe the German Magazine Der Spiegel announced the elections of the "World Government for the Internet". As a result 70 per cent of the registered voters in Europe came from Germany. No chance for somebody from Italy, the UK or Estonia to get elected. And in the final it was a German hacker which won against a German Telekom Manager. The plan, that the election will bring representatives of Internet users into the board, failed partly. In Asia we got a manager from Fuijutsi, in Latin America a banker form the Banco do Brazil. Good directors but not really representatives of civil society and individual Internet users.
4. When Carl Bildt proposed a reformed election (Montevideao, September 2001) where not every all E-mail address holder should have the right to vote but only domain name holders there was a broad protest against this mechanism: Only landowners would then have right to vote. Students which use an e-mail address of their university would be excluded from the election. The plan was never excuted. With this experience I finally accepted the new mixed mechanism with a NomCom. However I could imagine that we have more election within the SOs and ACs with public campaigns in the future.
5. Nevertheless I would recommend to continue with the principle of confidentially in the NomCom. You will get a different set of candidates. If you invite candidates to start a public campaign you will get different people. It would need probably money for a campaign and you would politisize a more technical process which needs specific skills and broader understanding of the complexity of the multistakeholder community. The risk would be high to get candidates like Donald Trump or Sarah Palin. Not sure whether this would be good for ICANN and the community. http://www.circleid.com/posts/removing_principle_of_confidentiality_in_icann...
6. A final point: Sometimes I am perplexed when you argue that the SOs and ACs make wrong decisions by sending bad people to the NomCom and bad people to the Board but you are sure that - if they form a sole Membership Organisation - everything will be ok. My experiences tell me that SOs and ACs send good people to the NomCom. Sometimes it could be better, but in general this is ok. I also experienced that SOs and ACs send good people to the board. Sometimes it could be better. But in general is is not bad. I trust the SOs and ACs and the community. But I know that many things has to be enhanced also within the ACs and SOs, including to make them more accountable to their constituencies, to do more outreach to underepresented groups, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America and to be more sensitive to the interests of individual Internet users and civil society interests, including human rights.
7. And BTW - @ Eberhard: In the 13 years of the NomCom only George and I myself made its way as former NomCom Chairs into the Board. And I myself was only the substitute for a director who stepd down. I served two years in the board for two retired directors. The other way around - that former Board members became members of the NomCom - did happen. Hagen Hultzsch, Mike Robert, Michael Palage and others joined the NomCom and helped to find the right directors. Their contributions were helpful. My recommendation for Eberhard is: Please apply for the CNSO seat in the NomCom. It is always better to tell other people what the NomCom is and how it works if you know it from inside and not what you hear from rumor. I repeat what I did say in my previous e-Mail. The NomCom is probably the most democratic element in the ICANN ecosystem.
Wolfgang
Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all that bad, please consider:
* The criteria for selection are secret
* The meetings are secret
* The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the candidates themselves, as a bad thing
* A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it worked (lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to formal advice)
* It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment to discussions about how real elections might actually work
* It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure to communicate with candidates
* It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to explain their decisions.
* It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis
* It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a terrific job
The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not matured to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations achieve every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely hard to be selected.
Kieren
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
Hello George.
I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom.
I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more representative and protective of the global Internet community and its interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its objectives each and every year.
Best regards, Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi, Phil,
I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired the NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees with Wolfgang's completely.
I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and eloquently.
Regards,
George
On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang < wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity.. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
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"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto: gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto: AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.o rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou nces@icann..org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu nity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto: steve.crocker@icann.org%3c// e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
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I'm surprised to see you both fall into the terrible ICANN habit of trying to diminish valid criticism by questioning the individual that makes it. I hope you recognize it for what it is: an unpleasant hangover from Board culture. That aside, I don't read anything in the two responses from the two former Nomcom chairs and now board members that refutes anything in my note. I note in particular that the long list of issues identified by a former chair-elect, who resigned because of the committee's "sickening" culture, are not mentioned. The criteria are secret. The meetings are secret. The Nomcom is accountable only to itself. The working methods have been criticized repeatedly, not just by me but also by former board members, former Nomcom members and former candidates. There have not been efforts to introduce a real election process because of the Nomcom's existence. These are just truths. Unpleasant truths but truths nonetheless. I will note that the response from those able to do something about these significant issues is not to recognise them but to go on the attack. And it is this approach writ large that is ICANN's fundamental problem with accountability. Kieren On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:48 AM George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote: > Thank you, Wolfgang, for putting the issues regarding the NomCom into a > proper and accurate perspective. In my opinion, your comprehensive > explanations are correct, and are supported by the facts. I hope that > members of the community will judge the value and operation of the NomCom > on its merits and on the facts rather than on the basis of isolated > published opinion. > > George > > > > On Oct 7, 2015, at 10:31 AM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang < > wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote: > > > > Hi Kieran, > > > > in the interest of transparency here are some additional comments: > > > > 1. Kieran applied under the NomCom 2005 for the position of a board > director. He made his application public and encouraged the NomCom to > publish the names of all applicants. I was a voting member of the 2005 > NomCom (nomintaed by ALAC) and George Sadowsky chaired the NomCom. The > NomCom operates under the principle of confidentiality. This principle > protects the candidate. It is not part of a conspiracy. It is, BTW, > difficult to organize a conspiracy among 16 voting members coming from > different constituencies of the community nominated by ACs and SOs within > nine months. The principle of confidentiality guarantees that applicants > who are not selected are not seen in the public as "loosers". This is the > difference to an election where you have public campaigns which ends with > winners and loosers. I explained this to Kieran in 2005 at length. We > continue to disagree on this issue. However, when it came to the final > selection, Kieran had no malus. He was treated equally to all the other > good candidates. And we had a lot of good candidates. Kieran was not > selected. I recommended Kieran to join ICANN Staff what he did. He has > written extensively about his positive and negaitve experiences afterwards. > No further comment needed. > > > > 2. The selection process in the NomCom follows different principles. The > final list of candidates who meet all the high level criteria are mainly > all excellent candidates. The final selection is made against a number of > additional criteria which takes into consideration factors like geography, > gender, skills etc. If you have five lawyers in the board there is no need > to send an additional lawyer even if there is an excellent candidate. If > you have five technical experts in the board but not managers it is better > to send a manager and not another technical experts. With other words you > will have always excellent candidates which are not selected because they > do not fit into the specific constellation of the year (as Kieran in 2005). > A candidate does not risk to be treated as a looser if he is not selected. > He just can reapply and nobody will know that he was not selected the > previous year. The final selection is indeed different from year to year > because the board changes from year to year. And with this changes there > are new needs for skill, gender and geography balances. We have elections > for the Board: The SOs and the ALAC - which send 7 directors to the Board - > have elections among their communities. So the final composition of the > board comes from a mix of elections adn selections. > > > > 3. Kieran is right that the NomCom was established in the 2002 reform to > substitute the elections. I was part of the election as adviser to the > Membership Advisory Committtee (MAG) in 1999 and as member of the > Membership Information Task Force (MITF) in 2000. I supported the election > and was excited. But I learned also some lessons. In Asia it was the > Japanese government which encouraged Japanese corporations to invite their > employees to register as voters to get a Japanese director. When Taiwan and > Korea realized the opportunity they started different campaigns but too > late. Japan won. In Europe the German Magazine Der Spiegel announced the > elections of the "World Government for the Internet". As a result 70 per > cent of the registered voters in Europe came from Germany. No chance for > somebody from Italy, the UK or Estonia to get elected. And in the final it > was a German hacker which won against a German Telekom Manager. The plan, > that the election will bring representatives of Internet users into the > board, failed partly. In Asia we got a manager from Fuijutsi, in Latin > America a banker form the Banco do Brazil. Good directors but not really > representatives of civil society and individual Internet users. > > > > 4. When Carl Bildt proposed a reformed election (Montevideao, September > 2001) where not every all E-mail address holder should have the right to > vote but only domain name holders there was a broad protest against this > mechanism: Only landowners would then have right to vote. Students which > use an e-mail address of their university would be excluded from the > election. The plan was never excuted. With this experience I finally > accepted the new mixed mechanism with a NomCom. However I could imagine > that we have more election within the SOs and ACs with public campaigns in > the future. > > > > 5. Nevertheless I would recommend to continue with the principle of > confidentially in the NomCom. You will get a different set of candidates. > If you invite candidates to start a public campaign you will get different > people. It would need probably money for a campaign and you would > politisize a more technical process which needs specific skills and broader > understanding of the complexity of the multistakeholder community. The risk > would be high to get candidates like Donald Trump or Sarah Palin. Not sure > whether this would be good for ICANN and the community. > > > http://www.circleid.com/posts/removing_principle_of_confidentiality_in_icanns_nomcom_is_a_bad_idea/ > > > > 6. A final point: Sometimes I am perplexed when you argue that the SOs > and ACs make wrong decisions by sending bad people to the NomCom and bad > people to the Board but you are sure that - if they form a sole Membership > Organisation - everything will be ok. My experiences tell me that SOs and > ACs send good people to the NomCom. Sometimes it could be better, but in > general this is ok. I also experienced that SOs and ACs send good people to > the board. Sometimes it could be better. But in general is is not bad. I > trust the SOs and ACs and the community. But I know that many things has to > be enhanced also within the ACs and SOs, including to make them more > accountable to their constituencies, to do more outreach to underepresented > groups, in particular from Africa, Asia and Latin America and to be more > sensitive to the interests of individual Internet users and civil society > interests, including human rights. > > > > 7. And BTW - @ Eberhard: In the 13 years of the NomCom only George and I > myself made its way as former NomCom Chairs into the Board. And I myself > was only the substitute for a director who stepd down. I served two years > in the board for two retired directors. The other way around - that former > Board members became members of the NomCom - did happen. Hagen Hultzsch, > Mike Robert, Michael Palage and others joined the NomCom and helped to find > the right directors. Their contributions were helpful. My recommendation > for Eberhard is: Please apply for the CNSO seat in the NomCom. It is always > better to tell other people what the NomCom is and how it works if you know > it from inside and not what you hear from rumor. I repeat what I did say in > my previous e-Mail. The NomCom is probably the most democratic element in > the ICANN ecosystem. > > > > Wolfgang > > > > > > > > > > > > Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all > that > > bad, please consider: > > > > * The criteria for selection are secret > > > > * The meetings are secret > > > > * The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the > > candidates themselves, as a bad thing > > > > * A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it > worked > > (lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to > > formal advice) > > > > * It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment > to > > discussions about how real elections might actually work > > > > * It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure > to > > communicate with candidates > > > > * It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to > > meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to > > explain their decisions. > > > > * It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each > > year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis > > > > * It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a > > terrific job > > > > > > The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not > matured > > to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations > achieve > > every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community > > rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely > > hard to be selected. > > > > > > Kieren > > > > On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote: > > > >> Hello George. > >> > >> I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom. > >> > >> I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more > >> representative and protective of the global Internet community and its > >> interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens > of > >> millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its > >> objectives each and every year. > >> > >> Best regards, Philip > >> > >> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >> Virtualaw LLC > >> 1155 F Street, NW > >> Suite 1050 > >> Washington, DC 20004 > >> 202-559-8597/Direct > >> 202-559-8750/Fax > >> 202-255-6172/cell > >> > >> Twitter: @VlawDC > >> > >> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM > >> To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang > >> Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability > >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model > >> > >> Hi, Phil, > >> > >> I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below. I chaired > the > >> NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience > agrees > >> with Wolfgang's completely. > >> > >> I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and > why > >> it works, but I don't have to. He has already made the case, and > >> eloquently. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> George > >> > >> > >>> On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang < > >> wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi Phil, > >>> > >>> thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a > >> "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk. > >>> > >>> I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had > endless > >> discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN > and > >> Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board > are - > >> in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They > are > >> not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the > >> community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the > >> community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with > voting > >> members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the > right > >> people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I > >> chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most > democratic > >> element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its > >> representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do > >> not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed > >> enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell > the > >> NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors > >> selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews > and > >> discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one > >> director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO > Seat? > >>> > >>> This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open > >> processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit > or > >> non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA > >> selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of > the > >> IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are > endless > >> back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are > >> indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is > >> difficult to remove them. > >>> > >>> The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - > >> one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. > And we > >> should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the > principle of > >> rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board > >> function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not > >> deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to > >> re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). > It > >> was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix > >> between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative > >> newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical > diversity.. > >> BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG > >> members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and > >> Asia? > >>> > >>> I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of > >> spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the > >> community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there > is no > >> need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on > the > >> basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the > >> discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the > same > >> high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short > time > >> we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to > errect > >> barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a > >> backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of > >> procedure how voting and other important elements (including > >> accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the > >> functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor > of > >> power sharing. But I am against power shifting. > >>> > >>> As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after > >> Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less > >> finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there > will be > >> a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin. > >>> > >>> Wolfgang > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have > >> made clear that I do not agree with that POV. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 > >>> September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's > >>> Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would > >>> place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and > >>> stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global > >>> stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to > >>> act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions > >>> based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global > >>> public interest". (Emphasis added) > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to > ICANN > >> and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in > any > >> way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on > >> anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it > >> cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN > >> community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite > >> evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at > >> significant variance from those of the community members comprising the > >> CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public > >> interest than the community from which it is drawn. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, > >> which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your > >> caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 > of > >> the CCWG Charter states: > >>> > >>> 2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public > >> interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working > >> Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG > >> Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A > determination > >> that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG > >> Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board. > >>> > >>> 3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany > the > >> initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method > >> (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will > >> occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and > >> efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns > >> regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal > belief > >> that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any > >> statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue > >> process provide for in the Charter. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it > >> would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and > start > >> the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and > >> non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the > >> global public interest in their memoranda. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> > >>> Philip > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >>> > >>> Virtualaw LLC > >>> > >>> 1155 F Street, NW > >>> > >>> Suite 1050 > >>> > >>> Washington, DC 20004 > >>> > >>> 202-559-8597/Direct > >>> > >>> 202-559-8750/Fax > >>> > >>> 202-255-6172/cell > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Twitter: @VlawDC > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" > >>> [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] > >>> Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM > >>> To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya > >>> Cc: CCWG Accountability > >>> Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Hi Phil, > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is > >> only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global > Internet > >> community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As > said in > >> previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion > both > >> for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader > >> Internet world. Be careful! > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Wolfgang > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > >>> > >>> Von: > >>> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability > >>> -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin > >>> > >>> Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 > >>> > >>> An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya > >>> > >>> Cc: CCWG Accountability > >>> > >>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model > >>> > >>> I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is > >> insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the > very > >> low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of > >> attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with > >> greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet > diversity > >> then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally > >> non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the > Board > >> is equally disqualified from being the steward. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >>> > >>> Virtualaw LLC > >>> > >>> 1155 F Street, NW > >>> > >>> Suite 1050 > >>> > >>> Washington, DC 20004 > >>> > >>> 202-559-8597/Direct > >>> > >>> 202-559-8750/Fax > >>> > >>> 202-255-6172/cell > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Twitter: @VlawDC > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> From: > >>> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability > >>> -cross-community-bounces@icann.org> > >>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of > >>> Paul Rosenzweig > >>> > >>> Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM > >>> > >>> To: Guru Acharya > >>> > >>> Cc: CCWG Accountability > >>> > >>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational > >> particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different > >> Board members in the next round of elections.... > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> Sent from myMail app for Android > >>> > >>> Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya > >> <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto: > >> gurcharya@gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I strongly agree with Jordan. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the > >> steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to > become > >> a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the > >> steward of IANA and not ICANN the community. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering > >> uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the > same > >> entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation > is > >> untested and very very unsafe'. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that > >>> > >>> 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN > >> should be made the steward. > >>> > >>> 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN > >>> should be made the steward > >>> > >>> 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is > >>> very very safe > >>> > >>> 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is > >>> arguing that > >>> > >>> 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the > >>> transition > >>> > >>> 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to > >>> become the members of ICANN > >>> > >>> 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership > >> organisation is very very unsafe. > >>> > >>> 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am > >> strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne < > AAikman@lrrlaw.com > >> <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto: > >> AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c// > >> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> @ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability > >> measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a > >> review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a > >> years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on > in > >> and of themselves - very ineffective. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Anne > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1& > >>> mode=attachment&bs=16497&bl=3767&ct=image%2fgif&cn=image001.gif&cte=ba > >>> se64] > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrl > >>> aw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailt > >>> o%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> | > >>> www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/ww > >>> w.lrrlaw.com/>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> From: > >>> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose > >>> /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.o > >>> rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my > >>> .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou > >>> nces@icann..org>> > >>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com > >>> /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces > >>> @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c > >>> //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu > >>> nity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter > >>> > >>> Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM > >>> > >>> To: Steve Crocker > >>> > >>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community > >>> > >>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Steve, all > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - > an > >> important one. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that > have > >> already been established by Board resolution. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the > >> community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based > >> around membership. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In > >> effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal > >> development process with its own definition of what the community > requires, > >> and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those > requirements. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the > >> multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board > claim > >> to uphold. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its > >> decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory > of > >> debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed > dictate > >> -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution > that > >> is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and > >> requirements-based conversation. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. > >> The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and > groups > >> who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder > Internet > >> policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and > alone > >> by "the people who matter". > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in > >> Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge > >> between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have > arrived > >> at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and > comprehension; > >> few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point > of > >> view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the > >> conflicting perspectives and aims here. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I > >> and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of > response > >> indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself > >> mystified. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Cheers > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Jordan > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<// > >> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org<mailto: > >> steve.crocker@icann.org%3c// > >> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> CCWG, > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the > >> public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los > >> Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on > >> California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that > was > >> in the second draft report. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member > model > >> still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still > introduces a > >> new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the > structure > >> we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to > >> constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, > >> accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will > require > >> more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock > >> multistakeholder balance. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full > >> multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will > >> join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues > >> present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the > >> Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by > key > >> factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new > >> fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance > >> structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the > >> five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal > >> if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these > >> consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Steve Crocker > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> for the ICANN Board of Directors > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> > >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto > >>> =mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org<mailto:Accounta > >>> bility-Cross-Community@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailt > >>> o%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org>> > >>> > >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Jordan Carter > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Chief Executive > >>> > >>> InternetNZ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) > >>> > >>> Email: > >>> jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan > >>> @internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%3c//e-aj.my.com/com > >>> pose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> > >>> > >>> Skype: jordancarter > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Web: > >>> www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz%3c > >>> http:/www.internetnz.nz>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> A better world through a better Internet > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> ________________________________ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the > >> individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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All the more reason to have an external whistleblower process available, if any part of ICANN process is to remain secret post-transition, that is not reliant on wikileaks or glenn greenwald to tell the public about hypothetical substantiated pressuring, which wouldn't happen if that type of process was in place. And NOMCOM would then be indirectly accountable via checks and balances while maintaining its necessary secrecy, would you agree? Ron
There is going to be a degree of devolvement in every group that is becoming less relevant to a consolidating power structure, the natural projection of frustration as the new corporate reality becomes clear. The key, if increasing community involvement was actually a long term goal of ICANN's board, would be to show that they are doing something productive to that end, and not just speaking broadly when the temperature of the community rises, in an effort to run out the clock. On the other hand, people like to complain and there remains the possibility that people really either really are upset about the board or people are substituting complaining for their lack of solutions and knowledge of the process, like a college student trying to sow disenfranchisement in a boring three hour class just to make it more interesting by asking 1000 annoying questions. In this case, though, there does appear to be some real solutions presented to the identified problem of lack or waning community engagement in ICANN, and it remains to be seen whether or not the community suggestions are actually taken into account. My opinion is that increasingly they will not be. "We need more money" is always the number one complaint, no matter if a community is becoming more or less relevant, even if that monetary agenda is hidden behind other complaints or factoids. Remember, the ICANN board is full of smart people with many people in their ears, they are probably fed-up with the general idea of "community engagement" in ICANN and at conferences because those people don't know all the acroymns and policies as well as they do. Those newcomers also are untrusted, the more power someone has the less they trust the lower people, the lower those people are on the ladder. Engagement and retainment of people being low doesnt necessarily mean the world is underrepresented at ICANN, think quality, not quantity, when it comes to a "quota" or ever increasing number of people engaged with the ICANN community. I think the opposite is true, that the community is being phased out. But, at the same time, the quantity and quality of retained people are low because ICANN is intellectually difficult and overwhelming for a world of people with low attention spans and addicted to entertainment, and with all the boring computer-tech stuff, many future intellectual leaders in the form of newcomers won't spend their money trying to keep up with ICANN (learning what all the groups do, the DNS, Root zone, TLD's etc.) because they have great ideas but never had an interest in what Verisign does or how things are inputed into a Root Zone Cluster,... unless they are the ones doing the inputting, New leaders aren't being retained by this community because of two additional reasons:: 1) the amount of unneccessarily drawn out reports, a non-streamlined process of endless boring information and minutes full of sometimes invented "business speak" that brutally manipulates the English language for the sake of sounding smart, and time wasting. While people like me can understand a system and try to make it work, many say, "No thanks" because it is difficult to learn a new or manipulated language at an older age. What is the age group of newcomers at ICANN? Most people can't resrructure their language learning skills past their 20s. 2) The lack of funds to get people to conferences to actually enjoy themselves while traveling half way across the globe to largely be ignored and royally confused by the glut of new information, and new funds that won't be allocated in my opinion would attract people with incentives other than exploiting the time and "good will" of participants. The board inherently thinks that because of the lack of funds, the rest of the community is probably unnecessary at this point, and should be limited in membership or disbanded, because once ICANN is transferred the rights to the internet by the US Government next June, the previous need to be inclusive of the community will in my opinion probably morph from the current lip-service into your basic corporate oligarchy, which only cares about its volunteers when it can steal an idea or two from them, or when the corporation royally screws up their product, like issuing level 3 keys to a fake microsoft employee. The mailing lists will increasing ask, "Whats in it for me" and the board will on reasing say to themselves, "Nothing, unless you have a genius idea we can use" or if the board screws something up so badly that it is newsworthy, then it becomes, "We are all in is together." In conclusion, ICANN will continue to trend towards what most other government-corporate structures of modern times trend towards, Oligarchy, with a cetain degree of "bread crumbs" strewn about to make it appear as if that isn't the case, when it clearly is. Ronald Baione-Doda NY-USA
On Oct 6, 2015, at 8:39 PM, Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com <mailto:ron.baione@yahoo.com>> wrote:
There is going to be a degree of devolvement in every group that is becoming less relevant to a consolidating power structure, the natural projection of frustration as the new corporate reality becomes clear. The key, if increasing community involvement was actually a long term goal of ICANN's board, would be to show that they are doing something productive to that end, and not just speaking broadly when the temperature of the community rises, in an effort to run out the clock.
Ron, I would like to highlight the "run out the clock" part of your text; when people ask why the Board took so long to comment, one reason that comes to mind is to leverage time pressure. If the same positions were discussed before, the transition clock would be in less of a hurry, so there would be more time to counter those with rationales and proposals. Rubens
Any Board or Leadership structure will stay as connected and verbal as possible to keep the part of the group that it feels is fowardly-relevant up to speed. Time delays either are a sign of what you suggested, or a sign that the communty isn't financially able to perform a function worthy of such upkeep, but that doesn't mean non-board members are worthless, because it seems as we do have the intellectual capability to perform our function. Could the entire process be controlled by a few just as good as it can be controlled by many? Yes, only if a vast majority of people don't care to understand the importance of ICANN and us as participants give up. Non-participants are too distracted by work, media and geopolitical events. The people here though are vital to keeping a balance therefore as representative for those distracted and non-distracted, like founders of a country who only need 5% of people to participate in a successful agenda, we as participants must not feel discouraged by any distractions, the distracted, or the unable, because we can represent them. Even if they have never heard of ICANN, they are still human beings who deserve our representation, and we have until next June to make sure of the correct humane balances of ICANn post-transition process, while at the same time expanding internet opportunities. The mentor idea is a good idea. Ron
Any Board or Leadership structure will stay as connected and verbal as possible to keep the part of the group that it feels is fowardly-relevant up to speed. Time delays either are a sign of what you suggested, or a sign that the communty isn't financially able to perform a function worthy of such upkeep, but that doesn't mean non-board members are worthless, because it seems as we do have the intellectual capability to perform our function. Could the entire process be controlled by a few just as good as it can be controlled by many? Yes, only if a vast majority of people don't care to understand the importance of ICANN and us as participants give up. Non-participants are too distracted by work, media and geopolitical events. The people here though are vital to keeping an important balance therefore as representative for those distracted and non-distracted, like founders of a country who only need 5% of people to participate in a successful agenda, we as participants must not feel discouraged by any distractions, the distracted, or the unable. As human beings affected by ICANN, people deserve quality non-board representation. The mentor idea could be a good idea if there is an incentive for mentoring, but what funds can or will be allocated for that by a system which is consolidating? The funds will have to be "funds of the will, funds of the passion for knowledge of importance of such a task", if someone can so articulate the importance. Intellectuals in history have been gathered and inspired by free funds of the spoken and written word, costing nothing if poetically articulated, and with great and vital progress and counter-balance to ever-buoyant power structures. Greatness in the future must be, for some time, redefined not by wealth but by intellectual necessity, as occurs from time to time historically. Ron
Thanks, Wolfgang, we needed this. Well presented and true Best, Roelof On 06-10-15 21:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Hi Phil,
thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are - in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is difficult to remove them.
The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above - one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity. BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and Asia?
I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of procedure how voting and other important elements (including accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
Wolfgang
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global public interest". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
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-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cro ss-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
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Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cro ss-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity.. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.co m%3cmailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw. com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAi kman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?ma ilto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org<mailt o:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann..org>
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/co mpose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann .org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj..m y.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounc es@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.croc ker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mail to=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann..org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________
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Hi Phil, Considering that there has been significant discussion made on the structural change route, I think we can also focus some energy on asking board/discussing how to achieve accountability of the community and of the board without structural change. As to fiduciary duties of the communities, I don't think it's out of line to say that as it's indeed the reality(as much as I hate to say it); ICANN is a very unique dynamic volunteer community that should always prompt us to be cautious of how much power we are assigning. I don't know of any organisation that operates on such status. It will really provoke my curiosity on what our personal intentions were if we don't all have doubts of the possible consequences/effect of jumping into a huge structural change during the transition, but we went ahead with the mindset of "its either now or never" and also the mindset that we need to keep board accountable at all cost! Even though it could directly or indirectly affect some members of the community. It's like causing an earthquake in order to mine a mineral resource, while that may achieve the goal it most likely will not leave the landscape the same again. Going through a significant structural change will most likely achieve the expected accountability goal on board but could create an unpredictable situation within the community and that in turn would negatively affect the entire organisation. The transition is already a huge operational(administrative) change, will it not be good to avoid using the structural change as the reason for any possible operational instability post-transition? There are reasons why we appoint board members and one of the reason is based on trust, I believe that should be evident in the ccwg proposal as much as possible. Whether we like it or not, the board is the only "neutral" stakeholder that can observe consensus and execute the community request, let's not loose that unique role of the board. I urge us all to continue on the path of checking/understanding how much accountability we can get to complete the transition without structural change. I believe we all want an improved accountability and whatever we finally come up with will certainly provide such improvement. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 6 Oct 2015 19:03, "Phil Corwin" <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel’s 29 September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG’s Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would place a significant amount of power in the hands of *individuals and stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to* ICANN or *the global stakeholder community*. *These individuals and stakeholders* are free to act in their personal interest and *are not required to make decisions based on what is best for* ICANN, the ICANN community, and *the global public interest*". (Emphasis added)
While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at significant variance from those of the community members comprising the CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public interest than the community from which it is drawn.
Given that it is ICANN’s outside Counsel that has raised this charge, which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your caution to “be careful” should be directed elsewhere.
Finally, on the matter of the “global public interest”, points #2 & 3 of the CCWG Charter states:
2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board’s concerns regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any statement that they did – much less a formal invoking of the dialogue process provide for in the Charter.
If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the global public interest in their memoranda.
Best,
Philip
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
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-----Original Message----- From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" [mailto: wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de] Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
Virtualaw LLC
1155 F Street, NW
Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004
202-559-8597/Direct
202-559-8750/Fax
202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Guru Acharya
Cc: CCWG Accountability
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
--
Sent from myMail app for Android
Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya < gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward.
2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe
4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that
1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition
2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN
3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe.
4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne < AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com <AAikman@lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>> [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
To: Steve Crocker
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker < steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org <steve.crocker@icann.org%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
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On Tuesday 06 October 2015 10:54 PM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
Hi Phil,
this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). Dear Wolfgang
Can you point me to when and where did I say so. And as a proof of how I question different legitimacies, including of the UN, please see the open letter <http://therules.org/petition/sdg-open-letter/> that I signed about two weeks back, which clearly puts a lie to your claim. In fact my email of 3rd Oct to this group says "This was/ is the time and opportunity to devise some kind of really globally representative structure outside the states based structures, and thus meet the requirements of participatory democracy, and alternative models of global governance that are still democratic, and interact with the current states based ones. " Does this look like I perhaps believe in other forms of representation of the global Internet community! What I dont believe in is scaremongering that you and the board is doing using the name of the UN, because I, like many others in the developing world, also know what all good the UN has done, and what degree of legitimacy it actually has, specially in comparison to US led hegemonic structures (and what it hasnt). (As a social-political scientist, Wolfgang, never lose the relative point.) My same email does say that ICANN needs to be incorporated in international law, which will, yes, have to be treaty based, and I will explain this point presently. But before that, can I say that either you accept this point, which I know you do not, or you believe that only the US jurisdiction and state is the one, to use your words, 'the legitimized representative of the global Internet community'? You have the accept this counter-point if you can tell me that just bec I asked for international law/ jurisdiction basis for ICANN I believe that UN is the the sole legitimate representative of the global Internet community. Now, before you or anyone else mangles my viewpoint further/ again, let me clearly state that 1. ICANN and its oversight structure should be based on an international treaty forming international law. Remember two things in this regard. Firstly, limits to state power are also something which legal frameworks alone provide and there are numerous such frameworks, both at national and international levels. Therefore an international law does not necessarily mean more power to the states, it could, and I think, should, be an agreement to limit it, and structure is in appropriate manners to be used only for specific, well defined ways. Secondly, any such law requires assent of the US and its allies, and would therefore certainly carry all the necessary safeguards, while getting us out of this untenable situation where a private body doing a public function, is (1) seeking to remain more or less completely unsupervised, and (2) is subject to the jurisdiction of one country. 2. The oversight mechanism should be broad, membership based, bringing in a very larger base of Internet community, in a suitable institutionalised way, /*which is what we should be discussing here and now*/. This mechanism should preponderantly be of communities currently outside ICANN, in its operational and policy making functions, and intending to remain so. (The logic is obvious.) Just because that perfect representative situation can never be arrived at , it does not mean we do not take it as our guiding principle and move in the right direction (such arguments against democracy have often been used, and debunked, 2015 is too late to be resuscitating them). Just Net Coalition has proposed two different models for making headway in this direction. Out test should we, did we substantially move in that direction or not, and not refuse to move just bec it would never be perfect. That is the real test of this 'transition' process, and it is failing on it entirely even as per the CCWG's current proposal, which simply seeks to consolidate power among the close ICANN engagers, a lot of them often going into and coming out of ICANN proper (of whose boundaries even no one is ever clear). As for the Board's response to it, it falls so low that I dont want stretch my vocabulary to describe it. 3. ICANN's current operational and technical policy making structures can largely keep working as they are, with some improvements that may be required. So, Wolfgang, if you ever in future want to describe my views, you have a full statement above. Please do not create a strawman to defend your and board's brazen attempt to resist greater democratication of the oversight over a key global infrastructure. Although, and that is the saddest part, democracy, democratisation, public and such are not the terms that anyone in this group ever utters at all. These are the sacrifices of sacred civilisational achievements that I rue most about what is happening. A discourse completely alien to what I have learnt and known about public and political affairs is being played out here, and that in the name of the global community. No, not only the board, and the ICANN in general, but this process itself does not represent the global pulbic in any kind of even close to adequate way. And in this alone, Wolfgang, you and the Board, are right. But as many have pointed out, the hypocrisy that it implies about the board's and ICANN's own legitimacy is so acute that I am quite surprised that you/ board got so desperate to actually present this particular argument. Best regards, parmidner
As said in previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader Internet world. Be careful!
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Phil Corwin Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15 An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board is equally disqualified from being the steward.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM To: Guru Acharya Cc: CCWG Accountability Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Exactly. The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational particularity. Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different Board members in the next round of elections....
-- Sent from myMail app for Android Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>:
I strongly agree with Jordan.
I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is untested and very very unsafe'.
In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN should be made the steward. 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN should be made the steward 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is very very safe 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is arguing that 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the transition 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to become the members of ICANN 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership organisation is very very unsafe. 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com>> wrote:
@ Jordan - well stated. Postponing truly effective accountability measures developed using the Multistakeholder process in favor of "a review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in and of themselves - very ineffective.
Anne
[https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&mode=at...]
Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
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AAikman@lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/>
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3asteve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker
for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAccountability%2dCross%2dCommunity@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
A better world through a better Internet
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On 07-Oct-15 10:01, parminder wrote:
. Although, and that is the saddest part, democracy, democratisation, public and such are not the terms that anyone in this group ever utters at all.
As you know, many of us consider multistakeholder model as a form of participatory democracy. When I say someone is thwarting the multistakeholder model, that is the same as saying they are thwarting participatory democracy. But you are right, perhaps not enough people understand that linkage, and it might be useful to use the word democracy more often. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
+1 Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell Twitter: @VLawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey Sent from my iPad On Oct 5, 2015, at 10:58 PM, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com<mailto:langdonorr@gmail.com>> wrote: Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Cheryl, Phil, all - that is an option, sure. But think about this. That option, unless I am mistaken, says in short form: "Defer this discussion on structure until after the transition." Now on its own that could be a route through. But think about that other subject that's sitting there for post transition discussion - jurisdiction. Is it viable to close out workstream 1 with both those issues on the table? Or isn't it simply a different version of the problem that the board's feedback raised - that you can't shift the model and do the transition at the same time, that any significant change would need to be bedded in before transition could occur? If I was a government decision maker, I'd be pretty nervous about a scenario that could see what some argue is 'fundamental' change being debated just after the contract comes to an end. That topic / approach does seem like the only possible route, so let's talk about it soon... Cheers! Jordan On Tuesday, 6 October 2015, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
+1
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell
Twitter: @VLawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
Sent from my iPad
On Oct 5, 2015, at 10:58 PM, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','langdonorr@gmail.com');>> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>> wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','steve.crocker@icann.org');>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
Ok Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell Twitter: @VLawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey Sent from my iPad On Oct 5, 2015, at 11:24 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Cheryl, Phil, all - that is an option, sure. But think about this. That option, unless I am mistaken, says in short form: "Defer this discussion on structure until after the transition." Now on its own that could be a route through. But think about that other subject that's sitting there for post transition discussion - jurisdiction. Is it viable to close out workstream 1 with both those issues on the table? Or isn't it simply a different version of the problem that the board's feedback raised - that you can't shift the model and do the transition at the same time, that any significant change would need to be bedded in before transition could occur? If I was a government decision maker, I'd be pretty nervous about a scenario that could see what some argue is 'fundamental' change being debated just after the contract comes to an end. That topic / approach does seem like the only possible route, so let's talk about it soon... Cheers! Jordan On Tuesday, 6 October 2015, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> wrote: +1 Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell Twitter: @VLawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey Sent from my iPad On Oct 5, 2015, at 10:58 PM, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','langdonorr@gmail.com');>> wrote: Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>> wrote: Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','steve.crocker@icann.org');>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
Dear All Let us work around Jonathan. Steve, Avis and my amendment to those proposal and move it through . Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 6 Oct 2015, at 05:24, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Cheryl, Phil, all - that is an option, sure. But think about this. That option, unless I am mistaken, says in short form:
"Defer this discussion on structure until after the transition."
Now on its own that could be a route through.
But think about that other subject that's sitting there for post transition discussion - jurisdiction.
Is it viable to close out workstream 1 with both those issues on the table? Or isn't it simply a different version of the problem that the board's feedback raised - that you can't shift the model and do the transition at the same time, that any significant change would need to be bedded in before transition could occur?
If I was a government decision maker, I'd be pretty nervous about a scenario that could see what some argue is 'fundamental' change being debated just after the contract comes to an end.
That topic / approach does seem like the only possible route, so let's talk about it soon...
Cheers! Jordan
On Tuesday, 6 October 2015, Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote: +1
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell
Twitter: @VLawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
Sent from my iPad
On Oct 5, 2015, at 10:58 PM, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board...
On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz
Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
All, I think the key point here is one of timing. Personally I don't disagree with any of the models proposed. But I can't agree them either because I do think the community as a whole should take their time in considering and eventually making such important changes. And I do not agree that "we must do it now because it's our only chance". I support the suggestions made by Jonathan Zuck and Steve DelBianco. Chris Disspain CEO - auDA
On 6 Oct 2015, at 13:58, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board...
On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
To comment on the specific proposal by Steve re: fundamental bylaws: The promise/assurance of a "governance review" alone would be inadequate. This bylaw must reflect the overwhelming support for the proposal of the CCWG, and should not in any way be a "back to the drawing board" exercise. On the note in general: it is unfortunate that the Board makes assertions which appear unilateral in character, totally against the multistakeholder ethos. I would only request the Board to play a constructive role with the group. Best, Arun -- Head, Cyber Initiative Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi http://amsukumar.tumblr.com +91-9871943272 On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:35 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
I think the key point here is one of timing. Personally I don't disagree with any of the models proposed. But I can't agree them either because I do think the community as a whole should take their time in considering and eventually making such important changes. And I do not agree that "we must do it now because it's our only chance".
I support the suggestions made by Jonathan Zuck and Steve DelBianco.
Chris Disspain CEO - auDA
On 6 Oct 2015, at 13:58, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Chris 1++ Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Chris Disspain Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 05:05 An: Cheryl Langdon-Orr Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model All, I think the key point here is one of timing. Personally I don't disagree with any of the models proposed. But I can't agree them either because I do think the community as a whole should take their time in considering and eventually making such important changes. And I do not agree that "we must do it now because it's our only chance". I support the suggestions made by Jonathan Zuck and Steve DelBianco. Chris Disspain CEO - auDA
On 6 Oct 2015, at 13:58, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board...
On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Regardless of the model or path we choose, we need to improve the inclusiveness of our decision-making model. We know this and we have been discussing this actively. As such, I think it is a bit of a red herring to use that as an argument against the designator model. Most of the concerns the Board expressed regarding the member model are simply absent in the Designator model, so I don't see how it can be flatly stated that "the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model." This email seems to gloss over the fact that the powers of designators are far more narrow and limited than those of members, and the use of designators requires only a relatively minor change in the (non-membership) governance structure of the corporation, as compared to the change to a membership structure. (There are two forms of public benefit corporation - member and non-member -- and ICANN would remain a non-member corporation if those appointing board members are deemed "designators.") The various statutory powers of a member are absent in the case of the designator, so I am not clear what is being referred to as "powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using," other than the power to remove individual directors (or to have the designators collectively remove all of the appointed directors) -- just the "community powers" that we are being told the Board supports. If this email is based on advice from counsel, it would be helpful to the transparency of the process if that advice can be shared on this list, just as the advice the CCWG receives is shared on this list. Thank you. Greg On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 12:03 AM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" < wolfgang.kleinwaechter@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
Chris 1++
Wolfgang
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Chris Disspain Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 05:05 An: Cheryl Langdon-Orr Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
All,
I think the key point here is one of timing. Personally I don't disagree with any of the models proposed. But I can't agree them either because I do think the community as a whole should take their time in considering and eventually making such important changes. And I do not agree that "we must do it now because it's our only chance".
I support the suggestions made by Jonathan Zuck and Steve DelBianco.
Chris Disspain CEO - auDA
On 6 Oct 2015, at 13:58, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board...
On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco's constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let's focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On 06/10/15 04:05, Chris Disspain wrote:
. . . . . . . . . . . And I do not agree that "we must do it now because it's our only chance".
Chris, thank you for being the voice of reason, with that observation. Having personally seen the multistakeholder process subverted before, in 1998/9, I am not mindful that it should be permitted a second, or even third time. Yes, I'm going to keep repeating myself. The Board has made a great mistake, in my view. Perceiving or seeing defects (whether real or imagined) in the WG's output, it has not contented itself with providing input (input that would have been seriously taken into account by the CCWG), it has like a cowboy hero in a bad Western, attempted to seize the reins of the stagecoach while the driver was yet not dead, and the driver is not liking it. The Board should realise that IF it cannot accept the WG output (and this is an entirely legitmate position) it should simply declare "no agreement yet" and own the consequences. As others have said, I feel the Boards actions have done much to derail the multistakeholder approach, recently.
Yes but with the amendments proposed by me and Avri Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 6 Oct 2015, at 04:57, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board...
On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Yes indeed Cheers, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com<mailto:langdonorr@gmail.com>> Date: dinsdag 6 oktober 2015 04:57 To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Jordan you ask what we think.... Well ... I am personally of the belief, that we should as a Community, explore the Zuck / Del Bianco options that were recently raised and mentioned in the correspondence from the ICANN Chair of the Board... On 6 Oct 2015 13:44, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Jordan I understand the degree of frustration that you have manifested but there is a room for compromise if we listen to each other and find out what should be done now and what should be done at WS2. There is no abuse of power. We should allow all stakeholder to freely and openly express their views without being accused for this or that . If we do not like a proposal we beed to legally and logically describe its problem. Statement like yours does not Help Tks Cheers Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 6 Oct 2015, at 04:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Leaving it for another day is out of the question. We need to finalize this. Now. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On 6 Oct 2015, at 04:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org> wrote: CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, I think we can have consensus as long as we as we told. Is this the new ICANN definition for the word? avri On 05-Oct-15 22:44, Jordan Carter wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org <mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
/A better world through a better Internet /
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Hi, Thad should have been, We can have consensus as long as we do as we are told. Have our meetings become negotiations on the terms of surrender? avri
Hi,
I think we can have consensus as long as we as we told. Is this the new ICANN definition for the word?
avri
On 05-Oct-15 22:44, Jordan Carter wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org <mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
/A better world through a better Internet /
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Avri, I believe the corollary to your statement is "If we want your opinion, we'll tell it to you." Greg On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 2:02 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Thad should have been,
We can have consensus as long as we do as we are told.
Have our meetings become negotiations on the terms of surrender?
avri
Hi,
I think we can have consensus as long as we as we told. Is this the new ICANN definition for the word?
avri
On 05-Oct-15 22:44, Jordan Carter wrote:
Steve, all
In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one.
It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution.
A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership.
The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold.
Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements.
It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation.
I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter".
In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed.
It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here.
I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose.
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours.
Cheers
Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org <mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote:
CCWG,
We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report.
To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance.
Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model.
Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review.
We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition.
Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
/A better world through a better Internet /
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What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect... Rubens
Interesting, if the Board persist in their "we know best" behaviour, all sorts of unintended consquences may flow. This is independent of whether the Board's reservations are justified or unjustified. On 06/10/15 07:07, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect...
Rubens
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Nigel, may I agree with this. The Board has serious and legitimate concerns to raise and perspectives to add. It is the manner in which this is being done that is causing the problem. best Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 19:11, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Interesting, if the Board persist in their "we know best" behaviour, all sorts of unintended consquences may flow.
This is independent of whether the Board's reservations are justified or unjustified.
On 06/10/15 07:07, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect...
Rubens
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
Hi Jordan, I fully agree with you. I also believe that although incredibly bureaucratic, certain truly international organisations might teach a lot in the area of consensus building and negotiation. Best, Giovanni On 06 Oct 2015, at 08:14, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Nigel, may I agree with this. The Board has serious and legitimate concerns to raise and perspectives to add. It is the manner in which this is being done that is causing the problem. best Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 19:11, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net<mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>> wrote: Interesting, if the Board persist in their "we know best" behaviour, all sorts of unintended consquences may flow. This is independent of whether the Board's reservations are justified or unjustified. On 06/10/15 07:07, Rubens Kuhl wrote: What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect... Rubens _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community Giovanni Seppia External Relations Manager EURid Woluwelaan 150 1831 Diegem - Belgium TEL: +32 (0) 2 401 2750 MOB:+39 335 8141733 giovanni.seppia@eurid.eu<mailto:giovanni.seppia@eurid.eu> http://www.eurid.eu<http://www.eurid.eu/> [cid:2934C4EE-CAF2-4BA4-9DC0-AB9A25CC6ADC@Docomointertouch.com] #2015euWA Please consider the environment before printing this email.<http://christmas2014.eurid.eu> Disclaimer: This email and any attachment hereto is intended solely for the person to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient or if you have received this email in error, please delete it and immediately contact the sender by telephone or email, and destroy any copies of this information. You should not use or copy it, nor disclose its content to any other person or rely upon this information. Please note that any views presented in the email and any attachment hereto are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of EURid. While all care has been taken to avoid any known viruses, the recipient is advised to check this email and any attachment for presence of viruses. http://www.eurid.eu/en/legal-disclaimer
If a civil servant had written the below quote in a memo, it would be translated into Englisg as: "You've all got it *ALL* wrong!" On 06/10/15 07:22, Giovanni Seppia wrote:
I also believe that although incredibly bureaucratic, certain truly international organisations might teach a lot in the area of consensus building and negotiation.
Hi, Do you mean consensus by Board command? The problem is not Board questions and concerns, it is Board commands. avri On 06-Oct-15 02:14, Jordan Carter wrote:
Nigel, may I agree with this. The Board has serious and legitimate concerns to raise and perspectives to add. It is the manner in which this is being done that is causing the problem.
best Jordan
On 6 October 2015 at 19:11, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>> wrote:
Interesting, if the Board persist in their "we know best" behaviour, all sorts of unintended consquences may flow.
This is independent of whether the Board's reservations are justified or unjustified.
On 06/10/15 07:07, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect...
Rubens
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
/A better world through a better Internet /
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They will blink first, if we don't :-)-O el On 2015-10-06 08:07, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified.
Since a stakeholder with enhanced leverage appears to be blocking the process, perhaps the alternative is asking NTIA for a competitive rebid of the IANA contract if a compromise can't be found. That could possibly have a consensus building effect...
Rubens
What are others' views about how we proceed from here?
Not this way, clearly. Recognize the board’s responsibility, continue a constructive dialogue, count our blessings ("We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary”), work from there and explore the path proposed by Steve del Bianco. Cheers Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Date: dinsdag 6 oktober 2015 04:44 To: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet
On 6 Oct 2015, at 07:18, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Recognize the board’s responsibility, continue a constructive dialogue, count our blessings ("We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary”), work from there and explore the path proposed by Steve del Bianco.
Please could someone explain what Steve del Bianco proposed, for the benefit of those of us who couldn't be there? Thank you, Malcolm
Dear Steve Delbianco May you pls forward yoyr message as amended by me to Malcolm Cheers kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 6 Oct 2015, at 14:26, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 6 Oct 2015, at 07:18, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Recognize the board’s responsibility, continue a constructive dialogue, count our blessings ("We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary”), work from there and explore the path proposed by Steve del Bianco.
Please could someone explain what Steve del Bianco proposed, for the benefit of those of us who couldn't be there?
Thank you,
Malcolm
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Why don't you ask him directly? Even I wouldn't go through the Co-Chairs on this one :-)-O el On 2015-10-06 14:26, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 6 Oct 2015, at 07:18, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Recognize the board’s responsibility, continue a constructive dialogue, count our blessings ("We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary”), work from there and explore the path proposed by Steve del Bianco.
Please could someone explain what Steve del Bianco proposed, for the benefit of those of us who couldn't be there?
Thank you,
Malcolm
Im 101% in agreement wit Jordan/ We are losing our legitimacy at this critical juncture. -James Gannon From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jordan Carter Date: Tuesday 6 October 2015 at 3:44 a.m. To: Steve Crocker Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model Steve, all In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an important one. It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have already been established by Board resolution. A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based around membership. The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal development process with its own definition of what the community requires, and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements. In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim to uphold. Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of debate away from what the community's requirements, fairly analysed dictate -- trying to force the group to "jump the tracks" and into a solution that is unlikely to be able to deliver on those requirements. It's an ugly display of force in what should be a rational and requirements-based conversation. I sincerely regret the Board's choice as a group to take that approach. The effect is to give fodder to all of those people, countries and groups who have long argued that the entire notion of multi-stakeholder Internet policymaking is a charade, behind which decisions are made simply and alone by "the people who matter". In terms of the CCWG's work, this email combined with your statement in Los Angeles reduce the chances of any consensus being able to emerge between what the Board has asked for and what the CCWG has developed. It leaves me very sad that the groups here (Board and CCWG) have arrived at this position. There is an apparent lack of listening and comprehension; few displays of empathy or willingness to see things from another point of view; and a consequent inability to really talk through and resolve the conflicting perspectives and aims here. I hoped the Board might make some overtures in that direction. I know I and other CCWG members have been trying to do. To get this sort of response indicates that that attempt serves no further purpose. What are others' views about how we proceed from here? I confess myself mystified. Look forward to speaking with you all in a few hours. Cheers Jordan On 6 October 2015 at 15:21, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>> wrote: CCWG, We appreciate the continued work that the CCWG is doing to consider the public comments received on its second draft report. Following the Los Angeles F2F we have heard suggestions that a Designator model relying on California statutes may be a replacement for the Sole Member model that was in the second draft report. To be clear, the concerns that the Board raised on the Sole Member model still apply to a Designator model. The Designator model still introduces a new legal structure with powers that are intrinsically beyond the structure we have been using. We understand that many believe it is possible to constrain these powers in order to provide established protections, accountability and thresholds: This is unproven territory and will require more detail and time to understand and test the impact on our bedrock multistakeholder balance. Further, it is unclear that this would represent the full multistakeholder community because we do not know yet which SO/ACs will join now or later. Moreover, the same community accountability issues present in the Sole Member are present in the Designator model. Steve del Bianco’s constructive suggestion over the weekend that the Board could commit to a future governance structure review triggered by key factors seems like a good path forward. This can be enshrined in a new fundamental bylaw that would require the holding of a future governance structure review if SOs and ACs agree to kick off that review. We are all in complete agreement on the objective of enforcement of the five community powers, with new/stronger mechanisms for board removal if/when necessary. Let’s focus on finalizing the details on these consensus elements to enable implementation and a successful transition. Steve Crocker for the ICANN Board of Directors _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet
participants (29)
-
"Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" -
Aikman-Scalese, Anne -
Arun Mohan Sukumar -
Avri Doria -
Chartier, Mike S -
Cheryl Langdon-Orr -
Chris Disspain -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Edward Morris -
George Sadowsky -
Giovanni Seppia -
Greg Shatan -
Guru Acharya -
James Gannon -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Kieren McCarthy -
Malcolm Hutty -
Nigel Roberts -
parminder -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Phil Corwin -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Ron Baione -
Rubens Kuhl -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve Crocker