_1 a great reflection Avri. -James On 30/09/2015 22:55, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Salaets, Ken" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of ksalaets@itic.org> wrote:

+1. As per our comments, ITI supports keeping CCWG-A 2.0 as the basis for the eventual proposal that gets forwarded to NTIA.

Ken

-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:38 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Is it reasonable to avoid new mechanisms?

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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+1. Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed. Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri. On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group. The divergence between: - the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation and - the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model is quite stark. FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated. cheers Jordan On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi, The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided. This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom. Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account. The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

...

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed.  As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM.  There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin. This is not an argument that the SMM must win.  But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports.  If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views.  But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority. Paul -- Sent from myMail app for Android Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> :

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM  while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss  

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com > :

...

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears < mshears@cdt.org > :

...

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel

wrote:

...

...

...

+1. 

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed. 

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri. 

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter < jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote:

...

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria < avri@acm.org > wrote:

...

Hi,

The  Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system.  The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough.  So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership.  Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model.  An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was  imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it.  It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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...

...

mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987

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...

...

www.avast.com

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[image: Images intégrées 9]Dear Paul Thank you very much for your message I was really delighted to receive such a nice words from you Sorry MY message was prematurely sent before I edit that. I fact I copied some part of your message to use it in my reply However, it was sent before I finish. PLS READ THAT MESSAGE void I repeat the reply as follows Dear Paul Thank you very much for your message and your analysis, I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid that few SOs which would probably participate in the voting with threshold of 2/3 ( say 3 SOs with 15 votes ,the 2/3 of which become 10 would decide rejecting standard Bylaws changes .This means out of 29 weighting vote 10 reject the changes which may be beneficial for 4 ACs .Is that the way you and your overwhelming majority wants to capture the entire commune by 10 votes out of 29 VOTES ??? it is not the "few" who have DIFFICULTIES with MSM ,as I do not your counting criteria. There is no such overwhelming majority supporting the SMM. The whole accountability method was the results of many back and forth options and just few partisans pushed for SMM. I did not severely objected to it until the issue was discussed at ICANN 53 that two ACs announced that they will not participate, another AC is also likely in a position not to participate .then remains 3 or 4 out of 7 communities . Then ICANN clearly opposed to SMM and ,in particular, its inherent voting concept. Very probably NTIA does not wish that GAC attend 7 participate at any voting as they have mentioned that they insist that GAC must remain as an Advisory Community. Then your SMM makes changes which touches the very interests of ACs and other who do not participate at voting and still you wish to impose the decision made by 10 vote to other communities with almost double number of votes weighting criteria .The interests of a minority prevails against the interest of majority. That is not acceptable .There are several question and NOT some questions about the structure of the SMM,, its accountability, And Fiduciary to the entire community which are much more larger than those 7 SOs and ACs in the beloved SMM. The 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would NOT win since there are much more than that who have not decided or they are abstention .You may know that if the number of abstention is more than those voted in favour or against the voting is in valid. Either we want to dominate others or we want to talk and negotiate and collaborate with others. There is neither superiority nor domination. The only criteria is democracy, mutual respect, working together with a view to reach consensus. It was good to hear from you and learn from you . We continue to learn from each other’s if we listen to each other’s Cheers my dead Paul, I remain Kavouss 2015-10-05 16:54 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

Dear Paul, Thank you very much for your message and your abnalysis, I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid the few SSs which would probably participate the voting with 273obUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT FEW sOs h respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

2015-10-05 16:44 GMT+02:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:

...

With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

-- Sent from myMail app for Android Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3akavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> :

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3amshears@cdt.org>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aavri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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I am very much in favor of the idea in Avri's email: What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model

instead of voting? The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more tha ​ n​ 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against)

​Voting, and the opting out in reaction to voting, has created complexities and weaknesses in our plan. It has also provided easy ammunition for those who don't want a membership model. A consensus-based SM should lead to a simpler and more inclusive process.​ The Community Forum could be made an integral part of that consensus-building process, as opposed to a mere consultation opportunity with non-voting stakeholders. I believe this should be pursued as a matter of urgency and priority. Greg On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 11:41 AM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear Avri, That is one of my preoccupation that we avoisd voting . Tks for proposal Pls read my reply to our distinguished Paul Kavouss

2015-10-05 17:28 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

...

[image: Images intégrées 9]Dear Paul Thank you very much for your message I was really delighted to receive such a nice words from you Sorry MY message was prematurely sent before I edit that. I fact I copied some part of your message to use it in my reply However, it was sent before I finish. PLS READ THAT MESSAGE void I repeat the reply as follows Dear Paul

Thank you very much for your message and your analysis,

I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid that few SOs which would probably participate in the voting with threshold of 2/3 ( say 3 SOs with 15 votes ,the 2/3 of which become 10 would decide rejecting standard Bylaws changes .This means out of 29 weighting vote 10 reject the changes which may be beneficial for 4 ACs .Is that the way you and your overwhelming majority wants to capture the entire commune by 10 votes out of 29 VOTES ??? it is not the "few" who have DIFFICULTIES with MSM ,as I do not your counting criteria. There is no such overwhelming majority supporting the SMM. The whole accountability method was the results of many back and forth options and just few partisans pushed for SMM.

I did not severely objected to it until the issue was discussed at ICANN 53 that two ACs announced that they will not participate, another AC is also likely in a position not to participate .then remains 3 or 4 out of 7 communities .

Then ICANN clearly opposed to SMM and ,in particular, its inherent voting concept. Very probably NTIA does not wish that GAC attend 7 participate at any voting as they have mentioned that they insist that GAC must remain as an Advisory Community. Then your SMM makes changes which touches the very interests of ACs and other who do not participate at voting and still you wish to impose the decision made by 10 vote to other communities with almost double number of votes weighting criteria .The interests of a minority prevails against the interest of majority. That is not acceptable .There are several question and NOT some questions about the structure of the SMM,, its accountability, And Fiduciary to the entire community which are much more larger than those 7 SOs and ACs in the beloved SMM.

The 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would NOT win since there are much more than that who have not decided or they are abstention .You may know that if the number of abstention is more than those voted in favour or against the voting is in valid.

Either we want to dominate others or we want to talk and negotiate and collaborate with others.

There is neither superiority nor domination. The only criteria is democracy, mutual respect, working together with a view to reach consensus.

It was good to hear from you and learn from you .

We continue to learn from each other’s if we listen to each other’s

Cheers my dead Paul, I remain

Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:54 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

...

Dear Paul, Thank you very much for your message and your abnalysis, I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid the few SSs which would probably participate the voting with 273obUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT FEW sOs h respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

2015-10-05 16:44 GMT+02:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:

...

With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

-- Sent from myMail app for Android Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3akavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>

...

:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3amshears@cdt.org>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter < <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aavri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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In ICANN-land, consensus comes in exotic varieties. For instance GNSO WGs operate by rough consensus (though we call it "consensus").... Here are the consensus thresholds for this group, from the CCWG charter: In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the

CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:

a) Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection b) Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree

In the absence of Full Consensus, the Chair(s) should allow for the submission of minority viewpoint(s) and these, along with the consensus view, shall be included in the report.

In a rare case, the chair(s) may decide that the use of a poll is reasonable to assess the level of support for a recommendation. However, care should be taken in using polls that they do not become votes, as there are often disagreements about the meanings of the poll questions or of the poll results.

Any member who disagrees with the consensus-level designation made by the Chair(s), or believes that his/her contributions are being systematically ignored or discounted should first discuss the circumstances with the relevant sub-group chair or the CCWG-Accountability co-chairs. In the event that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily, the group member should request an opportunity to discuss the situation with the Chairs of the chartering organizations or their designated representatives.

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:

There are only two types of consensus; Unanimous (no objection), or a call by the chair of consensus. I don't think you want to vest the power implied in the latter. If you want something less than unanimous then it's a vote.

On Oct 5, 2015, at 11:07 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:

I am very much in favor of the idea in Avri's email:

What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model

...

instead of voting? The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more tha ​ n​ 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against)

​Voting, and the opting out in reaction to voting, has created complexities and weaknesses in our plan. It has also provided easy ammunition for those who don't want a membership model. A consensus-based SM should lead to a simpler and more inclusive process.​ The Community Forum could be made an integral part of that consensus-building process, as opposed to a mere consultation opportunity with non-voting stakeholders.

I believe this should be pursued as a matter of urgency and priority.

Greg

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 11:41 AM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:

...

Dear Avri, That is one of my preoccupation that we avoisd voting . Tks for proposal Pls read my reply to our distinguished Paul Kavouss

2015-10-05 17:28 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

...

<image.gif>Dear Paul Thank you very much for your message I was really delighted to receive such a nice words from you Sorry MY message was prematurely sent before I edit that. I fact I copied some part of your message to use it in my reply However, it was sent before I finish. PLS READ THAT MESSAGE void I repeat the reply as follows Dear Paul

Thank you very much for your message and your analysis,

I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid that few SOs which would probably participate in the voting with threshold of 2/3 ( say 3 SOs with 15 votes ,the 2/3 of which become 10 would decide rejecting standard Bylaws changes .This means out of 29 weighting vote 10 reject the changes which may be beneficial for 4 ACs .Is that the way you and your overwhelming majority wants to capture the entire commune by 10 votes out of 29 VOTES ??? it is not the "few" who have DIFFICULTIES with MSM ,as I do not your counting criteria. There is no such overwhelming majority supporting the SMM. The whole accountability method was the results of many back and forth options and just few partisans pushed for SMM.

I did not severely objected to it until the issue was discussed at ICANN 53 that two ACs announced that they will not participate, another AC is also likely in a position not to participate .then remains 3 or 4 out of 7 communities .

Then ICANN clearly opposed to SMM and ,in particular, its inherent voting concept. Very probably NTIA does not wish that GAC attend 7 participate at any voting as they have mentioned that they insist that GAC must remain as an Advisory Community. Then your SMM makes changes which touches the very interests of ACs and other who do not participate at voting and still you wish to impose the decision made by 10 vote to other communities with almost double number of votes weighting criteria .The interests of a minority prevails against the interest of majority. That is not acceptable .There are several question and NOT some questions about the structure of the SMM,, its accountability, And Fiduciary to the entire community which are much more larger than those 7 SOs and ACs in the beloved SMM.

The 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would NOT win since there are much more than that who have not decided or they are abstention .You may know that if the number of abstention is more than those voted in favour or against the voting is in valid.

Either we want to dominate others or we want to talk and negotiate and collaborate with others.

There is neither superiority nor domination. The only criteria is democracy, mutual respect, working together with a view to reach consensus.

It was good to hear from you and learn from you .

We continue to learn from each other’s if we listen to each other’s

Cheers my dead Paul, I remain

Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:54 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

...

Dear Paul, Thank you very much for your message and your abnalysis, I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid the few SSs which would probably participate the voting with 273obUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT FEW sOs h respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

2015-10-05 16:44 GMT+02:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:

...

With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

-- Sent from myMail app for Android Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3akavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>

...

:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3amshears@cdt.org>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter < <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aavri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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Chief Executive *InternetNZ*

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It is up to us to be innovative in that regard. You can leave the determination of the consensus level to more than one person. In the GNSO you can have co-chairs in PDP working groups that jointly do the consensus determination. In this CCWG, the burden is shared by three co-chairs. You could even have representatives of all SO/ACs (or beyond) jointly doing the consensus call. It may well be the groups do not agree on substance, but they can jointly come to a conclusion of whether (rough) consensus is present or not. Thomas

Am 06.10.2015 um 01:23 schrieb Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com>:

I see unanimous, or something less called by the chair; what am I missing?

On Oct 5, 2015, at 5:41 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:

In ICANN-land, consensus comes in exotic varieties. For instance GNSO WGs operate by rough consensus (though we call it "consensus")....

Here are the consensus thresholds for this group, from the CCWG charter:

In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:

a) Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection b) Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree

In the absence of Full Consensus, the Chair(s) should allow for the submission of minority viewpoint(s) and these, along with the consensus view, shall be included in the report.

In a rare case, the chair(s) may decide that the use of a poll is reasonable to assess the level of support for a recommendation. However, care should be taken in using polls that they do not become votes, as there are often disagreements about the meanings of the poll questions or of the poll results.

Any member who disagrees with the consensus-level designation made by the Chair(s), or believes that his/her contributions are being systematically ignored or discounted should first discuss the circumstances with the relevant sub-group chair or the CCWG-Accountability co-chairs. In the event that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily, the group member should request an opportunity to discuss the situation with the Chairs of the chartering organizations or their designated representatives.

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com<mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: There are only two types of consensus; Unanimous (no objection), or a call by the chair of consensus. I don't think you want to vest the power implied in the latter. If you want something less than unanimous then it's a vote.

On Oct 5, 2015, at 11:07 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:

I am very much in favor of the idea in Avri's email:

What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model instead of voting? The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more tha ​ n​ 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against)

​Voting, and the opting out in reaction to voting, has created complexities and weaknesses in our plan. It has also provided easy ammunition for those who don't want a membership model. A consensus-based SM should lead to a simpler and more inclusive process.​ The Community Forum could be made an integral part of that consensus-building process, as opposed to a mere consultation opportunity with non-voting stakeholders.

I believe this should be pursued as a matter of urgency and priority.

Greg

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 11:41 AM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Dear Avri, That is one of my preoccupation that we avoisd voting . Tks for proposal Pls read my reply to our distinguished Paul Kavouss

2015-10-05 17:28 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>: <image.gif>Dear Paul Thank you very much for your message I was really delighted to receive such a nice words from you Sorry MY message was prematurely sent before I edit that. I fact I copied some part of your message to use it in my reply However, it was sent before I finish. PLS READ THAT MESSAGE void I repeat the reply as follows Dear Paul

Thank you very much for your message and your analysis,

I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid that few SOs which would probably participate in the voting with threshold of 2/3 ( say 3 SOs with 15 votes ,the 2/3 of which become 10 would decide rejecting standard Bylaws changes .This means out of 29 weighting vote 10 reject the changes which may be beneficial for 4 ACs .Is that the way you and your overwhelming majority wants to capture the entire commune by 10 votes out of 29 VOTES ??? it is not the "few" who have DIFFICULTIES with MSM ,as I do not your counting criteria. There is no such overwhelming majority supporting the SMM. The whole accountability method was the results of many back and forth options and just few partisans pushed for SMM.

I did not severely objected to it until the issue was discussed at ICANN 53 that two ACs announced that they will not participate, another AC is also likely in a position not to participate .then remains 3 or 4 out of 7 communities .

Then ICANN clearly opposed to SMM and ,in particular, its inherent voting concept. Very probably NTIA does not wish that GAC attend 7 participate at any voting as they have mentioned that they insist that GAC must remain as an Advisory Community. Then your SMM makes changes which touches the very interests of ACs and other who do not participate at voting and still you wish to impose the decision made by 10 vote to other communities with almost double number of votes weighting criteria .The interests of a minority prevails against the interest of majority. That is not acceptable .There are several question and NOT some questions about the structure of the SMM,, its accountability, And Fiduciary to the entire community which are much more larger than those 7 SOs and ACs in the beloved SMM.

The 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would NOT win since there are much more than that who have not decided or they are abstention .You may know that if the number of abstention is more than those voted in favour or against the voting is in valid.

Either we want to dominate others or we want to talk and negotiate and collaborate with others.

There is neither superiority nor domination. The only criteria is democracy, mutual respect, working together with a view to reach consensus.

It was good to hear from you and learn from you .

We continue to learn from each other’s if we listen to each other’s

Cheers my dead Paul, I remain

Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:54 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>: Dear Paul, Thank you very much for your message and your abnalysis, I wish if I could continue to support SMM. But we need to avoid the few SSs which would probably participate the voting with 273obUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT FEW sOs h respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

2015-10-05 16:44 GMT+02:00 Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>:

With respect, it is not the "few" who have agreed. As I read the history, the overwhelming majority support the SMM. There are some questions (per your "b" bullet below) about the precise structure of the SMM, but a mere review of the last 300 (!) messages on the chat and the transcripts from Paris, LA and the Board calls suggests that the if it were put to a straight vote the SMM would win by a large margin.

This is not an argument that the SMM must win. But it is a counter to the argument that the dissent of a small, but vocal, minority should be able to exercise a heckler's veto over a proposal that the majority of the community supports. If the multi-stakeholder model means anything, it means compromise in t he first instance, and respect for everyone's views. But it does not mean regression to the least common denominator or that the community's broader needs must yield to an intransigent minority.

Paul

-- Sent from myMail app for Android

Monday, 05 October 2015, 10:31AM -04:00 from Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>:

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3akavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3amshears@cdt.org>>: + 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote: +1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <<https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz<https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3ajordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org<https://e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aavri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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Hi, What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model instead of voting? The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more that 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against) Note: I personally accept that constant outreach, a place for anyone in an ACSO and open comment period in the 6 UN languages meets the condition for a viable global model of participation. avri On 05-Oct-15 10:31, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

...

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz>www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>

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I see a lot of positive progress in Avri's ideas hereunder. Thank you Avri Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez _____________________ email: crg@isoc-cr.org Skype: carlos.raulg +506 8837 7173 (cel) +506 4000 2000 (home) +506 2290 3678 (fax) _____________________ Apartado 1571-1000 San Jose, COSTA RICA

On Oct 5, 2015, at 8:49 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model instead of voting?

The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more that 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against)

Note: I personally accept that constant outreach, a place for anyone in an ACSO and open comment period in the 6 UN languages meets the condition for a viable global model of participation.

avri

On 05-Oct-15 10:31, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:

...

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>>:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org> <mailto:mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>> wrote:

...

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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Dear All, Avri? suggestion and Geg amendment are well compatible wuith what I prposed at LA . Let ius get ride of VOTING and go ahead with consensus recommendation( outcome for SOs and consensus advice from ACs, ALAC could opt with either of the two Regards Kavouss 2015-10-05 19:35 GMT+02:00 Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:

Yes.

Not much else to say. Keeps with the tradition of the bottom up multi-stakeholder model, eliminates some of the side issues that have contributed to derailing our effort, allows us the keep the legal certainty and statutory power of the SMM while modifying it to fit this communities cultural and operational norms.

Yes.

Thanks Avri - sometimes it takes a philosopher to lead a bunch of lawyers and engineers away from pessimism, conflict and darkness.

Best,

Ed

------------------------------ *From*: "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> *Sent*: Monday, October 5, 2015 3:51 PM *To*: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Is it reasonable to avoid new mechanisms?

Hi,

What about the idea of recasting the SM to work on a consensus model instead of voting?

The info we got from Sidley/Adler indicates that this should be possible. Then instead of working on votes we can work on Recommendations and Advice objections to gauge consensus (e.g. no more that 1 SO recommends against + 1 AC advises against)

Note: I personally accept that constant outreach, a place for anyone in an ACSO and open comment period in the 6 UN languages meets the condition for a viable global model of participation.

avri

On 05-Oct-15 10:31, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:

...

Jordan, We should not pusjh to a particular model SMM while we have disagreement a) from the Board and b) from people among CCWG ,in partzicular, if the voting arrangements are maintained and if most of the ACs refrain to pop in/ or opt for voting and c) indication from others that with such voting by the ACs the balance between the private sectors and others, on the one hand, and governments on the other hand is c ompromised, We need to listen to each others and not to few that have already agreed to SMM. Pls kindly understand that there is diverghence of views .$ Let us find out a consensus along the line that was proposed by Stev and amended by me Tks Kavouss

2015-10-05 16:25 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>:

2015-10-05 15:38 GMT+02:00 Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>:

+ 1 also

On 05/10/2015 13:54, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

+1.

Any claims that we must abbreviate accountability reforms in order to fit the IANA transition timeline has those two priorities reversed.

Sent via iPhone. Blame Siri.

On Oct 2, 2015, at 19:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:

...

Thanks Avri for this nice statement of one of the key dilemmas facing this group.

The divergence between:

- the transition can't happen until accountability is sustainable, and so that requires the member model as a foundation

and

- the transition can't happen if there is a significant change such as that to a member model, and so that requires ruling out the member model

is quite stark.

FWIW my instincts are in line with Avri's. If ICANN's current level of accountability was acceptable, the community would not have demanded an accountability process alongside the transition process, and NTIA would not have agreed the two had to be intertwined and interrelated.

cheers Jordan

On 1 October 2015 at 10:38, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided.

This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom.

Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account.

The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there.

avri

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Chief Executive *InternetNZ*

+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz>www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>

/A better world through a better Internet /

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Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987 <tel:%2B%2044%20771%20247%202987>

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