Dear all Work Party 1 has been discussing at some length the innovations developed in Dublin about community decision-making - particularly, the operation of decisions in the Community Mechanism that have to happen following the various dialogue and discussion phases. Over the past two calls in the last week, we've discussed some of the details, and I have the following recommendations for the CCWG arising from that. Each recommendation has some info about it noted below, and at the end of this email are some relevant attachments. *WP1 members - if I have made errors in the summary, please let us all know.* Overall, WP1 has agreed with the change to the broad approach into what might be called the "Dublin Approach". There are some specifics that are important: *a) on split or single decisions within each SO or AC* *WP1 recommends to the CCWG that each SO or AC should come to a decision by means of its own processes, and that "split" decisions or delegating decisions to sub-units will not be available.* This is a recommendation from WP1 to the CCWG and was largely consensus of the group on the call on 2 November. It is a change from the Second Draft Proposal but is consistent with what was discussed in Dublin. GNSO participants in WP1 have expressed concerns with this. It would be complex to allow split decisions in a consensus model. *b) on participating SOs and ACs* *Decision rights for the exercise of community powers be granted to the GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC. SSAC and RSSAC will be able to advise the other SOs or ACs through the Community Forum. Each SO or AC has the right to participate or not participate in any decision, with their choice not affecting the thresholds established for the exercise of community powers.* WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge it as a recommendation per se. We took a temperature check of the Adobe room and there were [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation. SSAC have made it clear they do not contemplate decisional rights. RSSAC we are awaiting input. GAC - GAC wishes to protect the right to opt in. There was a discussion about how to provide opt in or otherwise. My advice as rapporteur is that we should include all SOs or ACs as able to participate unless they indicate they do not wish to. This will allow them to decide (by their own consensus processes) at each stage of each decision whether to express support or objection to the exercise of a community power, but means that non-decision won't count either as objection or support. *c) on the distribution of influence between SOs and ACs* *Each of the five SOs and ACs with decision rights have an equality of voice/influence in decisions to exercise community powers.* Again, WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge this as a recommendation. We took a temperature check and this again showed [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation. Some WP1 participants continue to argue for the view that SOs should have relatively more influence than ACs. It is difficult to establish how to weigh such a difference in the context of each SO or AC by consensus offering a view in support of or objecting to the use of a power. *d) on decision thresholds in the community mechanism* *WP1 recommends to the CCWG that the levels of agreement among SOs and ACs in support of exercising a power, and the limits to levels of opposition, be agreed as those set out in the paper from Steve DelBianco updated by Jordan Carter and discussed at this meeting.* This recommendation from WP1 was broadly agreed as consistent with the previous temperature checks and the first recommendation. No temperature check was held. Two concerns were raised in discussion (see the table as attachment A to this email - you can ignore the last column based on recommendation in a) above). 1) with five SOs or ACs participating, and with GAG not having decided whether to participate, whether a threshold of four SOs/ACs by consensus supporting the use of a power was too high a threshold. It would essentially require unanimity among the three SOs and ALAC. (This threshold is proposed for Budget veto, approval of changes to fundamental bylaws, recall of the ICANN Board and decisions re IANA Functions separation for names.) 2) for the power to recall the entire ICANN Board, whether one objecting SO or AC should prevent that power being used. (The broad view was no, it should not - consistent with our principled position that no single SO or AC should be able to prevent the use of any of the community powers.) *Papers* Please find the following attached: A - the consensus measure table related to item d) above. B - the "Dublin Approach" background paper C - the breakout report, including the decision table D - the public comments report on the community mechanism Cheers, Jordan WP1 Rapporteur CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *