Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 3 Nov 2015 07:14, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Dear all
b) on participating SOs and ACs
Decision rights for the exercise of community powers be granted to the
GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC. SSAC and RSSAC will be able to advise the other SOs or ACs through the Community Forum. Each SO or AC has the right to participate or not participate in any decision, with their choice not affecting the thresholds established for the exercise of community powers.
WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge it as a recommendation per se.
We took a temperature check of the Adobe room and there were [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation.
SO: Is there any particular reason why you did not formerly lodge this? For how long do we have to keep an issue open especially at this injury time.
c) on the distribution of influence between SOs and ACs
Each of the five SOs and ACs with decision rights have an equality of
voice/influence in decisions to exercise community powers.
Again, WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge this as a recommendation.
We took a temperature check and this again showed [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation.
SO: Same comment/question as above. When do you intend to get closure on this? Thanks Regards
Some WP1 participants continue to argue for the view that SOs should have relatively more influence than ACs. It is difficult to establish how to weigh such a difference in the context of each SO or AC by consensus offering a view in support of or objecting to the use of a power.
d) on decision thresholds in the community mechanism
WP1 recommends to the CCWG that the levels of agreement among SOs and ACs in support of exercising a power, and the limits to levels of opposition, be agreed as those set out in the paper from Steve DelBianco updated by Jordan Carter and discussed at this meeting.
This recommendation from WP1 was broadly agreed as consistent with the previous temperature checks and the first recommendation. No temperature check was held.
Two concerns were raised in discussion (see the table as attachment A to this email - you can ignore the last column based on recommendation in a) above).
1) with five SOs or ACs participating, and with GAG not having decided whether to participate, whether a threshold of four SOs/ACs by consensus supporting the use of a power was too high a threshold. It would essentially require unanimity among the three SOs and ALAC. (This threshold is proposed for Budget veto, approval of changes to fundamental bylaws, recall of the ICANN Board and decisions re IANA Functions separation for names.)
2) for the power to recall the entire ICANN Board, whether one objecting SO or AC should prevent that power being used. (The broad view was no, it should not - consistent with our principled position that no single SO or AC should be able to prevent the use of any of the community powers.)
Papers
Please find the following attached:
A - the consensus measure table related to item d) above. B - the "Dublin Approach" background paper C - the breakout report, including the decision table D - the public comments report on the community mechanism
Cheers, Jordan
WP1 Rapporteur CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
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