This is the separation process
This is the separation process from the CWG proposal: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53779816#_ftn57 "The selection of a new operator to perform the IANA Naming Functions or other separation process will be subject to approval by the ICANN Board, and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process. [62] A determination by the ICANN Board to not approve a recommendation by the SCWG that had been supported by a supermajority of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils will need to follow the same supermajority thresholds and consultation procedures as ICANN Board rejection (by a supermajority vote) of a PDP recommendation that is supported by a supermajority of the GNSO."
This is the detailed step out, from Annex L: CCWG Accountability Dependencies Enumeration of the relevant accountability mechanisms that could or must be exhausted before a separation process could be triggered: - Creation of an ICANN fundamental bylaw to describe the IANA Function Review (IFR) and establish the above voting thresholds for triggering a Special IFR and approving the outcomes of an IFR. - Creation of an ICANN fundamental bylaw to describe the procedure for creating the SCWG and its functions and establish the voting thresholds for approval of a new operator for the performance of the IANA Functions or other end-result of the SCWG process. - Approval by a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process to approve the final selection of the SCWG (if this tenet of the CCWG-Accountability proposal is not implemented a new approval mechanism will have to be put in place. - Per the above separation process the selection of the entity that would perform the IANA naming functions following a separation process will require community approval through the established mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process. On 19 October 2015 at 18:00, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
This is the separation process from the CWG proposal: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53779816#_ftn57
"The selection of a new operator to perform the IANA Naming Functions or other separation process will be subject to approval by the ICANN Board, and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process. [62] A determination by the ICANN Board to not approve a recommendation by the SCWG that had been supported by a supermajority of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils will need to follow the same supermajority thresholds and consultation procedures as ICANN Board rejection (by a supermajority vote) of a PDP recommendation that is supported by a supermajority of the GNSO."
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
participants (2)
-
Bruce Tonkin -
Jordan Carter