responding to Eric's questions
Responding to Eric’s question re independent counsel, my responses are in blue. If one of the "free, soon, adequate" requirements can be waived, theneven I don't have my view, but the legal staff do meet those criteria, and their client is the corporation, which is capable of reorganization, a subject of interest for the purposes of exploring the "member" and "oversight" sets of issues. I don’t think ICANN staff is adequate, for the reasons described below. Even if someone at Jones Day could be, ICANN will have to pay them, which knocks out that requirement. I'm glad you mention fiduciary duty as there are no shareholders, rather stewards of the public trust exercising reasonable care, inquisitive ...the strictest standard of duty of care in American law. This is one reason that I think we need to go outside. ICANN Legal has asserted that the Board members have a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and that duty precludes them from agreeing to a binding dispute resolution mechanism. I have never heard them say that they have a duty under California law to the public trust, or suggest that such a duty trumps any obligation is may have to serve as the steward of a public interest. As many members of the community having a material interest in unique endpoint identifiers are employed by for-profit entities with shareholders, the same meaning may not be conveyed when we use the same phrase. Not sure I understand your point here Would you do me the kindness (at some point in the proximal future, it isn't urgent) of providing a URL to the conclusion, and perhaps the supporting analysis, of the Berkman Center during the first ATRT review? I'm interested in which legal positions by the Corporation's legal staff they found in need of additional research. The statement I referenced is actually in the Berkman ATRT1 Recommendations: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-recommendations-20oct10.... The following is from page 46: In the course of broad consultations, ATRT received feedback to the effect that ICANN could enter into agreements with parties that called for binding arbitration without running afoul of California law. While this latitude could apply in a contractual context, it is less clear and deserves further legal analysis as to what extent and through what mechanisms ICANN could agree to enter into binding arbitration more generally. Again, were we constituted externally by some other corporate entity, then retaining our legal counsel rather than relying upon the legal counsel of the subject of our inquiry, concerning its reorganization, would be necessary for the reason you mention -- the ethical duty of counsel towards its clients -- but we -- the CCWG-whatever -- are not, and staff -- all of staff, from IT to Legal, as resources allocated by the executive, are available to us. Absent a refusal to allocate or a demonstration of incompetence, why shouldn't we expect an adequate work product from staff counsel? I was actually thinking of the ethical obligations of ICANN staff attorneys and outside counsel. Given that ICANN has asserted that the Board’s fiduciary duty under California law prohibits the board from ceding authority to a binding dispute resolution procedure in this context, we already know that they have taken a position that is contrary to the community’s desire. Given that, as well as the Berkman Center’s conclusion that this issue deserved further legal analysis, I don’t know how we could consider the staff/outside counsel to be unconflicted in this situation. (For the record, I am not sure that binding authority is absolutely necessary – depends on what other tools are available, e.g., spilling the Board. Based on the what I heard in Frankfurt, however, the community sees this as an important tool for accountability.) Thank you for your kind note, and on the International Law issue, which to me seems excessively speculative, I share your remark. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
I've added an additional response on the last point, in green. Greg Shatan *Gregory S. Shatan * Partner | *Abelman Frayne & Schwab* *666 Third Avenue **|** New York, NY 10017-5621* *Direct* 212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022 *Fax* 212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428 *gsshatan@lawabel.com <gsshatan@lawabel.com>* *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> * *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>* On Thu, Jan 22, 2015 at 12:58 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Responding to Eric’s question re independent counsel, my responses are in *blue*.
If one of the "free, soon, adequate" requirements can be waived, theneven I don't have my view, but the legal staff do meet those criteria,
and their client is the corporation, which is capable of reorganization, a subject of interest for the purposes of exploring the "member" and "oversight" sets of issues.
*I don’t think ICANN staff is adequate, for the reasons described below. Even if someone at Jones Day could be, ICANN will have to pay them, which knocks out that requirement.*
I'm glad you mention fiduciary duty as there are no shareholders, rather stewards of the public trust exercising reasonable care, inquisitive ...the strictest standard of duty of care in American law.
*This is one reason that I think we need to go outside. ICANN Legal has asserted that the Board members have a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and that duty precludes them from agreeing to a binding dispute resolution mechanism. I have never heard them say that they have a duty under California law to the public trust, or suggest that such a duty trumps any obligation is may have to serve as the steward of a public interest. *
As many members of the community having a material interest in unique endpoint identifiers are employed by for-profit entities with shareholders, the same meaning may not be conveyed when we use the same phrase.
*Not sure I understand your point here*
Would you do me the kindness (at some point in the proximal future, it isn't urgent) of providing a URL to the conclusion, and perhaps the
supporting analysis, of the Berkman Center during the first ATRT review? I'm interested in which legal positions by the Corporation's legal staff they found in need of additional research.
*The statement I referenced is actually in the Berkman ATRT1 Recommendations: **https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-recommendations-20oct10... <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-recommendations-20oct10...>. The following is from page 46:*
In the course of broad consultations, ATRT received feedback to the effect that ICANN could enter into agreements with parties that called for binding arbitration without running afoul of California law. While this latitude could apply in a contractual context*, it is less clear and deserves further legal analysis as to what extent and through what mechanisms ICANN could agree to enter into binding arbitration more generally*.
Again, were we constituted externally by some other corporate entity,
then retaining our legal counsel rather than relying upon the legal
counsel of the subject of our inquiry, concerning its reorganization,
would be necessary for the reason you mention -- the ethical duty of
counsel towards its clients -- but we -- the CCWG-whatever -- are not,
and staff -- all of staff, from IT to Legal, as resources allocated by
the executive, are available to us. Absent a refusal to allocate or a
demonstration of incompetence, why shouldn't we expect an adequate work product from staff counsel?
*I was actually thinking of the ethical obligations of ICANN staff attorneys and outside counsel. Given that ICANN has asserted that the Board’s fiduciary duty under California law prohibits the board from ceding authority to a binding dispute resolution procedure in this context, we already know that they have taken a position that is contrary to the community’s desire. Given that, as well as the Berkman Center’s conclusion that this issue deserved further legal analysis, I don’t know how we could consider the staff/outside counsel to be unconflicted in this situation. (For the record, I am not sure that binding authority is absolutely necessary – depends on what other tools are available, e.g., spilling the Board. Based on the what I heard in Frankfurt, however, the community sees this as an important tool for accountability.)*
In the corporate world, it is not uncommon for board committees to retain separate counsel, so that they receive advice independent of company's inside and outside counsel. Our situation is analogous. While company's in-house counsel is almost certainly "available" to us, they would not have the requisite independence, for the reasons Becky has stated above and that others have stated earlier. Finally, "adequacy" is not the standard to apply here for several reasons. First, we need better than adequate work product; we need first-rate work product (and really, this is not just about work product -- this is about advice, produced through an iterative process, where the work product is just the end product of that process). Second, while ICANN has a first-rate in-house legal team, that does not mean they are first-rate in dealing with every legal issue regardless of substance. I don't think we need a "demonstration of incompetence" to be reasonably confident that we will get more skilled and valuable advice on these issues from a leading outside counsel, who spends their days wrestling with corporate governance and/or non-profit law issues on a daily basis for a variety of clients in a variety of contexts. Third, this is not merely about being competent -- it is about about getting counsel with the right approach to these matters, whose goal it is to find solutions to the issues we raise, who will look for rational interpretations of the laws, regulations and cases in these areas to achieve our goals -- or to recommend other ways to achieve them if our initial suggestions are not viable or preferable. Keep in mind that there is artistry and advocacy in legal work, and very little legal advice is "neutral" in the sense that no particular outcome is more desirable than any other outcome. Outside of the obvious, lawyers of similar skill and ability will often come to different conclusions based on the same sets of law and facts, for many reasons -- interpretation, risk tolerance, weighting of different variables, prior experience, client's goals, creativity, etc. Even if all we could get is "adequate" legal advice, what we need is OUR adequate legal advice, and we can only get that from independent counsel.
Thank you for your kind note, and on the International Law issue, which to me seems excessively speculative, I share your remark.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
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Becky, Thank you. Let's assume "they" are Jones Day, in their capacity as external counsel, and also assume "ICANN will have to pay them", and the question on which advice is sought is whether, as organized, or under some reorganization scenario, an "oversight" function may be exercised over the Board, without change to the incorporation status (Cal. Non-profit & IRS 501(c)(3)). The Board already has, as someone pointed out, referring to a 1pp note, tasked legal staff to provide an answer to the question. The proposal to retain "they", for a reasonable fee paid by ICANN, to produce a responsive memo to a question for which the Board has chosen to be informed by its in-house counsel, _is_ a proposal to conduct that very oversight (an action taken in the absence of, or contrary to, some act by the Board, here not electing to refer the question to external counsel) upon which an opinion is sought -- not by the Board, but by (assuming a process outcome) this WG, or some members of this WG. This WG, like any WG, may recommend actions, but taking the step to conduct an action of oversight, to determine if oversight may exist without reference beyond California's non-profit incorporation language and case law, is that very oversight. Third-party money, fine. An unsolicited memo thrown over the transom, fine. Persuade the Board to direct the Executive, fine. On any question not previously considered, or not known to be under present, or planned consideration, by the Board, fine. But oversight by an inferior organ (us) to determine if oversight of a superior organ (Board) is possible -- a question previously considered by the Board -- answers the hypothetical with the actual. It crosses a Rubicon. In an aside to Greg and the word "adequate", my thought when selecting that word was that an opinion which prevailed when tested at the appellate level, in California, where issues of law are considered, in California, would be adequate. I'm not entirely happy with personalizing a question, and at some point the process for resolving differences of views among those concerned -- this or any other -- must be referenced. Again, thanks to Becky, Greg, and others who've provided thoughtful, considered, and differing views on this issue. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/22/15 9:58 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
Responding to Eric’s question re independent counsel, my responses are in *blue*.
If one of the "free, soon, adequate" requirements can be waived, theneven I don't have my view, but the legal staff do meet those criteria,
and their client is the corporation, which is capable of reorganization, a subject of interest for the purposes of exploring the "member" and "oversight" sets of issues.
/I don’t think ICANN staff is adequate, for the reasons described below. Even if someone at Jones Day could be, ICANN will have to pay them, which knocks out that requirement./
I'm glad you mention fiduciary duty as there are no shareholders, rather stewards of the public trust exercising reasonable care, inquisitive ...the strictest standard of duty of care in American law.
/This is one reason that I think we need to go outside. ICANN Legal has asserted that the Board members have a fiduciary duty to the _corporation_, and that duty precludes them from agreeing to a binding dispute resolution mechanism. I have never heard them say that they have a duty under California law to the public trust, or suggest that such a duty trumps any obligation is may have to serve as the steward of a public interest. /
As many members of the community having a material interest in unique endpoint identifiers are employed by for-profit entities with shareholders, the same meaning may not be conveyed when we use the same phrase.
/Not sure I understand your point here/
Would you do me the kindness (at some point in the proximal future, it isn't urgent) of providing a URL to the conclusion, and perhaps the
supporting analysis, of the Berkman Center during the first ATRT review? I'm interested in which legal positions by the Corporation's legal staff they found in need of additional research.
/The statement I referenced is actually in the Berkman ATRT1 Recommendations: //https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-recommendations-20oct10.... The following is from page 46:/
In the course of broad consultations, ATRT received feedback to the effect that ICANN could enter into agreements with parties that called for binding arbitration without running afoul of California law. While this latitude could apply in a contractual context*, it is less clear and deserves further legal analysis as to what extent and through what mechanisms ICANN could agree to enter into binding arbitration more generally*.
Again, were we constituted externally by some other corporate entity,
then retaining our legal counsel rather than relying upon the legal
counsel of the subject of our inquiry, concerning its reorganization,
would be necessary for the reason you mention -- the ethical duty of
counsel towards its clients -- but we -- the CCWG-whatever -- are not,
and staff -- all of staff, from IT to Legal, as resources allocated by
the executive, are available to us. Absent a refusal to allocate or a
demonstration of incompetence, why shouldn't we expect an adequate work product from staff counsel?
/I was actually thinking of the ethical obligations of ICANN staff attorneys and outside counsel. Given that ICANN has asserted that the Board’s fiduciary duty under California law prohibits the board from ceding authority to a binding dispute resolution procedure in this context, we already know that they have taken a position that is contrary to the community’s desire. Given that, as well as the Berkman Center’s conclusion that this issue deserved further legal analysis, I don’t know how we could consider the staff/outside counsel to be unconflicted in this situation. (For the record, I am not sure that binding authority is absolutely necessary – depends on what other tools are available, e.g., spilling the Board. Based on the what I heard in Frankfurt, however, the community sees this as an important tool for accountability.)/
Thank you for your kind note, and on the International Law issue, which to me seems excessively speculative, I share your remark.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (3)
-
Burr, Becky -
Eric Brunner-Williams -
Greg Shatan