Seems good to me. I would support it too. Best regards, León
El 09/11/2015, a las 3:07 p.m., Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> escribió:
This is a new proposal by Brazil to replace the current Bylaw change to address Stress Test 18. It re-instates the requirement that the Board reject GAC advice by a supermajority, one of the ATRT outcomes that was proposed several months ago. At that time, there was significant push back that increasing the rejection threshhold increased the power of the Board. Although possible technically correct, in my mind, it would not make a difference, because rejection of GAC advice, in the relatively rare times it has happened, has been nearly or completely unanimous.
This is now accompanied by a much stronger requirement to consider the advice of all ACs including the ALAC.
This may well be a way to bypass the GAC's rejection of the ST18 outcomes and at first glance, I would support it.
Comments?
Alan
To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 14:28:46 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
Dear CCWG colleagues,
As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has provided a consensus input with regards to the bylaw amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the following:
"The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to have a better understanding of the different views on the issue. In assessing the different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the GAC considered: The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the Committee; The need that each and every Advisory Committee should preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus; The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice; The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to set the threshold for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority voting, consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations.
In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by various parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress Test 18, and to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account the timelines of the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the CCWG to finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability."
With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN 54 communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18 proponents, I present for your consideration the following alternative amendments (underlined) in ICANN bylaws.
ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES Section 1. GENERAL The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board. Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires finding mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the Advisory Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In this context, each Advisory Committee has the right to determine its particular definition of consensus.
ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES Item 1.j The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a GAC consensus may only be rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
Kind regards,
Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação Ministério das Relações Exteriores T: +55 61 2030-6609
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