Fwd: draft NCSG accountability statement
Hello all. The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes. I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it. - Evan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu Dear All I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference Regards Cintra Sooknanan DRAFT Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan v.03 The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on “Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN. A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay. NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staff’s assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal. At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders. Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability structures being circular and lacking independence. We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved. An advisor’s role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable. On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-crocker-...
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56
I agree with your argument. The statement would have my vote. Maureen -----Original Message----- From: alac-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org [mailto:alac-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Evan Leibovitch Sent: Monday, 11 August 2014 10:13 p.m. To: ICANN ALAC list Subject: [ALAC] Fwd: draft NCSG accountability statement Hello all. The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes. I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it. - Evan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu Dear All I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference Regards Cintra Sooknanan DRAFT Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan v.03 The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on “Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN. A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay. NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staff’s assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal. At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders. Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability structures being circular and lacking independence. We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved. An advisor’s role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable. On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-cr ocker-31jul14-en.pdf
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Hi Evan I share the sentiments. However, the statement itself is repetitive and, in being so, unnecessarily unpleasant. The basic comment is that staff have not provided a synthesis of comments. There may be a dozen reasons why it hasn’t been done, so let’s not assume they are all involved in a conspiracy, and give them the benefit of the doubt - and just ask them to do what they do all the time, saying that the issue is now on the table and it would be really to gather what has already been said - with thanks for their help. We can be firmer if the summary still isn’t provided. The reason - from the ALAC perspective - must be that we will be working on input into the ICANN consideration of the issue and want to understand what work has already been done. That said, we need to start work on some basic documentation for the accountability task of the FCWG. See - we really do need the stuff Holly On 12 Aug 2014, at 6:13 pm, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Hello all.
The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes.
I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it.
- Evan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear All
I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference
Regards
Cintra Sooknanan
DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan v.03
The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on “Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN.
A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.
NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staff’s assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal.
At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders.
Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability structures being circular and lacking independence.
We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved.
An advisor’s role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable.
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-crocker-...
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada
Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
I agree with Holly. I can be shortened somehow. I can agree with the statement. -ed On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:14 AM, Holly Raiche <h.raiche@internode.on.net> wrote:
Hi Evan
I share the sentiments. However, the statement itself is repetitive and, in being so, unnecessarily unpleasant. The basic comment is that staff have not provided a synthesis of comments. There may be a dozen reasons why it hasn’t been done, so let’s not assume they are all involved in a conspiracy, and give them the benefit of the doubt - and just ask them to do what they do all the time, saying that the issue is now on the table and it would be really to gather what has already been said - with thanks for their help. We can be firmer if the summary still isn’t provided.
The reason - from the ALAC perspective - must be that we will be working on input into the ICANN consideration of the issue and want to understand what work has already been done.
That said, we need to start work on some basic documentation for the accountability task of the FCWG.
See - we really do need the stuff
Holly
On 12 Aug 2014, at 6:13 pm, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Hello all.
The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes.
I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it.
- Evan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear All
I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference
Regards
Cintra Sooknanan
DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan v.03
The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on “Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN.
A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.
NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staff’s assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal.
At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders.
Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability structures being circular and lacking independence.
We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved.
An advisor’s role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable.
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-crocker-...
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada
Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
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I share many of Holly's concerns with the specific wording. I do believe that we need an "official" mechanism, one that, IF they can come to closure on recommendation, binds ICANN to act. I have some problems with the proposed schema, but parts of it can be fixed (such as the Board not naming advisors, but proposing names, and those advisors being bound to advise not decide). I do believe that we ultimately need a relatively small group to draft something. One of the problems AND strengths of the multi-stakeholder model is that not all stakeholders agree with each other. That's why we need them all involved. But it also means that compromises will be needed to get agreement. That is VERY hard to do in a very large group. As an example, Evan has asked why the proposal calls for 7 people from each AC/SO and 16 from the GNSO. I cannot speak to the specific numbers, but the overall answer is that the disparate parts of the GNSO have claimed (and apparently convincingly to some) that the SGs are so different from each other that they each need to be able to speak with their own voice. I am not defending the outcome, just illustrating the differences going into the process. That time is flying by and we have no action is without doubt true. Olivier - when is the next AC/SO leaders call scheduled? If they are going to publish the MP3 and transcript, what is the rationale for not allowing us to listen in real time? Alan At 12/08/2014 08:14 AM, Holly Raiche wrote:
Hi Evan
I share the sentiments. However, the statement itself is repetitive and, in being so, unnecessarily unpleasant. The basic comment is that staff have not provided a synthesis of comments. There may be a dozen reasons why it hasnt been done, so lets not assume they are all involved in a conspiracy, and give them the benefit of the doubt - and just ask them to do what they do all the time, saying that the issue is now on the table and it would be really to gather what has already been said - with thanks for their help. We can be firmer if the summary still isnt provided.
The reason - from the ALAC perspective - must be that we will be working on input into the ICANN consideration of the issue and want to understand what work has already been done.
That said, we need to start work on some basic documentation for the accountability task of the FCWG.
See - we really do need the stuff
Holly
On 12 Aug 2014, at 6:13 pm, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Hello all.
The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes.
I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it.
- Evan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear All
I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference
Regards
Cintra Sooknanan
DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staffs Accountability Plan v.03
The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staffs non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on Enhancing Accountability at ICANN.
A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.
NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staffs proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staffs assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal.
At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANNs accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staffs proposal, including its basis in the communitys stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANNs bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders.
Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANNs accountability structures being circular and lacking independence.
We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved.
An advisors role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable.
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-crocker-...
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada
Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
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Thanks Evan for sharing this draft. I agree with Holly. Fatimata On Aug 12, 2014 11:39 AM, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
I share many of Holly's concerns with the specific wording.
I do believe that we need an "official" mechanism, one that, IF they can come to closure on recommendation, binds ICANN to act.
I have some problems with the proposed schema, but parts of it can be fixed (such as the Board not naming advisors, but proposing names, and those advisors being bound to advise not decide).
I do believe that we ultimately need a relatively small group to draft something. One of the problems AND strengths of the multi-stakeholder model is that not all stakeholders agree with each other. That's why we need them all involved. But it also means that compromises will be needed to get agreement. That is VERY hard to do in a very large group. As an example, Evan has asked why the proposal calls for 7 people from each AC/SO and 16 from the GNSO. I cannot speak to the specific numbers, but the overall answer is that the disparate parts of the GNSO have claimed (and apparently convincingly to some) that the SGs are so different from each other that they each need to be able to speak with their own voice. I am not defending the outcome, just illustrating the differences going into the process.
That time is flying by and we have no action is without doubt true.
Olivier - when is the next AC/SO leaders call scheduled? If they are going to publish the MP3 and transcript, what is the rationale for not allowing us to listen in real time?
Alan
At 12/08/2014 08:14 AM, Holly Raiche wrote:
Hi Evan
I share the sentiments. However, the statement itself is repetitive and, in being so, unnecessarily unpleasant. The basic comment is that staff have not provided a synthesis of comments. There may be a dozen reasons why it hasn’t been done, so let’s not assume they are all involved in a conspiracy, and give them the benefit of the doubt - and just ask them to do what they do all the time, saying that the issue is now on the table and it would be really to gather what has already been said - with thanks for their help. We can be firmer if the summary still isn’t provided.
The reason - from the ALAC perspective - must be that we will be working on input into the ICANN consideration of the issue and want to understand what work has already been done.
That said, we need to start work on some basic documentation for the accountability task of the FCWG.
See - we really do need the stuff
Holly
On 12 Aug 2014, at 6:13 pm, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Hello all.
The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes.
I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it.
- Evan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear All
I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference
Regards
Cintra Sooknanan
DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan v.03
The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on “Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN.
A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.
NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staff’s assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal.
At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders.
Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability structures being circular and lacking independence.
We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved.
An advisor’s role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable.
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org
wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/ thune-rubio-to-crocker-31jul14-en.pdf
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada
Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
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I agree the statement could do with some tightening up, but ALAC wordsmiths are good at putting ideas down tactfully and succinctly. -----Original Message----- From: alac-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org [mailto:alac-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Holly Raiche Sent: Tuesday, 12 August 2014 2:15 a.m. To: Evan Leibovitch Cc: ICANN ALAC list Subject: Re: [ALAC] Fwd: draft NCSG accountability statement Hi Evan I share the sentiments. However, the statement itself is repetitive and, in being so, unnecessarily unpleasant. The basic comment is that staff have not provided a synthesis of comments. There may be a dozen reasons why it hasnt been done, so lets not assume they are all involved in a conspiracy, and give them the benefit of the doubt - and just ask them to do what they do all the time, saying that the issue is now on the table and it would be really to gather what has already been said - with thanks for their help. We can be firmer if the summary still isnt provided. The reason - from the ALAC perspective - must be that we will be working on input into the ICANN consideration of the issue and want to understand what work has already been done. That said, we need to start work on some basic documentation for the accountability task of the FCWG. See - we really do need the stuff Holly On 12 Aug 2014, at 6:13 pm, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Hello all.
The following is the current draft of the NCSG statement on the current ICANN Accountability processes.
I ask my fellow At-Largers to read and consider this statement; I would like to suggest ALAC's endorsing it.
- Evan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cintra Sooknanan <cintra.sooknanan@gmail.com> Date: 11 August 2014 17:54 Subject: Re: draft NCSG accountability statement To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear All
I have made some edits to the google doc mostly tightening up the language. Updated text is posted below for your ease of reference
Regards
Cintra Sooknanan
DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staffs Accountability Plan v.03
The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the ICANN Staffs non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on Enhancing Accountability at ICANN.
A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability and transparency mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had not been taken into account in the development of this proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability discussions. Over a month ago, staff assured it was working on this during GNSO Council and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.
NCSG reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal. It is impossible to know where the components of staffs proposal come from and on what basis they are called for, without being privy to staffs assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find those elements in the written comments to effectively evaluate the proposal.
At a time when the world is indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANNs accountability crisis; to skip the step of providing the rationale for staffs proposal, including its basis in the communitys stakeholder comments, seems imprudent at best. From its inception, the community should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th hour. This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter to ICANNs bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of the stakeholders.
Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support it as currently drafted. Of particular concern is the proposed Community Coordination Group (CCG), which would prioritize issues identified by the community and build solutions for those issues. As proposed by staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff and as such it replicates the problem of ICANNs accountability structures being circular and lacking independence.
We reiterate that given the overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would fill a large number of the seats on the CCG. It is also unclear on what basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as representatives of community members. Outside experts are welcome and can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to the community not the board or staff, for independent accountability to be achieved.
An advisors role must be clarified as an informational role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process. It is also necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in a non-decision making, support or liaison function. For the CCG to have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN board and staff. The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by the community for this proposal to be acceptable.
On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 5:38 PM, Carlos Raul Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org> wrote:
Thune & Rubio certainly deserve a place in the Accountability discussion!
Enviado desde mi iPad
_________________________ email carlosraul@gutierrez.se skype carlos.raulg cel +506 8335 2487 home +506 4000 2000
Apartado 1571-1000 San jose COSTA RICA
El 11/08/2014, a las 10:23, Edward Morris <emorris@MILK.TOAST.NET> escribió:
Hi Avri,
Thanks for doing this.
Would it be possible to insert the word "transparency" in the document somewhere? I'd suggest here:
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own accountability *and transparency* mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
but anywhere is fine. The important thing is to keep the concept alive, and the concept of accountability broad.
I'll note that the Thune-Rubio letter that so concerned Mr. Chehade:
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/thune-rubio-to-c rocker-31jul14-en.pdf
calls for a FOIA type mechanism at ICANN. In debating accountability structures I don't want to lose sight of the fact that accountability without transparency is impossible.
Thanks,
Ed
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada
Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56 _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committe e+(ALAC)
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA C)
My own take -- repeated from comments on the NARALO call -- is that the cause for the current mess is neither malice nor incompetence on the part of ICANN management. ICANN's staffers are generally intelligent people who do not seek actively to put down the community. Having said that, I think that we have clear and ongoing evidence that the ICANN bureaucracy -- especially at the highest levels -- have never understood the imperative to fully engage stakeholders at the bottom of the pyramid. This is especially true regarding those stakeholders upon whom ICANN is not directly dependent for revenue. Fundamental misunderstanding of the global public's needs from ICANN has led to a top down approach, because staff simply does not have (and has never really had) any idea how to do it otherwise. Until now, ICANN has been able to brush aside such difficulty thanks to an active domain industry and a relatively low profile. With the massive gTLD expansion causing so many unanticipated policy problems and the coming globalization of the IANA stewardship, that low profile is gone. The response has been an attempt to manage a community whose importance, and whose needs, ICANN has traditionally been able to ignore. Legally, ICANN is a California nonprofit whose Directors have a fiduciary duty to ... ICANN. Functionally, however, it acts as a global regulator and manager of a critical Internet resource; since it is not a treaty organization or recognized regulatory agency, it must perform its work through contracts and allocations while banning internal use of the "R" word. These contracts and allocations have been driven by policy development which, while superficially multi-stakeholder, has been dominated by self-interested parties (registries, their agents and commodity domain traders) which have now essentially made ICANN's financial health dependent on theirs. This friction ... between ICANN's professed duty to serve the public and its internal duty to serve the industry which is its majority revenue source ... is IMO at the heart of its staff's inability to accommodate what are in fact multiple different (and quite divergent) "community" accountability needs. Indeed, it is my observation that the needs of the domain industry are quite different from those of the public interest; all we really agree upon is that the current process is unworkable. The current tinkering does not address the core problems and IMO is incapable of producing a result that satisfies the ICANN accountability needs required to serve the global public interest. While I agree with the NCSG statement in its identification of the problems in the current staff proposal, I am increasingly pessimistic about the ability of *any* process that is designed and managed by an ICANN bureaucracy that has its own self-interest in the outcome, and still does not grasp the true global responsibility at hand. I am trying to come up with an alternative but will hold back further comment until the next SO/AC meeting later this week. - Evan
Hi Evan I largely agree with this. ALAC is very much a late comer to the ICANN structure and as long as all that we want is tweaking around the edges to make things more user friendly, it can be accommodated. But I think we are asking ICANN - indeed the whole transition process is asking ICANN - to step back and look at the structure. The easy answer - and one that, in the end may be accepted, is that the ASO and all of its structures within - work well and can managed the really fundamental tasks of numbering and routing. The real issues lie with the names - the growing number of them - and how to manage that in a way that has, as its core (not on the periphery) users. The accountability piece fits in there - which is why it fits so nicely into the FCWG - and why it will be soooo difficult. That said, the immediate task is to have the comments summarised. Which brings us back to the letter - which I think we all support in principle, so it’s a matter both of wording and maybe a direct approach, explaining that the FCWG will be dealing with the accountability issue, and does not want to reinvent the wheel, so could we please, have a summary. Does that work for you? Holly On 13 Aug 2014, at 6:32 am, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
My own take -- repeated from comments on the NARALO call -- is that the cause for the current mess is neither malice nor incompetence on the part of ICANN management.
ICANN's staffers are generally intelligent people who do not seek actively to put down the community. Having said that, I think that we have clear and ongoing evidence that the ICANN bureaucracy -- especially at the highest levels -- have never understood the imperative to fully engage stakeholders at the bottom of the pyramid. This is especially true regarding those stakeholders upon whom ICANN is not directly dependent for revenue. Fundamental misunderstanding of the global public's needs from ICANN has led to a top down approach, because staff simply does not have (and has never really had) any idea how to do it otherwise.
Until now, ICANN has been able to brush aside such difficulty thanks to an active domain industry and a relatively low profile. With the massive gTLD expansion causing so many unanticipated policy problems and the coming globalization of the IANA stewardship, that low profile is gone. The response has been an attempt to manage a community whose importance, and whose needs, ICANN has traditionally been able to ignore.
Legally, ICANN is a California nonprofit whose Directors have a fiduciary duty to ... ICANN. Functionally, however, it acts as a global regulator and manager of a critical Internet resource; since it is not a treaty organization or recognized regulatory agency, it must perform its work through contracts and allocations while banning internal use of the "R" word. These contracts and allocations have been driven by policy development which, while superficially multi-stakeholder, has been dominated by self-interested parties (registries, their agents and commodity domain traders) which have now essentially made ICANN's financial health dependent on theirs.
This friction ... between ICANN's professed duty to serve the public and its internal duty to serve the industry which is its majority revenue source ... is IMO at the heart of its staff's inability to accommodate what are in fact multiple different (and quite divergent) "community" accountability needs. Indeed, it is my observation that the needs of the domain industry are quite different from those of the public interest; all we really agree upon is that the current process is unworkable. The current tinkering does not address the core problems and IMO is incapable of producing a result that satisfies the ICANN accountability needs required to serve the global public interest.
While I agree with the NCSG statement in its identification of the problems in the current staff proposal, I am increasingly pessimistic about the ability of *any* process that is designed and managed by an ICANN bureaucracy that has its own self-interest in the outcome, and still does not grasp the true global responsibility at hand. I am trying to come up with an alternative but will hold back further comment until the next SO/AC meeting later this week.
- Evan
If they would consider Evans draft, I would be happy to endorse. Can we approach them with this, and suggest changes in exchange for our support? Regards, Raf On 13 Aug 2014, at 00:36, Holly Raiche <h.raiche@internode.on.net> wrote:
Hi Evan
I largely agree with this.
ALAC is very much a late comer to the ICANN structure and as long as all that we want is tweaking around the edges to make things more user friendly, it can be accommodated. But I think we are asking ICANN - indeed the whole transition process is asking ICANN - to step back and look at the structure. The easy answer - and one that, in the end may be accepted, is that the ASO and all of its structures within - work well and can managed the really fundamental tasks of numbering and routing. The real issues lie with the names - the growing number of them - and how to manage that in a way that has, as its core (not on the periphery) users. The accountability piece fits in there - which is why it fits so nicely into the FCWG - and why it will be soooo difficult.
That said, the immediate task is to have the comments summarised. Which brings us back to the letter - which I think we all support in principle, so it’s a matter both of wording and maybe a direct approach, explaining that the FCWG will be dealing with the accountability issue, and does not want to reinvent the wheel, so could we please, have a summary.
Does that work for you?
Holly
On 13 Aug 2014, at 6:32 am, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
My own take -- repeated from comments on the NARALO call -- is that the cause for the current mess is neither malice nor incompetence on the part of ICANN management.
ICANN's staffers are generally intelligent people who do not seek actively to put down the community. Having said that, I think that we have clear and ongoing evidence that the ICANN bureaucracy -- especially at the highest levels -- have never understood the imperative to fully engage stakeholders at the bottom of the pyramid. This is especially true regarding those stakeholders upon whom ICANN is not directly dependent for revenue. Fundamental misunderstanding of the global public's needs from ICANN has led to a top down approach, because staff simply does not have (and has never really had) any idea how to do it otherwise.
Until now, ICANN has been able to brush aside such difficulty thanks to an active domain industry and a relatively low profile. With the massive gTLD expansion causing so many unanticipated policy problems and the coming globalization of the IANA stewardship, that low profile is gone. The response has been an attempt to manage a community whose importance, and whose needs, ICANN has traditionally been able to ignore.
Legally, ICANN is a California nonprofit whose Directors have a fiduciary duty to ... ICANN. Functionally, however, it acts as a global regulator and manager of a critical Internet resource; since it is not a treaty organization or recognized regulatory agency, it must perform its work through contracts and allocations while banning internal use of the "R" word. These contracts and allocations have been driven by policy development which, while superficially multi-stakeholder, has been dominated by self-interested parties (registries, their agents and commodity domain traders) which have now essentially made ICANN's financial health dependent on theirs.
This friction ... between ICANN's professed duty to serve the public and its internal duty to serve the industry which is its majority revenue source ... is IMO at the heart of its staff's inability to accommodate what are in fact multiple different (and quite divergent) "community" accountability needs. Indeed, it is my observation that the needs of the domain industry are quite different from those of the public interest; all we really agree upon is that the current process is unworkable. The current tinkering does not address the core problems and IMO is incapable of producing a result that satisfies the ICANN accountability needs required to serve the global public interest.
While I agree with the NCSG statement in its identification of the problems in the current staff proposal, I am increasingly pessimistic about the ability of *any* process that is designed and managed by an ICANN bureaucracy that has its own self-interest in the outcome, and still does not grasp the true global responsibility at hand. I am trying to come up with an alternative but will hold back further comment until the next SO/AC meeting later this week.
- Evan
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
participants (7)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Eduardo Diaz -
Evan Leibovitch -
Fatimata Seye Sylla -
Holly Raiche -
Maureen Hilyard -
Raf Fatani