On 19 March 2010 11:21, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
At 19/03/2010 10:57 AM, you wrote:
I am thinking that my presence here would merely be bouncing the rubble. I know of situations where the registry also act as registrar even as it appoints registrars. It is often times a size-appropriate response but undeniably, it is a business decision. I cannot see a threat to user interest here and no compelling reason for an intervention.
It is not clear what is meant by "intervention". There is a sort of status quo where cross-ownership is not allowed. Staff suggested moving away from this in DAGv2. The economic study used to at least partially justify it has been faulted by many. Based on community feedback, the proposal was withdrawn in DAGv3.
Well, we as ALAC have the ability to at least request to reinstate it. Even the term 'cross ownership' is bothersome to me. It infers that the two functions require functional separation, and the issue is one of ownership. This would seem to preclude a tightly integrated single system which has the opportunity to pass cost savings to end-users. In the Ryanair model, there is no "cross-ownership" between airline and travel agent ... there is no separate travel agent.
For better or worse, being allowed do pick and chose among accredited registrars is counter the GNSO nGTLD recommendation 19 and I do not bleeive that this is on the table at this point.
Yes, we get that. Would one expect any less from a GNSO is 50% made up of contracted parties that have a vested interest in the status quo and preventing newcomers from innovating with new models? Add that together with representation from domainer registrants, and you have a perpetual obstacle to innovation. There is a deep structural conflict of interest within ICANN in allowing the contracted parties such a huge say in how ICANN makes policy regarding its relationship with these same contracted parties. In the meantime, Alan, I thought that ALAC was deliberately placed outside the bounds of GNSO, in part so it could reflect on the public interest (or lack thereof) inherent in GNSO recommendations? Either ICANN considers community response to its traditional processes or it doesn't.
There are certainly some cases where elimination of separation is an easy decision. Registries which may only have a small number of second-level domains, or who do not sell them but distribute them without charge seem to fall into this category.
I repeatedly see opinions that suggest that the elimination of separation is OK so long as the registry doesn't get too big. This would seem to another impediment to innovation. If a registry has a direct model and is really successful at it, must it be punished by then being forced to sell through registrars? This sounds more like a cartel every day.
On the other side, there was a wild out-cry when some registrars started front-running (registering a domain when someone had just done query on it). This practice has largely been eliminated as a unplanned consequence of the domain tasting PDP (front-running used the AGP). If a registrar is wholly owned by a registry (or vice-versa), front-running would again be possible - there would be a charge on the books of the registrar and a credit for the registry, but spanning both organizations, it is revenue-neutral - when registrar X inquires about a domain on behalf of a user, the registry knows, and it's captive registrar can take action.
The problem here is still front-running, not cross-ownership. And so long as there is sufficient competition amongst TLDs, those who engage in such practise will suffer in favour of those who don't. It is ICANN's own policies that are keeping .COM so dominant. ... then it over-reacts to a monopoly situation that simply need not exist. But it serves the existing players well. - Evan