The first well known incident of the vulnerability was reported back in 1997 when Eugene Kashpureff hijacked the Internic web site.
Kashpureff used a different BIND security hole that involved putting fake data in the "additional" section of genuine DNS responses. It was unrelated to the sequence guessing bug.
Now if you know anything about UDP and DNS you will know the problem is the way random ports are assigned. It was easy for an attacker to guess the port number.
Bernstein identified the security issue of non-random UDP port and sequence numbers and distributed a fix with his djbdns in about 1999, but Kaminsky made an important modification that reduced the time needed for an attack by orders of magnitude. I suppose the difference might not be evident to people who aren't familiar with some of the subtle details of the DNS.
In fact I can go further and say that the issue was mainly ignored by all the experts.
You can certainly say whatever you want. R's, John